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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
DEVELOPMENT DIVIDE
MargaretChon*

"The ends and means of development require examination and
scrutiny for a fuller understanding of the development process; it is
simply not adequate to take as our basic objective just the maximization
of income or wealth, which is, as Aristotle noted, 'merely useful and for
the sake of something else.' For the same reason, economic growth
cannot sensibly be treated as an end in itself. Development has to be
more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we
enjoy."
-Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom'

"

*

Professor and Dean's Distinguished Scholar, Seattle University School of Law.

This Article was incubated in various venues, including the Pacific Intellectual Property
Scholars (PIPS) Conference (2003 and 2005), the Pacific Northwest Center for Health Law and
Policy Conference on Corporate Health Care and Governance in the Health Care Marketplace
(2004); the Michigan State University Conference on Intellectual Property, Sustainable
Development and Endangered Species: Understanding the Dynamics of the Information
Ecosystem (2004); the University of Oregon Wayne Morse Center Conference on Malthus,
Mendel and Monsanto: Intellectual Property and the Law and Politics of the Global Food Supply
(2004); the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting Roundtable on Intellectual Property and
Globalization (2004); the Pacific Northwest Center for Health Law and Policy Conference on
Global Health & Justice: Paradigms for Multidisciplinary Collaboration (2005); and the
University of California Davis Faculty Speaker series (2005).
Many thanks to everyone who made helpful comments at these conferences, and on drafts
of this paper, including Donna Arzt, Mark Chinen, Graeme Dinwoodie, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Brett
Frischmann, James Gathii, Daniel Gervais, Renee Giovarelli, Laurence Helfer, Jessica Litman,
Doris Long, Lydia Loren and all the other PIPS participants, Tayyab Mahmud, Bob Menanteaux,
Ruth Okediji, David Skover, Ron Slye, Madhavi Sunder and Peter Yu. I particularly want to
thank Keith Aoki for his constant encouragement, cheerful friendship and model minority
inspiration, without which this Article would have remained dormant. Reference librarians Kerry
Fitz-Gerald and Bob Menanteaux, as well as research assistants Jennifer Dinning, Class of 2006,
and Kateryna Mogulevska, Class of 2007, were extremely helpful and I owe them a big debt of
gratitude. Finally, I thank Dean Kellye Testy and Associate Dean Annette Clark who provided
the institutional support that enabled me to complete this longstanding project.
This Article is dedicated to my children, Nicholai Chon Diamond and Chloe Chon
Diamond.
I AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14 (1999).

2821

2822

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27:6

"Americans spend more on cosmetics than it would cost to provide
basic education to the two billion people in the world who lack schools,
and Europeans spend more on ice cream than it would cost to provide
water and sanitation to those in need. .. ."
-Richard Peet with Elaine Hardwick, Theories of Development2
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INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS EQUALITY IN GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

In the early twenty-first century, the concept of intellectual
property is beginning to encounter insistently the concept of
development. These recent interactions, occurring within the context of

2 RICHARD PEET WITH ELAINE HARTWICK, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT 7 (1999).
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accelerating globalization, have renewed questions about the
fundamental purpose of intellectual property. Indeed, one leading
observer has noted the absence of any explicit overarching principle or
policy of international intellectual property. 3 This has led to a
consensus among many scholars of growing and dangerous
asymmetries 4 in intellectual property norm-setting and interpretation
occurring in multilateral and bilateral activities across the world.
Intellectual property, while purporting to heed the issues of
development, often runs rough-shod over the central concerns of
development.
This Article attempts to map the challenges raised by these
encounters between intellectual property and development. It proposes
a normative principle of global intellectual property-one that is
responsive to development paradigms that have moved far beyond
simple utilitarian measures of social welfare. Recent insights from the
field of development economics suggest strongly that intellectual
property should include a substantive equality principle, measuring its
welfare-generating outcomes not only by economic growth but also by
distributional effects. This new principle of substantive equality is a
necessary corollary to the formal equality principles of national
treatment and minimum standards that are now imposed on virtually all
countries regardless of their level of development.
It has only been approximately ten years since the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) entered into force as a
part of the world trading system administered through the World Trade
Organization (WTO).5 Yet in that short period, TRIPS has effected a
3 Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 819, 888 (2003) [hereinafter Okediji, Public Welfare].
4 CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 5-6 (2000) (listing "North-South

Asymmetries" including a negligible proportion of developing countries' world R&D
expenditures, patents and trade in medium and high technology goods); see also Paul J. Heald,
Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS
International relations specialists use the term
Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249 (2003).
"asymmetry" to refer to an imbalance in power and resources between developed and developing
countries. See Robert 0. Keohane, Comment: Norms, Institutions, and Cooperation, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 65, 65-66 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds.,
2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS]:

Power is distributed in a highly asymmetrical fashion. The United States, the
European Union, and to a lesser extent, large, rich states such as Japan have a great
deal of influence in the World Trade Organization (WTO), in the stipulation and
implementation of the TRIPS agreement, and in domains not regulated by international
institutions. Small, poor states have little influence: They are "policy-takers," rather
than "policy-shapers."
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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tectonic shift in the landscape of intellectual property law. The
emergence of the WTO/TRIPS framework has also spurred longstanding international intellectual property law institutions, such as the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), into greater activity. 6
I will call this recent historical phenomenon "intellectual property
globalization, '7 recognizing of course that forms of international
intellectual property mechanisms existed prior to the turn of this
8
millennium.
Intellectual property globalization has been a fertile period for
generating new insight into the concept of intellectual property. For
example, there is new empirical evidence measuring the actual impact
of intellectual property laws on rates of innovation and economic
6 See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 65 (1997); World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997). See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
InternationalIntellectualProperty Law System: New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 98
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 213 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, PropertyLaw System] (describing
WIPO's efforts to reinvent itself in the aftermath of the World Trade Organization).
7 Used primarily outside of law, "globalization" is a complex term that made its first
appearance in the late twentieth century. Sociologist Anthony Giddens characterizes it as 'the
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local
happenings are shaped by the events occurring many miles away and vice versa." ANTHONY
GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 64 (1990). While there is no set definition,
globalization is frequently invoked to describe this intense interconnectedness across different
realms including communications, economics (in particular, financial markets), geography as well
as political and social systems. See, e.g., WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL
THEORY 4 (2000) (defining globalization as a process that "tends to create and consolidate a
unified world economy, a single ecological system, and a complex network of communications
that covers the whole globe"). As discussed in depth in this Article, globalization is increasingly
characterized (or perhaps driven) by pervasive marketization and trade, a process that is overseen
by the three Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), consisting of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (also known as the World Bank), the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
8 See Ruth L. Okediji, The InternationalRelations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of
Developing Country Participationin the Global IntellectualProperty System, 7 SING. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 315, 320-41 (2003) (describing various multilateral regimes preceding TRIPS).
Various international law scholars are beginning to advocate a "law and globalization" model of
analysis vis-A-vis traditional international law, in which legal analysis shifts away from nationstates and towards transnational norm-generating activity.
See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia,
Globalizationand the Theory of InternationalLaw (Boston College Law School, Legal Studies
Research
Paper
Series,
Research
Paper
No.
75,
2005),
available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=742726 (arguing for a recasting of international law away from a society
of states model and toward a global society model); Paul Schiff Berman, From InternationalLaw
to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 489 (2005) (arguing for an
expanded "law and globalization" framework that situates cross-border norm development at the
intersection of various areas of law and disciplines, to "afford a more nuanced idea of how people
actually form affiliations, construct communities, and receive and develop legal norms"). This
conceptual shift is becoming apparent also in the area of intellectual property. See, e.g., Peter
Drahos, An Alternative Frameworkfor the Global Regulation of Intellectual Property Rights 21
AUS. J. DEV. STUD. 44 (2005) [hereinafter Drahos, An Alternative Framework] (contrasting pre1995 period of sovereignty to post- 1995 period of globalization and advocating nodal governance
approach to generating global intellectual property norms).
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growth, a key justification for the regulatory intervention into the public
goods problem that intellectual property represents. 9 This inquiry has

been characterized in the past more by conjecture than hard data.' 0
Moreover, the crisis over access to patented antiretroviral drugs has

recently injected human rights and social justice debate into a field
dominated by commercial instrumentalism and economic rationales,
and given intellectual property a reason to reconsider its welfare

generating justification.II
However, when intellectual property globalization encounters
development, even in debates that prominently feature development
concerns, dysphoria ensues.
This is true even though the term
"development" features prominently in the basic legal texts that
purportedly address differentials among disparately-situated member
states in an otherwise formally equal global intellectual property

system.

For example,

the TRIPS

Agreement references

the

"developmental... objectives" of all member states as well as member
states' ability to "adopt measures necessary to protect public health and

nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital

12
importance to their socio-economic and technological development.'
And, an agreement between the United Nations and WIPO also refers to
the latter being
a specialized agency [within the UN] and as being responsible for
taking appropriate action in accordance with its basic instrument,

9 See, e.g.,

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT:

LESSONS

FROM RECENT

ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005) (collecting recent World
Bank analyses); Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatizationof Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS, supra note 4, at 3, 13; KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE

GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000) (analyzing recent literature on the economic effect of TRIPS on least
developed countries (LDCs)); see also Paul J. Heald, Misreadinga Canonical Work: An Analysis
of Mansfield's 1994 Study, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 309 (2003).
10 COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 17-18 (2002) [hereinafter CIPR REPORT], available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/finalreport.htm (Box 1.2 quoting various
economists skeptical of the value of intellectual property, such as Edith Penrose, Fritz Machlup,
Lester Thurow and Jeffrey Sachs).
II See generally infra Section I.C. See also James Thuo Gathii, The Structural Power of
Strong PharmaceuticalPatent Protection in the U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
267 (2003); Oxfam, Priced Out of Reach: How WTO Patent Policies Will Reduce Access to
Medicines in the Developing World, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we-do/issues/health/
bp04_priced.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2006); OXFAM, GENERIC COMPETITION, PRICE AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES: THE CASE OF ANTIRETROVIRAL IN UGANDA (July 10, 2002), available
at http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp0207 10_no26 generic competition briefing-paper.pdf.
12 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 8 (emphasis added). In addition, the Preamble refers to the
"special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the
domestic implementation of laws." Id. at pmbl. As discussed in further detail below in Section
IA, infra, TRIPS Article 7's list of objectives state that "[t]he protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation.., in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare." Id. at art. 7.
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treaties and agreements administered by it, inter alia, for promoting
creative intellectual activity and for facilitating the transfer of
technology related to industrial property to the developing countries
13
in order to accelerate economic, social and culturaldevelopment.

Yet arguably, while the impact of intellectual property
globalization on the relative well-being of developing countries
compared to developed countries 14 has been discussed in the specific
13 Agreement between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property Organization
art. 1, Dec. 17, 1974 [hereinafter UN-WIPO Agreement], available at http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/agreement/index.html; see also Convention Establishing the World Intellectual
Property Organization,
13(1), July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 848 U.N.T.S. 3. The WIPO
Convention was amended on October 2, 1979, and entered into force on June 1, 1984. See
generally James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9.
14 This Article will frequently contrast developing countries with developed countries. In the
WTO framework, "developing countries" self-identify themselves as such, subject to challenges
from other countries. See World Trade Organization, Who are the Developing Countries in the
WTO?, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/devel e/dlwhoe.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
Generally, however, this term refers to
poor... nations, using criteria based almost exclusively on per capita income.
The... countries in this group include states which are variously labeled as developing
countries, underdeveloped countries, low-income countries, Majority World, the South
or the Third World. These nations generally have low levels of technology, basic
living standards and little in the way of an industrial base. Their economies are mainly
agricultural and are characterized by cheap, unskilled labour and a scarcity of
investment capital. Per capita incomes are below $5000 and often less than $1500.
Around 70% of the world's population live in the developing countries, almost all of
which are in Africa, Asia, Oceania and Latin America.
ANDY CRUMP, THE A TO Z OF WORLD DEVELOPMENT 78-79 (Wayne Ellwood ed., 1998).
Within the WTO, "developing countries" are contrasted to "least developed countries"
(LDCs), the latter category being defined by the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Least Developed
Countries (LDCs), http://www.unctad.org/templates/countries.aspintltemlD=1676 (last visited
Apr. 13, 2006). Generally, however, this term refers to "poor, commodity-exporting developing
countries with little industry... [with] per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $1000 or less
(at 1970 prices); manufacturing that congtributed 10% or less of GDP; and a literacy rate of 20%
or less." CRUMP, supra, at 156.
Because LDCs are a subset of the category developing countries, I will not differentiate
LDCs from developing countries as a whole, except when the TRIPS agreement or other
international instruments discussed here refer specifically to LDCs.
"Developed countries" refers to the
northern, industrialized nations, sometimes also referred to as the "First World." The
list of developed countries varies according to the organization which is compiling the
tables. However, it almost always includes the 35 market-oriented countries of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as well as
Bermuda, Israel and South Africa. Generally, nations having a per capita income of
over $10,000 are included in the group.
Id. at 78.
As many have pointed out, there are unfortunate connotations to the terms "developed,"
"developing" and "least developed" as applied to countries in the context of a taxonomy
indicating wealth and status. See, e.g., Gustavo Esteva, Development, in THE DEVELOPMENT
DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS POWER 6, 6-25 (Wolfgang Sachs ed., 1992).
However, these terms must be used in the intellectual property litcrature if, as Professor Doris
Long points out, for no other reason than their use in relevant treaties. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra
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(and obviously important) question of access to patented
pharmaceuticals within the context of member states' rights 15 to
regulate public health, 16 there has been little inquiry (at least within the
17
U.S.) into the development concerns of many developing nations.
These concerns, expressed through the Millennium Development Goals,
are a centerpiece of the United Nations in its efforts to assure a certain
basic threshold of human material support and dignity throughout the
world. 18 Adopted in 2000, the nations of the U.N. system committed to
"eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary
education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child
mortality, improve maternal health, combat [] diseases, ensure
environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for
development," by 2015.19
And while there is a rapidly increasing body of scholarship on
protection of traditional knowledge, 20 relatively little attention has been
note 5, at arts. 65-67; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works app.,
openedfor signature Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S.
22 1; see also Doris Estelle Long, "Democratizing" Globalization: Practicing the Policies of
CulturalInclusion", 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 217, 222 n.13 (2002). Indeed part of the
project of this Article is to examine the implications of the legal use of terms that are so fraught
with unexamined non-legal meanings.
15 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) (adopted Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration] (affirming "WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to
promote access to medicines for all") (emphasis added). Note that two separate Doha Ministerial
Declarations were issued on November 14, 2001; the one referenced herein as the "Doha
Declaration" was specific to the issue of TRIPS and public health. The other, referenced herein
as the "Doha Ministerial Declaration," more generally addressed the objectives of the so-called
"Doha development round." See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) (adopted Nov. 14, 2001)
[hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration].
16 See also Decision of the General Council, Implementation of ParagraphSix of the Doha
Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter
General Council Decision], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/implem
_para6e.htm.
17 The CIPR Report, which was commissioned by the U.K. government and chaired by John
Barton, a U.S. law professor, is the most sustained academic effort to address the concept of
development. CIPR Report, supra note 10, at 8:
We therefore conclude that far more attention needs to be accorded to the needs of the
developing countries in the making of international IP policy. Consistent with the
recent decisions of the international community at Doha and Monterrey, the
development objectives need to be integrated into the making of IP rules and practice.
See also Graham Dutfield, Literature Survey on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable
Human Development (Apr. 2003), http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/GDutfield_
LiteratureSurveyOnlPApril2003.pdf.
18 UN Millennium Development Goals, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept, 18,
2000), availableat http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.html.
19 Id; see also JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY, ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR
TIME 210-25 (2005).
20 See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A TRIPSCompatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137; Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The
Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004); Peter K. Yu, Traditional
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paid to local development cultures and values outside this context.2 1
Nor, except in the context of technology transfer and technical
assistance to implement intellectual property minimum standards, has
much attention been paid to whether and how intellectual property
globalization should contribute to what some development or welfare
economists, taking a developmental ethics perspective, have called
human capability potentials, 22 culminating in the so-called human
23
development approach.
In other words, analysis of the intersection of intellectual property
and development is sector-specific, 24 absent larger guiding principles
within intellectual property that truly address the central concerns of
development. The debate over intellectual property's relationship to

Knowledge, Intellectual Propertyand Indigenous Culture: An Introduction, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 238 (2003); Shubha Ghosh, Reflections on the Traditional Knowledge Debate, II
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 497 (2003); Rosemary J. Coombe, Fear,Hope, and Longing for
the Future of Authorship and a Revitalized Public Domain in Global Regimes of Intellectual
Property, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1171 (2003) [hereinafter Coombe, Fear, Hope and Longing];
Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in
InternationalLaw Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of
Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59 (1998) [hereinafter Coombe, Intellectual
Property]; Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in
Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175 (2000); Doris Estelle Long, The
Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229 (1998); Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of
Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Propertythe Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997).
21 Notable exceptions include Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, "Piracy," Biopiracy and Borrowing:
Culture, Cultural Heritage and the Globalization of Intellectual Property (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author); Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of TraditionalKnowledge (UC Davis Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
75,
2006),
available
at
http://ssm.com/abstract-890657; Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Politics:
Playing with Fire, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 69 (2000) (analyzing relationship of intellectual
property to cultural values in India, generated by the film Fire by Deepa Mehta); Keith Aoki,
Neocolonialism,Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order
ofInternationalIntellectual PropertyProtection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 11, 13-21 (1998)
(explicitly discussing neoliberal assumptions and the inevitably politicized nature of any global
intellectual property regime); and Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, The Progress of
Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW & POL'Y 315 (1996)
(contrasting the human rights status of intellectual property rights with the right to development
and self-determination; arguing for IP systems that reflect unique socioeconomic and cultural
norms and that are consistent with development objectives).
22 See infra Section III.B.
23 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1991), available
at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1991/en/ (inaugurating new criterion of development, the
Human Development Index (HDI), which measures development through longevity, knowledge
and income sufficiency); see also MAHBUB UL HAQ, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
(1995). The UNDP's recent human development approach arguably had its genesis in the mid1970's with the International Labour Organization's "Basic Needs Approach, 'aiming at the
achievement of a certain specific minimum standard of living before the end of the century."'
Esteva, supra note 14, at 15.
24 For a recent excellent introduction to these various sectors, see Graham Dutfield,
Introduction to TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND
SUSTAINABILITY (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE].
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essential drugs 25 has not generalized into whether or how knowledge
goods, critical in meeting basic human needs (such as provision of food,
water, education and health care), are facilitated or impeded by
26
intellectual property globalization.
Of course, a growing number of intellectual property specialists are
starting to attend to intellectual property globalization in the context of
development. 27 Yet relatively few analyses so far have analyzed the
legal impact of the term "development" in the international legal
documents that refer specifically to it.28 Nor has there been a sustained
effort to link these terms to recent development literature, or to what has
29
been proposed as a human right to development.
As implemented and interpreted thus far, intellectual property
globalization seems to have incorporated the standard domestic
balancing test between protection of knowledge goods through
intellectual property and, on the other hand, access by consumers and
25 The World Health Organization (WHO) has issued a list of essential drugs, defining them
as "those drugs that represent the best balance of quality, safety, efficacy and cost for a given
health setting." World Health Organization, Medicines Strategy: Framework for Action in
EssentialDrugs and Medicines Policy 2000-03, at 7, WHO Doc. WHO/EDM/2000.1 (2000). As
Laurence Helfer describes it, the "essential drug concept has led the WHO and its member
governments to adopt lists of essential drugs as part of their national drug policies... The WHO
itself publishes a Model List of Essential Drugs and updates it every two years." Laurence R.
Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and the New Dynamic of International
Intellectual Property Law-Making, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 42 n.186 (2004) [hereinafter Heifer,
Regime Shifting].
26 As Susan K. Sell puts it:
Even if the [access to essential medicines] campaign ultimately triumphs on the
medicines issue, the rest of the agreement still locks in a commitment to intellectual
property as a system to exclude and protect. The public-regarding side of the balance
is vastly overshadowed by the private rights side of the ledger.
SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 174 (2003).
27 See infra Section I.C. for a sustained discussion. In addition to the scholars discussed
there, the aforementioned CIPR Report, supra note 10, should be included.
See also
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 4.
28 But see Maskus & Reichman, supra note 9, at 31-32; Robert Howse, The Canadian
Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 493, 502 (2002); Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note 3, at 914:
A particularly revealing aspect of these disputes is the way each of the Panels and the
Appellate Body have ducked the thorny question of how to apply the preambular
statements and the broad themes of Article 7 and 8 to evaluate the substantive
obligations of the TRIPS Agreement. While tribunals can use strict construction to
constrict or expand the requirements of TRIPS, the vagueness of these general
qualifications in Articles 7 and 8 will likely lead to a one-way ratchet of rights.
See also L. Danielle Tully, Prospects for Progress: The TRIPS Agreement and Developing
Countries After the Doha Conference, 26 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 129, 139 n.78 (2003)
(citing developing country proposals regarding Articles 7 and 8).
29 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex, U.N., GAOR 41st
Sess., No. 53, U.N. Doc, A/4/53 (Dec. 4, 1986); L. Amede Obiora, Beyond the Rhetoric of a
Right to Development, 18 LAW & POL'Y 355 (1996); James C.N. Paul, The Human Right to
Development: Its Meaning & Importance, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 235 (1992). But see Gana,
supra note 21, and scholarship discussed in more detail infra Section I.C.

2830

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27:6

users 30 to information embedded within these protected knowledge
goods. 3 1 This domestic balancing test-writ large on the global stageis widely acknowledged as the primary TRIPS framework even by the
developing countries whose welfare is most directly affected by the
inclusion of other criteria. 32 For all countries, this balancing test is
assumed-at least in approximate terms-to generate optimal social
welfare via the intellectual property bargain.
30 While the statutory rights of the owners of intellectual property are often referred to by
shorthand as IPRs (intellectual property rights), see infra note 280, the language of rights has not
been applied as consistently to the need of users of intellectual-property-protected goods to access
these goods for various purposes. Cf Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round 1I: Should Users
Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004) (calling for the articulation of a user right in the
context of TRIPS). See generally L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE
OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS (1991). This remains a severely under-theorized area
of intellectual property law despite the abundance of literature on the public domain and access
issues. See Margaret Chon, The Emerging Rights of Access to Knowledge (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
International human rights instruments recognize user rights at the same time that they may
also recognize intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 27, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948)
("Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the
arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits," whereas subsection two states,
"Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author."); see also Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 29, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 15,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); Paul, supra note 29, at 253 (discussing Philip Alston's criteria
for deciding on what is a new human right and characterizing human rights as a positive law
regime with post-WWII rights created out of "thin air"). However, it remains to be seen how the
mainstream human rights agencies frame and interpret user rights. See generally Laurence
Heifer, Collective Management of Copyright and Human Rights: An Uneasy Alliance in
Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 05-28, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-816984. In
this Article, I have tried to avoid using the term "right" to refer to either side of the balance.
31 TRIPS Article 7 (entitled "Objectives") places "[t]he protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights" within a framework of "mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations." TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 7(emphasis added). A leading
treatise writer on the TRIPS negotiating history has commented that
[t]he importance accorded to... Articles [7 and 8] in the Doha negotiations [on
development] is unlikely to formally change the legal status of these provisions, but
may lead a panel to take a longer look at how these provisions should be interpreted in
the context of the Agreement as a whole, especially with respect to the need for
balance.
DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 120 (2d ed.
2003) (providing negotiating history, travaux prdparatoires and comments on each Article of
TRIPS); see, e.g., Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DS 160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section 110(5) Panel Report] (interpreting Article 13's
three step test).
32 See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Submission on
TRIPS and Public Health by the African Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador,Honduras,India, Indonesia, Jamaica,Pakistan, Paraguay,Philippines,Peru,
Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, T 21, IP/C/W/296 (June 29, 2001) [hereinafter WTO,
Submission] (discussing Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS).
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I argue here that this binary analysis is overly simplistic even in the
domestic context and is radically incomplete in the global context.
Intellectual property, when it encounters development either
domestically or globally, must incorporate a more comprehensive
understanding of social welfare maximization. The title of this Article
refers to a development divide. This alludes not only to the material
divide figuring in other debates on intellectual property, 33 but also to an
unnecessary ideological divide between efficiency and distributional34
driven understandings of development.
The overall assessment of intellectual property's instrumental
goal-the promotion of "Progress," at least in the U.S. context-has
been dominated of late by the assumption that pure wealth or utilitymaximization serves adequately to evaluate social welfare. 35 Reliance
on these metrics can be explained by an analogy to a drunk looking for
his keys under a streetlight: since it is extremely difficult to measure
how intellectual property affects rates of innovation, policy-makers tend
to over-rely on rough proxies that can be measured, such as the "bottom
line" of economic growth or losses, or net trade balances or deficits.
This approach dovetails with the interests of intellectual property
industries, whose short term goals of maximizing revenue generation
are not necessarily aligned with society's long term dynamic goals of
maximizing innovation. 36 While severely problematic even in the
domestic welfare generating context, this type of crude welfare
calculation can have brutal consequences in the context of intellectual
property globalization.

33 See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Introduction to Symposium, Bridging the DigitalDivide: Equality in
the Information Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Yu, Introduction]
(describing a global digital divide in access to networked digital technology); Madeleine
Mercedes Plasencia, Telecommunications in the Twenty-First Century: Global Perspectives on
Community andDiasporaAmong Netcitizens, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (2000) (same).
34 Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the
Incorporationof the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 199, 225 (2004):
The result is a wall between the two sides of the development agenda, the effect of
which is to make the established legal framework the background condition in which
other objectives, including social objectives, must be pursued. It is as if the legal
framework of investment, production and exchange had no effect on the social and,
aside from the changes described above, the incorporation of social objectives into the
development agenda had few necessary institutional implications.
35 James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41 (2003) ("Indeed, the post-Cold War 'Washington
Consensus' is invoked to claim history teaches the only way one gets growth and efficiency is
through markets; property rights, surely, are the sine que non of markets."); see also Julie E.
Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000). See infra Section III.B.
for a detailed discussion of this claim.
36 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857 (1987).
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Over-reliance on utility-maximization ignores distributional
consequences. 37 Within domestic intellectual property policy-making,
this insight will often be met with a shrug. Equality concerns are
second order concerns to efficiency norms, if voiced at all.38 But
intellectual property globalization has made these aspects of the
39
provision of basic knowledge goods increasingly difficult to ignore.
In the parallel universe of development economics, an alternative
to raw utilitarianism in the measurement of social welfare has gained
broad consensus. The assumption that wealth or utility maximization is
the sole legitimate measure of social welfare meant that a single
economic growth indicator (i.e., gross national or gross domestic
product) was thought to suffice in the development context. But this
measure could actually miscalculate welfare: a majority of a country's
people could be living without access to the essential goods and services
required for human functioning, with a small percentage of its
population capturing a disproportionate amount of the overall wealth.
Recognizing this shortcoming in the standard welfare economics
approach, economists such as Amartya Sen began to theorize an
alternative human capability approach towards the measurement of
social welfare, which has been adopted by mainstream development
institutions. 40 Since 1991, the Human Development Index, composed of
three variables-life expectancy at birth, educational attainment, and the
standard of living measured by real per capita income4 l-has been used
annually by the United Nations Development Programme to measure
social welfare within and across nations. 42 Yet this human capability
approach, based on the idea that a society is not fully developed until
certain basic needs are provided for all of its people, has not yet
informed intellectual property globalization.
More recently within the area of development economics, others
are taking a fresh look at public goods theory. While economists have
long recognized that "most of the real economy operated in the messy
world of impure public goods" and "[t]heorising about the provision of

37 A.P. Thirlwall, Development as Economic Growth, in THE COMPANION TO DEVELOPMENT

STUDIES 41, 42 (Vandana Desai & Robert B. Potter eds., 2002).
38 Cf Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535
(2005).
39 Peter M. Gerhart, Distributive Values and InstitutionalDesign in the Provisionof Global
Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 4, at 69, 70 ("Although we
normally do not highlight this distributive question when we talk about national intellectual
property systems, it always remains relevant.").
40 SEN, supra note 1.
41 Kamal Malhotra, The Purpose of Development, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 13, 13-18 (2004)
(explaining components of the HDI); see also UL HAQ, supra note 23, at 46-66 (same).
42 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 23 (inaugurating the Human
Development Index of development that ranks health education, nutrition and employment).
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public goods has become a long story in economics," 43 a new "rubric"
of global public goods is emerging. 44 Global public goods theorists

include an enormous array of things as potential public goods. Indeed
states themselves can be viewed as public goods, as can markets and
legal regimes. 45 To one degree or another, each of these other global
public goods (like all public goods) bears the characteristics of non-

rivalry and non-exclusivity. Each also has the potential either to benefit
diverse global populations through positive spill-over effects or to
46
generate tremendous negative externalities.

Of particular significance to this Article is the concept of
international legal regimes, such as the TRIPS component of WTO, as a
type of intermediate public good, 47 potentially but not always leading to

positive global public good outcomes such as the production of more
knowledge goods.

Various other global public goods relating to the

provision of human needs are integrally entwined with knowledge
goods and, I argue here, must be analyzed in tandem with them. These
include communicable disease control, education, cultural norms and
48
even equality.
The enormous variety of items now classified as global public
goods differentiates this newer type of public goods theory from its
predecessor. Several other major points of departure exist between
standard public goods theory and the more recent approaches that selfconsciously address globalization. Global public goods theorists ask
insistently who the beneficiaries of public goods are-that is, who are
the haves and have-nots? Moreover, some theorists focus not only on
under-supply of public goods (or over-supply of public bads), but also
unequal access to global public goods. 49 These various beneficiary

43 Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra
note 4, at 46, 47.
44 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 4; GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS I]; PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION
(Inge Kaul et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS II].
45 Inge Kaul et al., Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today?, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
II, supra note 44, at 7 [hereinafter Kaul et al., Why]; Inge Kaul et al., How to Improve the
Provision of Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS II, supra note 44, at 21, 44
[hereinafter Kaul et al., How to Improve].
46 Global public goods theorists have not only expanded the number of potential public goods
that require international cooperation for adequate provision, but have also identified certain
public "bads," such as global warming, disease outbreaks or international financial instability.
These bads also have characteristics of nonrivalry and nonexclusivity. Correcting the undersupply or under-access of public goods is as important as, and is often the flip side of, coping
with these global bads. Kaul et al., How to Improve, supra note 45, at 42 (citing Desai).
47 Kaul et al., Why, supra note 45, at 11.
48 Equality is discussed at greater length infra Section IV.B.
49 Pedro Conceigao, Assessing the Provision Status of Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOODS II, supra note 44, at 152.
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questions differentiate this approach from the previous public goods
50
approach.
To the extent that development encompasses not only economic
but also cultural, social, and political dimensions of national wellbeing,5 1 a more deliberate consideration of these newer concepts in
development economics could ameliorate intellectual property's onesided emphasis on pure wealth- or utility-maximization. In the trade
context of TRIPS, this emphasis tends to favor countries with wellestablished intellectual property industries 52 and compounds a bias
towards measuring the development effects of intellectual property
solely through economic growth.5 3 The net result is an intellectual
property balance that has become increasingly lopsided in favor of
producer interests, possibly to the detriment of overall global social
welfare and clearly to the detriment of the most vulnerable populations.
Arguably, even the legitimate public health and welfare objectives
of developed countries such as the U.S. are in danger of being trumped
by the "trade utilitarianism ' 54 of the substantive provisions in TRIPS. 55
Thus, if "development analysis is relevant even for richer countries" '56
such as the U.S., then it is pertinent to whether longstanding American
doctrines such as copyright fair use can survive TRIPS Article 13's

50 Inge Kaul & Ronald U. Mendoza, Advancing the Concept of Public Goods, GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOODS 11, supra note 44, at 78, 89 ("More than the notion of public goods, the concept of
the public domain is actively and often heatedly debated.").
51 Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 29; UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF DEVELOPMENT:
TOWARDS A PRACTICAL APPROACH (1995). See generally Paul, supra note 29.
52 A recent estimate, by the World Bank, suggests that most developed countries would be the
major beneficiaries of TRIPS in terms of the enhanced value of their patents, with the benefit to
the U.S. estimated at an annual $19 billion. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2002: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR THE WORLD'S POOR 133 (cited

in the CIPR REPORT, supra note 10, at 24).
53 PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2, at 13; Esteva, supra note 14, at 12-13, 17.
54 Long, supra note 14, at 243.
55 Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COL. J. TRANS'L L. 75
(2000) [hereinafter Okediji, Toward] (arguing that the U.S. fair use provision probably flunks the
three-step test of TRIPS Article 13). But see Pamela Samuelson, Implications of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights for Cultural Dimensions of National
Copyright Laws, 23 J. CULTURAL ECON. 95, 100-03 (1999) (surmising that existing exceptions
and limitations reflecting cultural values, such as the U.S. fair use exception, may have been
grandfathered into TRIPS and therefore not violate Article 13); Stuart Macdonald, Exploring the
Hidden Costs of Patents, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS
AND DEVELOPMENT 13, 36 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) ("TRIPS has forced the
developing world to examine the patent system more deeply and thoroughly. This is something
that most firms and most governments in the developed world should have done years ago.").
56 SEN, supra note 1, at 6; see also Obiora, supra note 29, at 358 ("Development is not just
for the 'Other.' An expansive definition of development suggests that no nation has 'arrived,' so
to say."); cf. Hope Lewis, Women (Under)Development: Poor Women of Color in the United
States and the Right to Development, in GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL
READER 95 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2000).

2006]

THE DE VEL OPMENT DIVIDE

2835

three-step test. 57 The development policy space for all countries has
been constricted by minimum standards; for example, wealthy countries
such as Canada cannot maintain exceptions for early workings of
patents to promote generic competition. 58 Regardless of the differential
impact on developing as opposed to developed countries, the concept of
development has not been mapped fully for the benefit of either group
of countries.
Thus in addition to the venerable principles of national treatment
and minimum standards, 59 resulting in formal equality 60 among nations
who participate in regimes of intellectual property globalization, I
suggest that intellectual property globalization must incorporate a
principle of substantive equality. 6' Indeed this principle is arguably the
very core of a human development-driven concept of "development,"
whether expressed as heightened attention to distributional concerns, or
to the social consequences of economic growth, or as a commitment to
poverty reduction. Certain foundational capacities, whether viewed as
57 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 13 (Limitations and Exceptions: "Members shall confine
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder."). Compare Okediji, supra note 55, with Samuelson, supra note 55.
58 Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Generic
Medicines), WT/DS 114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada Panel Report]. This was not
appealed by Canada and now adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (interpreting TRIPS
Article 27.1 ("[P]atents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as
to ... the field of technology .... "), Article 28.1 ("A patent shall confer on its owner the
following exclusive rights: ... making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these
purposes that product .. ") and Article 30 ("exceptions to the exclusive rights ... do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties.")).
59 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 3; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
art. 2, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5, supra note 14.
60 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual
Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 96 (2004) (commenting on the overlyformalist interpretation of the TRIPS dispute resolution panels, resulting in "formal equality"
among states).
61 1 have previously proposed a normative equality principle in traditional knowledge
protection. See Margaret Chon & Shubha Ghosh, Joint Comment on WIPO Draft Report:
Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders (Nov. 2, 2000),
available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffmn/ffm-report-comments/msgOO008.html.
[W]e propose that the creation of an appropriate system for the protection of traditional
knowledge should be guided by the goal of empowering traditionally subordinated
groups. Since traditional knowledge is rooted in the groups that have developed such
knowledge over time, it is necessary to protect the peoples who are the source of the
knowledge. Preservation of the people entails granting and protecting fundamental
economic and non-economic rights held by the people. While acknowledging that
intellectual property law and human rights are distinct, we also recognize that they
should be guided by the same principle: protection of groups that have been typically
subordinated and on whose existence the development of intellectual property depends.
Id. (emphasis added).
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the sum of individual capabilities or as national capacities, should guide
application of the rules of intellectual property globalization. The
provision of certain global public goods must take precedence over
others. For example, the provision of basic food, health care, and
education must be prioritized over the provision of intermediate public
goods such as legal regimes that facilitate innovation through the grant
of exclusionary rights. After all, basic education and adequate health
status are prerequisites to any capacity-building for the technological
progress that is one of the biggest rationales of TRIPS. 62
The TRIPS Preamble as well as TRIPS Article 8 both reference the
key term "development," which can be interpreted to incorporate a
substantive equality norm, as evidenced by other documents such as the
U.N. Millennium Development Goals. 63 According to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, "a treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose. ' 64 The
UN-WIPO Agreement
similarly references
"development," which can be similarly incorporated throughout all of
WIPO's activities. 65 Thus, these institutions can and should manifest
the equality norm that is expressed in the broader development context
within which both organizations operate.
The proposed principle of substantive intellectual property equality
would be analogous to strict scrutiny review in the judicial context of
U.S. constitutional law. It would be foundational to any form of
intellectual property decision making. Simply put, the decision maker
should accord much less deference and exercise much more skepticism
towards the proposed government action (in this case, the regulatory
intervention by the state in the form of the grant of intellectual property
protection) in the context of the provision of a basic human
development capability, such as basic education or health care. In a
norm-setting (as opposed to norm-interpreting or judicial) context, the

62 Joseph Stiglitz, Learning to Learn, Localized Learning and Technological Progress, in
ECONOMIC POLICY AND

TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE

126

(Partha Basgupta

&

Paul

Stoneman eds., 1987) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Learning to Learn] (inquiry into the learning process
leading to technological progress that, in turn, leads to economic growth).
63 UN Millennium Development Goals, supra note 18.
64 Vienna Convention o the Law of Treaties Between United States and International
Organizations art. 31(1), Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
According to Mark Janis, "treaties are to be interpreted primarily by reference to the treaties text,
giving rather less emphasis than might some municipal laws of contract to the circumstances
surrounding the explicit agreement of the parties. The 'context' referred to in the Convention
means only a treaty's own preamble and annexes...." MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (4th ed. 2003).

65 UN-WlPO Agreement, supra note 13.
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decision maker should err on the side of creating a norm that maximizes
66
the access to the public good by the most needy.
Some who adhere to utilitarianism will question the introduction of
substantive equality as a normative principle. 67 The implicit assumption
in standard liberal economic theory is that efficiency will lead to
equality in the long run because all boats will rise with economic
growth and, in the case of intellectual property, concomitant innovation.
Yet a few global public goods theorists claim that the opposite may in
fact be true: equity can lead to greater efficiency. Moreover, there is
growing evidence that international cooperation on the provision of
public goods depends on actual and perceived equity in the formulation,
substance and outcome of international agreements. I develop this
claim further in the body of this Article.
On the other side of the coin, some who adhere to a bleak view of
development will question why I even bother with the concept of
development at all. 68 Indeed, there is early evidence to support this
pessimism. 69 One must not take an overly-na'fve view of development's
66 Peter Gerhart suggests that a
healthy international system that respected distributive values could provide
for... judicial review of international agreements to determine whether they meet
norms of fairness in the division of rewards. Although this approach would have to be
exercised gingerly, with due respect for the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda and the
need to preserve the stability of mutual cooperation, the approach could curb
opportunistic behavior by powerful countries and would reinforce norms leading to the
fair distribution of gains from cooperation.
Gerhart, supra note 39, at 75-76.
67 See Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPS Agreement, 22 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 307 (2004) (addressing law and economics-based critiques of the Doha
Declaration).
68 Esteva, supra note 14, at 6-25 (describing the various failed incarnations of development,
including pure economic growth, integration with social growth, the so-called unified approach,
participative development, the basic needs approach, endogenous development and, currently,
sustainable development and human development); see also PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2,
at 150-53.
In the legal academic world, this perspective has been espoused most vigorously by
Tayyab Mahmud, Ruth Gordon and Jon Sylvester.
See Tayyab Mahmud, Postcolonial
Imaginaries: Alternative Development or Alternatives to Development?, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 26 (1999) (arguing that development should be jettisoned altogether: "I
submit that a radical critique must move beyond the discourse of alternative development and
begin to imagine alternatives to development."); Ruth Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester,
Deconstructing Development, 22 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (2004); see also Chantal Thomas, Critical
Race Theory and PostcolonialDevelopment Theory: Observations on Methodology, 45 VILL. L.
REV. 1195, 1198-99 (2000).
69 Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Rights in Global Trade Framework: IP Trends
in Developing Countries, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 95, 97 (2004). Abbot discusses the
aftermath of the Doha Declaration and reports:
[T]here is bad news as well, and in many ways the bad news is more noteworthy than
the good news. While multilateral negotiations were going on in Geneva and
progressive strides towards promoting access to medicines were being made, the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) were busy incorporating an alternative and highly restrictive set of
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ability to leverage intellectual property's potential for addressing
equality. This Article is written with a keen awareness of the centermargins momentum of development. 70 Yet many who have examined
the question of power in various forms of socio-political and legal
relations have emphasized that even the relatively powerless have some
agency, 71 and that margins should impact centers as much as the other
way around. 72 Some international relations theorists even claim that we
need to insist against the center-margin paradigm in a world
destabilized by the multidirectional impacts of globalization. 73 My
methodology here tries to reflect alternative, critical understandings of
development, while acknowledging that there typically is a discernible
hegemonic approach that requires careful attention-in this case, liberal
economic theory. I also try not to overemphasize the North-South
distinction, recognizing that there may be shifting alliances between and
among developed and developing countries as power blocs within the
WTO. 74 Nonetheless, it is useful for purposes of this analysis to use the
terms "developing" and "developed" in a strategic essentialist 75 sense as
rules in new "free trade" agreements [such as the CAFTA and the Australian Free
Trade Agreement] that will effectively undermine the flexibilities in the Doha
Declaration and the Decision on Implementation, thus preventing access to lower
priced generic medicines. The extent of these restrictions is extraordinary, and they
will have bad effects on the poor.
Id.
70 PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2, at 11.
71 See generally SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES (Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak eds., 1988).
72 BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003); Brenda J. Cossman, Turning the
Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, and the PostcolonialProject, in
GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 56, at 27.
73 See generally L.H.M. LING, POSTCOLONIAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CONQUEST AND
DESIRE BETWEEN ASIA AND THE WEST (2002); Thomas F. Mclnerney, Law and Development as
Democratic Practice, VOICES OF DEVELOPMENT JURISTS, Mar. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.idli.org/DLRC/vdj/vdjl_2004.pdf (critiquing law and development/rule of law
programs; suggesting model based on Habermas: discursive intersubjective law-making by
citizens).
74 See PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 196-97 (2002) [hereinafter DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM]:
The first basis of [US] diplomacy was that jumping on the TRIPS bandwagon was in
[the developing country's] own interests if they wanted to attract capital and become a
knowledge economy ....
Even on India, the most powerful holdout [to TRIPS], the
US worked tirelessly, pointing out to India that.., it had a software and film industry
that gave it very different interests from other developing countries such as the
ASEANS, and so on. At the same time,... [the U.S.] went to the ASEANS and said
these guys [India and Brazil] should not be representing you because they don't care
about investment climate.
See also SELL, supra note 26, at 161 (describing U.S. proposal to put a wedge between India and
Brazil and those countries without domestic manufacturing capacity for pharmaceuticals).
75 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990).
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proxies for broad and enduring differences between the global
intellectual property "haves" and "have-nots."
As observers situated on all parts of the ideological spectrum have
noted, intellectual property policy-making is made far more, not less,
multivariate and contingent when it goes global. However, this
proposed principle is not adding complexity for complexity's sake.
There are many compelling reasons why an additional first principle of
international intellectual property is necessary. A substantive equality
principle transforms the relatively crude binary intellectual property
balancing test into a more nuanced and context-sensitive discourse
about the instrumental purpose of intellectual property.
It also
reconsiders that purpose within the context of intellectual property
globalization with its especially pressing questions of distribution. And
finally, it begins to explicitly address questions of equity, fairness, and
justice, issues that have been submerged if not altogether ignored in
much of the domestic discourse of intellectual property.
The concept of intellectual property has encountered the concept of
development but, up to now, these concepts have merely coexisted. A
new first principle of intellectual property fairly demands to be
articulated in the context of globalization. This recalibration of the
concept of intellectual property in light of the concept of development is
actually long overdue. It is a gift that intellectual property globalization
can give to the domestic social welfare analysis of intellectual property,
76
in a recursive move that is characteristic of our postmodern global age.

I.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENCOUNTERS DEVELOPMENT

A.

The WTO Encounters Development

All observers agree that intellectual property globalization was
accelerated greatly by TRIPS. Adopted in 1994 as part of the Uruguay
Round of the WTO, TRIPS establishes uniform minimum standards for
many basic areas of intellectual property law, compared to the
patchwork and subject-specific approach of previous bilateral or
multilateral agreements. 77 TRIPS binds its signatories to the principle
of national treatment such that a country cannot treat a foreign
intellectual property rights holder any worse than it would treat its own

76 GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 39 ("We are abroad in a world which is thoroughly constituted
through reflexively applied knowledge, but where at the same time we can never be sure that any
given element of that knowledge will not be revised.").
77 Ruth Okediji, TRIPs Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International)Copyright Law,
49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 584, 587 (2001) [hereinafter Okediji, TRIPs Dispute Settlement].
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rule of non-

discrimination for the principle of reciprocity. ' 79 Most importantly,
TRIPS is administered under the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute
settlement understanding (DSU) mechanisms for enforcing trade
violations-as opposed to the previous largely ineffectual systems for
enforcing violations of extant treaties. 80
Concerns over global
freeriding 8 1 drove the placement of intellectual property issues on the
world trade agenda; these new global intellectual property laws are now

buttressed by relatively effective enforcement mechanisms via the
82
global trade framework.
Because so many countries, both rich and poor, have a strong
interest in participating in the rules of global trading established by the
WTO, intellectual property norms have now been imported into many

countries that had previously little to no legal regulation in this area.
Intellectual property laws through TRIPS are linked to non-intellectual

property issues, such as trade in agricultural and textile goods. Termed
linkage bargaining, previously unrelated areas are now linked via
negotiations over universal trade rules. 83 Linkage bargaining was
critical to getting developing countries to sign on to the higher standards
of intellectual property protection than they would have otherwise
84
desired.
78 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 2 (entitled "National Treatment").
79 GRAEME B. DINWOODIE,
WILLIAM 0.
HENNESSEY &

SHIRA

PERLMUTTER,

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 79 (2001).

"The first international copyright treaties were based on a system of material reciprocity.
Under material reciprocity, country A would grant country B's authors the same protection as
country B would grant country A's authors." INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ANTHOLOGY 222 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds., 1996) (quoting Peter Burger,
The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J. L. & TECH. 1 (1988)).
80 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 64 ("Dispute Settlement"). The Berne and Paris Conventions,
for example, were never enforced, although hypothetically member states could bring complaints
before the International Court of Justice.
81 "A freerider is a person who takes the benefit of an economic activity without contributing
to the costs needed to generate that benefit. In the case of intellectual property the freerider takes
the benefit of information for which the costs of discovery/creation have been met by the
producer."
Peter Drahos, Introduction to GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 55, at 3-4.

As economist Suzanne

Scotchmer recently observed, harmonized intellectual property standards are "a tool by which
cross-border externalities can be recaptured by the innovating country." Suzanne Scotchmer, The
PoliticalEconomy of IntellectualProperty Treaties,20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 415,416 (2004).
82 See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 9, at 5.
83 MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION: GLOBAL
COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12-13, 92-93 (1998). See
generally Symposium, The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (symposium on
linkages).
84 Okediji, TRIPs Dispute Settlement, supra note 77, at 610-11 (describing under regime
theory why countries might have entered into agreements against their best interests); see also
Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371-79 (2006)
[hereinafter Yu, Discontents] (describing four narratives explaining why developing countries
signed onto TRIPS).
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Furthermore, the minimum standards of TRIPS are an example of
deep integration-"integration not only in the production of goods and
services but also in standards and other domestic policies. 8 5 In contrast
to the previous trade approach of shallow integration, where the focus
was on trade barriers at the borders rather than harmonization of
standards across borders, under TRIPS, developing countries are no
longer thought to need the special protection of high trade barriers in
light of their relative economic vulnerability. 86 The TRIPS approach
abandons the special treatment approach of shallow integration and
adopts a formalistic, universalistic approach of deep integration of
minimum standards regardless of a country's economic status. The end
of preferential treatment for poor countries is tied to the ever-pervasive
87
process of marketization of economies across the world.
The allusions within the TRIPS Agreement to national public
policy and public interest concerns related to development were placed
there at the behest of the so-called "Group of 14" developing
countries. 88
As
stated
earlier,
this
language
includes
"developmental... objectives" of all member states, mentioned in the
85 Nancy Birdsall & Robert Z. Lawrence, Deep Integration and Trade Agreements: Goodfor
Developing Countries?, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS I, supra note 44, at 128.
86 Id. at 130-3 1:
When barriers at nations' borders were high, as they were in the immediate postwar
period, governments and citizens could sharply differentiate international policies from
domestic policies. International policies dealt with the border barriers, but nations
were sovereign over domestic policies without regard for the impact on other
nations....
In the 1980s the notion that developing countries should develop behind high
barriers began to change.
87 Id.
88 These were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. Other participants in the Uruguay round that
submitted proposed drafts included the European Community, the United States, Switzerland,
Japan and Australia. GERVAIS, supra note 31, at 73 n. 1; see also Adronico 0. Adede, Origins
and History of the TRIPS Negotiations, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 24, at 28; Daniel
J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
505, 508-09 (2005) [hereinafter Gervais, IntellectualProperty,Trade & Development].
[T]he emerging outline of a possible TRIPS result had essentially been at the level of
principles, not legal texts. The draft legal texts, which emanated from the European
Community, the United States, Japan, Switzerland, and Australia, foreshadowed a
detailed agreement covering all IP rights then in existence ....
As a reaction, more
than a dozen developing countries proposed another "legal" text, much more limited in
scope, with few specific normative aspects. They insisted on the need to maintain
flexibility to implement economic and social development objectives. In retrospect,
some developing countries may feel that the Uruguay Round Secretariat did them a
disservice by preparing a "composite" text, which melded all industrialized countries'
proposals into what became the "A" proposal, while the developing countries' text
became the "B" text. The final Agreement mirrored the "A" text. As such, it
essentially embodied norms that had been accepted by industrialized countries. The
concerns of developing countries were reflected in large part in two provisionsArticles 7 and 8.
Id. at 508 (footnotes omitted).
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Preamble, as well as to a reference in TRIPS Article 8 (entitled
"Principles") to member states' ability to "adopt measures necessary to
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development. ' 89 TRIPS Article 7 (entitled "Objectives") frames "[t]he
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights" within a
framework of "mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations." 90
The Group of 14 pushed to include this language referencing
development after it became inevitable that intellectual property rights
were to be included in the global trading framework. 9 1 By presenting
their own text, these countries wanted
to highlight the importance of public policy objectives underlying
national IPR [Intellectual Property Rights] systems, the necessity of
recognizing those objectives at the international level and.., the
need to respect and safeguard national legal systems and traditions
on IPRs, in view of the diverse needs and levels of development of
92
states participating in the IPR negotiations.
From the perspective of developed countries, non-tariff trade barriers
such as overly-lax intellectual property standards were viewed as the
key challenge in a post-TRIPS environment. The resulting one-sizefits-all 93 minimum standards of intellectual property protection
contained in TRIPS apply to countries varying widely in their levels of
development. 94 Thus this language of "development" was to provide
developing countries with some leeway to argue in favor of flexibilities
in the minimum standards mandated by TRIPS, if these flexibilities
served the purposes of development. 95

89 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 8 (emphasis added).
90 Id. at art. 7; see also id. at art. 66 (entitled "Least-Developed Country Members," setting

forth transitional periods for LDCs).
91 Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 10-14 (Carlos

M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998). There is widespread agreement among historians
of TRIPS that the move to link intellectual property rights to global trade regime was instigated
by U.S. corporations, led primarily by Pfizer and IBM. See SELL, supra note 26; DRAHOS WITH
BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 74; RYAN, supra note 83.

92 Adede, supra note 88, at 28.
93 Numerous commentators have adapted the term "one-size-fits-all" not only to describe the
new minimum standards that now apply across the board to all nations, but also to describe the
inflexibility of these standards as applied to countries varying greatly in their level of
development.
94 See SELL, supra note 26, at 13.

95 See World Trade Organization, Work on Special and Differential Provisions,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/devel-e/dev-specialdifferential-provisions e.htm
(last
visited Apr. 13, 2006) (summarizing various WTO and TRIPS provisions that make special

provisions for LDCs).
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Indeed, during the recent policy debate over the compulsory
licensing provisions of TRIPS in the context of the AIDS pandemic, 96 a
number of developing countries invoked these references to
development to argue before the TRIPS Ministerial in Doha, Qatar
97
(Doha) that TRIPS should not place limits on public health priorities.
A key impediment, however, is that the language referencing
development in TRIPS is not mandatory, but rather hortatory, and is
98
placed within parts of the treaty that are not in the main treaty body.
This issue (rather than the substantive content of development) has
preoccupied the few legal scholars who have addressed these terms. 99
Partly in recognition of the inequalities permeating this global
trading regime, the current "Doha Development Round" of the WTO is
supposed to focus on the needs of the least developed countries.10 0 One
of the most galvanizing events so far of the Doha Round, by all
accounts, has been the negotiation between developed and developing
countries over the relationship of TRIPS to public health. TRIPS allows
for limited exceptions to the exclusive rights of patent and copyright.
One of them is Article 30, which includes "exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate rights of the patent owner,
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties."''1 1 Another is
Article 31, which allows countries to engage in compulsory licensing
under certain conditions, the most salient of which is that "any such use
shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market
of the Member authorizing such use. '10 2 Because many developing
countries in need of pharmaceuticals do not have domestic
manufacturing capacity, this condition effectively nullified any ability
to invoke compulsory licensing. Essentially, governments can only
override the patents as long as they order generic substitutes from

96 Many accounts have been written about this issue. For a succinct overview, see DRAHOS
WITH BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 74, at 5-10. See also SELL, supra
note 26, at 121-62.
97 WTO, Submission, supra note 32, at 5 para. 18 (For example, the argument was advanced
that "Article 7 is a key provision that defines the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement. It clearly
establishes that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights do not exist in a
vacuum. They are supposed to benefit society as a whole and do not aim at the mere protection of
private rights." (emphasis added)).
98 But see Vienna Convention art. 3 1(1), supra note 64 (a "treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose"). A treaty's "context" includes preambles and
annexes. Id. at art. 31(2). See infra Section IV.C. for further discussion.
99 See infra Section I.C.
100 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 15.
101 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 30 ("Exceptions to Rights Conferred").
102 Id. at art. 31 ("Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder").
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domestic producers. But most of the countries that need the drugs most
urgently have no pharmaceutical industry of their own.
The battle over these legal provisions culminated in various
concessions: first in the so-called Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health, 10 3 and then in the General Council Decision that allows
the most desperate countries to override patents on expensive
antiretroviral drugs and order cheaper copies from generic
manufacturers located in other countries. 10 4 Negotiations over the
05
implementation of these concessions are still underway. 1

B.

The WIPO Encounters Development

Before the WTO was put on center stage as the global intellectual
property norm enforcer, WIPO was the primary administrative body for
the major multilateral intellectual property institutions such as the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 10 6 Since
TRIPS came into force, it has been widely observed that WIPO seems
under increasing pressure to adopt a high protectionist stance towards
TRIPS Article 68 specifically sets forth a
intellectual property.
framework for cooperation between the Council for TRIPS and
WIPO, 10 7 and a cooperation agreement was quickly executed. 08 While
arguably WIPO has historically been more receptive to producer than
user interests, 10 9 this tendency was most evident in the negotiations
103 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 15.
104 General Council Decision, supra note 16.
105 Abbott, supra note 69, at 97; see also Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The
Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS,
supra note 4, at 393, 393 [hereinafter Abbott, Hydra].
106 Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention have been incorporated into TRIPS through
TRIPS Article 9 ("Relation to the Berne Convention"). Similarly, Articles 1 through 12 and
Article 19 of the Paris Convention have been incorporated into TRIPS through TRIPS Article 2
("Intellectual Property Conventions").
107 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 68 ("Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights").
108 Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade
Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754 (1996) [hereinafter WIPO-WTO Agreement].
109 Pedro de ParanaguA Moniz, The Development Agenda for WIPO: Another Stillbirth? A
Battle Between Access to Knowledge and Enclosure 29-32 (July 1, 2005) (unpublished LLM
thesis in Intellectual Property, Queen Mary & Westfield College, University of London),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=844366 (claiming the existence of an historically close
relationship between WIPO and copyright industries). WIPO's operating budget is derived
substantially from fees generated from Patent Cooperation Treaty filing fees, most of which come
from applications filed by developed country members. For example, in the year 2005, WIPO
projected that approximately 90% of its income would be derived from filing fees (PCT Union,
Madrid Union and Hague Union combined). Of a total projected income of 313,560 francs, only
17,223 would come from member state contributions and 284,578 would come from filing fees.
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leading up to the 1996 enactment of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
The contentious
proceedings illustrated the increasing tensions between copyright
producers and users in the context of digital technology, and the
willingness of WIPO to accede to producer interests in the face of
consumer and small firm opposition.I 10
In addition, WIPO has been trying to address sector-specific issues
related to development. For example, it has been investigating quite
extensively the thorny issues relating to the protection of traditional
knowledge, engaging in extensive fact-finding."' 1 It has been involved
in discussions on how to coordinate obligations under the Convention
for Biological Diversity with obligations under TRIPS. 112 And it has
been trying to reinvent itself through activities such as cooperation
agreements with WTO to assist with the implementation of TRIPS 113 as
well as the negotiation and implementation of the Uniform Dispute
14
Resolution Procedure (UDRP) for Internet domain names."
More recently, WIPO has been put under pressure by a coalition of
developing countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
re-consider its intellectual property mandate in light of development.
The WIPO 31 st General Assembly met in the fall of 2004, and agreed to
"further examine a proposal originally presented by a group of
developing countries to enhance the development dimension in all of
See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO], PROGRAM AND BUDGET 2004-

2005, at 179 tbl.
18, available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/budget/
2004 05/pdf/wopbc_6 2.pdf (Income 1998-2009: Variation by Source of Income and Union).
110 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT

128-50 (2001); Jessica Litman, Digital

Copyright andInformation Policy, in GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21 ST
CENTURY: EUROPE, ASIA, AND THE INTERNET 299-309 (Craig et al. eds., 1999); Pamela

Samuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgendaat WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369,430-31 (1997).
111 See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: WIPO REPORT ON FACTFINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (1998-1999)

25 (2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/pdf/partl.pdf. WIPO has
recently extended the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) for another two years. See Press
Release
421,
WIPO
(Sept.
9,
2005),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2005/wipo pr_2005_421 .html.
112 Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 25, at 34.
113 WIPO-WTO Agreement, supra note 108. This agreement was precipitated by TRIPS
Article 68. See Laurence R. Helfer, Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International
Intellectual Property Regime, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 123, 132-33 (2004) [hereinafter
Helfer, MediatingInteractions]:
The Agreement requires the two organizations to share information received from their
respective members relating to intellectual property laws and regulations; mandates
that each organization provide technical and legal assistance to developing countries
that are members only of the other organization; and delegates to WIPO certain
administrative functions contained in TRIPS.
114 WIPO runs a Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service, which processes an enormous
number of arbitrations. See WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center-Domain Name Disputes,
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
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WIPO's work."' "I5 Originally submitted by Argentina and Brazil, this
so-called "Development Agenda" item was then discussed in the
context of inter-sessional intergovernmental meetings held during the
spring and summer of 2005 prior to the General Assembly's 2005 fall
meeting. In addition, WIPO sponsored international seminars on
intellectual property and development open not only to member states,
but also to NGOs, civil society organizations (CSOs) and other
interested observers. This set of meetings provides insight into how
WIPO understands its role vis-d-vis the U.N. development mandate.
The Development Agenda proposal (AB Proposal) called for
WIPO to implement its functions in the context of various initiatives of
the United Nations, of which it is now an agency, including the
adoption of the Millennium Development Goals. 116 The proposal
reiterated the instrumental purpose of intellectual property and called
for a contextualized assessment of the impact of intellectual property
globalization on development. It alluded to the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health as "an important milestone" for the
recognition that "the protection of intellectual property[] should operate
in a manner that is supportive of and does not run counter to the public
health objectives of all countries." ' 1 7 It also referenced paragraph 19 of
the WTO's Doha Ministerial Declaration, in setting the mandate for the
TRIPS Council in the context of the Doha Development Agenda, which
refers explicitly to the need to "take fully into account the development
dimension." ' 1 8 Among other specific suggestions, the AB Proposal
requested that WIPO adopt a high-level declaration on intellectual
property and development and consider amending its convention to
incorporate the development dimension into WIPO's objectives and
functions. 119

115 Press Release 397, WIPO (Oct. 5, 2004), available at www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/
en/2004/wipo pr_2004_397.html.
116 WIPO, Proposalby Argentina and Brazilfor the Establishment of a Development Agenda
for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter AB Proposal], available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wogbga/pdf/wo-ga_3 11 .pdf; see also
WIPO, Report on the Thirty-First(15th Extraordinary)Session, at 33-37, WO/GA/31/15 (Oct. 5,
2004),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wogb ga/
pdf/woga_3 l_15.pdf. This proposal was joined by twelve other member states (Bolivia, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania
and Venezuela).
117 AB Proposal,supra note 116, at 2.
118 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 15.
119 AB Proposal,supra note 116. Other specific actions proposed include safeguarding public
interest flexibilities such as exceptions for the specific development needs of developing
countries. The proposal specifically recommended that the objectives and principles of TRIPS
Articles 7 and 8 be incorporated into WIPO's draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT). It
proposed that WIPO take up discussions on a draft Treaty on Access to Knowledge and
Technology, to be guided by a balanced approach to intellectual property enforcement, and to
promote further development-oriented technical cooperation and assistance. Id.
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Even at the early stage of the discussion of the Development
Agenda proposal, there were two major views on the part of the member
states of how intellectual property globalization should handle
development. The first could be characterized as insular: WIPO's
methods in ensuring strong intellectual property protection across the
board were appropriate and no real effort to engage with development
concerns needed to take place. The other could be characterized as
intersectional: intellectual property activities should be more responsive
to development concerns such as health care, access to educational
materials, and improving infrastructure as a measure of improving the
economy. The insular intellectual property perspective was expressed
by countries in the so-called Group B, 120 the European Union, and
various groups nominally dubbed NGOs.12 1
The intersectional
perspective was shared by a group of developing countries informally
known as "Friends of Development": the Asian Group; CARICOM (the
Caribbean Community); and the African Group. Thus, the terms on
which intellectual property globalization was to encounter development
were already being contested.
Informal minutes of the various meetings held in the spring and
summer of 2005 present a picture of the mechanical workings of WIPO
as an agency that is not particularly equipped to mediate these
differences in perspective.
At the second inter-sessional
intergovernmental meeting on the Development Agenda, held in June
2005, various NGOs and governmental representatives testified about
the relationship of intellectual property to development. 122 It became
clear that the Group B nations were trying to push the discussion of the
Development Agenda off to what the developing countries viewed as an
ineffectual committee 123 and/or were trying to frame development solely
120 The United Kingdom along with the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, Switzerland, and other
wealthy OECD countries are known colloquially at WIPO as "Group B." See, e.g., Posting of
Isabelle Scherer to Intellectual Property Watch, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=3
(Apr. 11, 2004, 10:09 EST) (reporting on remarks of Jonathan Dudas, Director of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, and referring to "[t]he delegation of Canada, on behalf of
Group B (i.e., an informal grouping composed of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan,
Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States)"); Thiru
Balasubramaniam,
Notes
from
First
Day
of
WIPO
General
Assembly,
http://www.ipjustice.org/WIPO/092704notes.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2006) (referring to
"Canada, on behalf of Group B (15 original European Community states, Japan, USA, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland and some others)").
121 It is notable that AB Proposal includes a request that WIPO differentiate between public
interest NGOs and user organizations. AB Proposal,supra note 116, at 5.
122 See WIPO, Inter-Sessional Intergovernmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for
WIPO, IIM/2/10 (Sept. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Intergovernmental Meeting], available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/iim_2/iim-2 10.pdf.
123 Known as the Permanent Committee for Cooperation for Development Related to
Intellectual Property (PCIPD). See id. at 23. At the time of this suggestion, it had apparently
gone for four years without meeting and had voted to disband its parent committee in 2002 (notes
on file with author).
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as an issue of technical assistance. 24 On the other hand, the developing
125
countries and various NGOs articulated a hodgepodge of felt needs,
127
126
ranging from competition policy to education.
These positions did not soften during the subsequent General
Assembly meeting held in the fall of 2005. For example, Argentina
stated that
[w]ith respect to the Doha Plan of Action,.

.

. its implementation

requires working towards a common strategy for securing national
policy space for developing countries in all areas, which allows
members to adopt the most appropriate measures and priorities and
to realize their right to development .... The Plan of Action also
called on WIPO as a UN Agency to include in all its future plans and
activities including legal advice a development dimension that
includes promoting development and access to knowledge for all,
pro-development norm setting, establishing development-friendly
principles and guidelines for the provisions of technical assistance
8
and the transfer and dissemination of technology.12
The U.S. stated, on the other hand, that while it was in favor of a
frank exchange of views, it did not support WIPO becoming a
permanent development body. 129 There was continued skirmishing over
the correct venue for the continued discussion of the issues.
At the time of this writing, there is a stand-off. The First Session
of the Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO
Development Agenda (PCDA) was held from February 20 to 24, 2006
in Geneva. There were two sets of proposals: a set of sixty six detailed
proposals from the Group of Friends of Development, and a list of forty
five, including proposals from the Africa Group, Chile, Colombia, and
the United States. All one hundred eleven proposals, containing
substantive and procedural suggestions, will form the basis for the
discussions at the Second Session scheduled for June 26 to 30, 2006.130
124 TRIPS Article 66.2 provides: "Developed country Members shall provide incentives to
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound
and viable technological base." TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 66.2. Article 67 provides:
"developed country Members shall provide... technical and financial cooperation in favour of
developing and least-developed country Members." Id at art. 67.
125 CIiTACD Statement on the Development Agenda to the Second Inter-sessional
Intergovernmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO, available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/ci-tacd062005.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
126 IntergovernmentalMeeting, supra note 122, at 86 (statement of South Aftri-a).

127 Posting of Teresa Hackett, teresa.hackett@eifl.net, to http://lists.essential.org (June 22,
2005), http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/a2k/2005-June/000464.html.
128 South-North Development Monitor, Sept. 29, 2005 (on file with author).
129 Id.

130 Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a World Intellectual Property Organization
Development Agenda (PCDA), 1st Sess., Geneva, Feb. 20-24, 2006, available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_1/pcda1_www_56972.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
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As one recent observer has stated, the Development Agenda proposal is
simply another iteration of a decades-long struggle between developing
countries and developed countries over appropriate intellectual property
policy in the international arena.131
C.

Academic Analyses of These Early Encounters

The recent scholarship of intellectual property globalization 132 falls
into several general genres. One insists on adherence to a classical
international law view that the nation-state is the best guardian of the
domestic welfare bargain and the international trading system should
not be allowed to intrude upon this traditional police power. Another

variation welcomes the proliferation of multiple actors in the global
arena and (implicitly) predicts that the system will mostly be improved
from the ensuing pluralism. While all genres express some worry that
the proper intellectual property balance is being maintained in the
global arena, a third group is clearly much more skeptical of intellectual
property globalization. It is a heterogeneous group, addressing different
distributional concerns under the rubrics of "information feudalism,"
"neocolonialism," or "romance of the public domain."
Although scholars in all three groups tentatively and occasionally
refer to development, none state that development has any claim on
intellectual property other than as a reminder that intellectual property
balance might be increasingly askew. And none suggest the need for a
substantive principle of equality within the intellectual property welfare

calculus that would mirror the trend in development economics of
incorporating equality measures in the global welfare calculus.
1.

Classical

The first body of scholarship is best exemplified by the work of
Ruth Okediji and Jerome Reichman. 133 Both have long written about
131 Moniz, supra note 109, at 33-37.
132 For the sake of brevity, I am apologetically omitting some important early (pre-WTO)
pioneers such as A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World
Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 800; Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the South, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989); William P. Alford, Intellectual Property, Trade and Taiwan: A
GATT-Fly's View, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 97. Any other omissions in this section are my
oversight, and I apologize in advance.
133 See, e.g., Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note 3; Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public
Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117 (1999) [hereinafter Okediji,
Copyright and Public Welfare]; J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes ofAge: Conflict or
Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441 (2000); J.H.
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the difficulty inherent in the dual balancing act of intellectual property
globalization: the domestic welfare balance between the producers and
users of intellectual property along with the simultaneous global welfare
balance between developing and developed countries. They insist on
the primacy of the nation-state as the initial arbiter and enforcer of the
domestic welfare balance. In their view, the basic challenge with
globalization is how to protect that domestic balance from being
corrupted from undue pressures introduced by globalized trade regimes
such as TRIPS.
For example, a recent piece by Reichman, co-authored by Keith
Maskus, a development economist specializing in intellectual property,
suggests that the DSU powers of the WTO must be exercised in a way
that recognizes an implicit reservation of welfare and police powers of
the state pursuant to Article XX of the GATT. 134 Similarly, Okediji has
written that in a global public welfare calculus, "the determination of
resource allocation, including allocation of intellectual property rights,
must first reflect and promote domestic welfare, since globalization
does not entail a complete loss of sovereignty."' 35
She recently
reiterated that
[a]s balance in intellectual property regulation is negotiated
domestically, the international system should do what it does bestpromote the welfare of nation states by recognizing the legitimate
exercise of sovereign discretion in domestic affairs. Only where the

state fails in its mandate--either by over- or by under-protecting
owners of intellectual property-should the international system
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11 (1997).
134 Maskus & Reichman, supra note 9, at 31:
In any event, the burgeoning encroachment of international IPRs on the reserved
welfare and police powers of states constitutes an anomaly in public international law
that must be fixed before it cripples the WTO and fatally weakens the infrastructure
that supports world trade. One should not view this as some minor irritant to be
blamed on NGOs or recalcitrant developing countries.
For an overview of the GATT, see ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 197

(John P. Grant & J. Craig Barker eds., 2d ed. 2004) (quoting PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN,
BOWETT'S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 116 (5th ed. 2001)):

[The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades or GATT] originated as a contractual
arrangement, signed at Geneva on 30 October 1947, and put into force by the
simultaneous Protocol of Provisional Application...,
wherein the parties
recited ... their recognition of the need for an International Trade Organization and
their undertaking to observe the principles of the Draft Charter of that body, then under
consideration.
That organization, however, never came into existence....
In
consequence, "it was left to the trade negotiations (or 'rounds') held under the auspices
of the GATT to devise a de facto institutional machinery .... The last round of
negotiations, the Uruguay Round (1986-93) saw the creation in 1994 of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) as the new principal institution of the multilateral trading
system..".... The GATT remains the foundation of the WTO framework and is the
pre-eminent agreement in the international trade area.
135 Okediji, Copyright andPublic Welfare, supra note 133, at 125.
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pierce the sovereign veil, as it does currently with respect to human
right violations, to demand accountability on behalf of citizens....
However, when the international system assumes a welfare neutrality
in the context of intellectual property interpretation, and when it
accommodates a broader set of actors and recognizes varied sources
of law in the form of different institutions, it actually perverts the
traditional paradigm of public international law by undermining the
capacity of states to regulate in ways that best address the interests of
1 36
their citizens.

This classic international law position was advanced as well by
Rochelle Dreyfuss and Andreas Lowenfeld, who argued in the context
of TRIPS dispute resolution that in the absence of a clear-cut
international norm on which member states have agreed would allow
the WTO to assume the enforcement role long missing from the
Berne and Paris Conventions[,] ...deference to each state's own law
is appropriate, on the theory that lack of consensus is an indication
that there is no "best rule" and that different economies and cultures
37
require different rules. 1
38
Others have also taken this basic approach.
While one can sense a growing alarm about the welfare imbalance
caused by intellectual property globalization throughout this
scholarship, 139 overall these scholars trust the social welfare measures of

136 Ruth L. Okediji, The Institutions of Intellectual Property: New Trends in an Old Debate,
98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 219, 221 (2004) (emphasis added); see also Ruth L. Okediji,
Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in Developing Countries, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 4, 142, 147-48 [hereinafter Okediji, Sustainable
Access] ("In sum, the international system has become a major source of domestic copyright
norms, which has destabilized and, in some instances, inverted the traditional sphere of sovereign
prerogative with far-reaching consequences for the normative principles that potentiate access to
content.").
137 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay
Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 297 (1997).
Indeed, Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld specifically examine a hypothetical involving a copyright
dispute between a developed country and a developing country, and state that compliance by the
developing country with the TRIPS minimum standard may lead to a less than optimum standard
being applied.
138 Accord Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 60, at 102 (arguing for less formalism in
TRIPS/GATT jurisprudence to accommodate claims of national importance and "to protect the
viability of the TRIPS Agreement in its early years"); see also Samuelson, supra note 55, at 95
(discussing the problem of"incomplete commodification" of knowledge goods compared to other
goods in trade, e.g., alcohol, because of cultural policies and values embedded in intellectual
property laws).
139 See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 9, at 3 1:
Telling poor people in rich countries that the TRIPS Agreement prevents domestic
policymakers from regulating access to essential medicines will not long remain
politically feasible. As matters stand, if nothing had been done to address the plight of
millions dying of AIDS because of TRIPS patent rights, then the WTO would have
contributed to the greatest health tragedy in history.
See also Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare, supra note 133, at 167:
Once the international rules were set in place, the focus turned to strengthening
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intellectual property. They tend to focus on the need for norm-setting

and norm-enforcing institutions such as the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body to be less formalistic in its decision-making. Thus any normative
proposal would be in the direction of paying more attention to domestic
policy priorities in the interpretation of existing rules. Substantive
40
proposals tend to focus on developing greater domestic flexibilities.1

2.

Pluralist

A second genre of recent writing in the area of intellectual property
14 1 Daniel Gervais, 142
globalization is advanced by Graeme Dinwoodie,
Laurence Helfer, 143 Peter Yu,14 4 and others.145 These scholars articulate

more pluralistic norms for the determination of global social welfare in
the intellectual property context. For the most part, they welcome the

proliferation of actors in intellectual property globalization, although

intellectual property rights internally.
This domestic turn, in tandem with the
international system, expanded marginalization to discrete and disaggregated
individuals, including a vast majority of United States citizens, as well as citizens of
developing countries. One of the profound effects of globalization, therefore, is the
determination of socioeconomic status based on access to, or control of, information
products.
140 Quite a few commentators have suggested exploiting the flexibilities within TRIPS to
remedy the perceived increasing imbalance. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 30 (calling for a user
right); Okediji, Toward, supra note 55 (proposing an international fair use doctrine); Okediji,
SustainableAccess, supra note 136, at 182-83 (same); Heald, supra note 4, at 289-92 (urging
developing countries to expand exhaustion/first sale doctrine and to refuse to enforce one-sided
license agreements). Another set of proposals focuses on strengthening national competition law
and policies. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Comment: Competitive Baselines for Intellectual Property
Systems, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 4, at 793.
141 See Dinwoodie, PropertyLaw System, supra note 6, at 216.
142 See Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development, supra note 88; Daniel J.
Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2005); Daniel J. Gervais, The InternationalizationofIntellectual
Property: New Challengesfrom the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929 (2002).
143 Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 25.
144 Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the InternationalIntellectualProperty Regime,
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2004) [hereinafter, Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents](exploring the
five crosscurrents that have emerged in the international intellectual property regime in recent
years: reciprocization, diversification, bilateralism, non-nationalization, and abandonment;
concludes by providing observations on the international intellectual property regime in five
different areas: bargaining frameworks, regime development, global lawmaking, harmonization
efforts, and judicial trends); Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists, and
InternationalRelations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569 (2002).
145 Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who
Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and PharmaceuticalPatent Protection, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 4. at 884 (using global public goods theory to
illustrate complexity of TRIPS policy-making).
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some sound a cautionary note. Heifer is best known for his work on the
concept of regime-shifting, in which he claims that
state and non-state actors shift lawmaking initiatives from one
international venue to another for many reasons. In the case of
intellectual property rights, developing countries and their allies are
shifting negotiations to international regimes whose institutions,
actors, and subject matter mandates are more closely aligned with
Within these regimes, developing
these countries' interests.
countries are challenging established legal prescriptions and
generating new principles, norms, and rules of intellectual property
protection for states and private parties to follow. Intellectual
property regime shifting thus heralds the rise of a complex legal
environment in which seemingly settled treaty bargains are contested
of lawmaking and dispute settlement must be
and new dynamics
46
considered. 1
Thus, according to Helfer, NGOs, CSOs, intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) and other non-state actors have entered into the
intellectual property norm-generating fray and influenced policymaking outcomes. Because of their ability to shift from intellectual
property rule-making venues to human rights and other venues,
developing countries are not as handicapped by the rules of the
intellectual property game, and can use regime-shifting to their strategic
advantage. 147 Implicitly, this is a positive development, particularly
since the core institutions of intellectual property globalization such as
the WTO and WIPO are resistant to the concerns of developing
countries. Underlying this analysis is an assumption that institutions
such as human rights organizations and public health agencies have the
caused by the
wherewithal to "correct" the excesses of development
148
over-extension of intellectual property norms.
146 Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 25, at 14 (defining "regime-shifting" as "an attempt to
alter the status quo ante by moving treaty negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting
activities from one international venue to another," using examples of TRIPS and food,
agriculture, public health, biodiversity and human rights); see also Laurence Helfer, Human
Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 8 (2003)
[hereinafter Heifer, Human Rights and IntellectualProperty](discussing two approaches: conflict
and balance; outlining U.N. human rights interventions in IP); Laurence R. Heifer, Adjudicating
Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights
Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357 (1998).
147 Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 25, at 6; cf JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS,
GLOBAL BUSINEss REGULATION 571 (2000) (defining forum-shifting and suggesting that it is a
game that only the powerful states can play).
148 Cf Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1218 (2005)
(claiming that "Democracy persists as long as We the People, even when faced with a WTO
ruling that calls into question a host of local regulations, can still assert our will over such
regulation through normal political processes"). However, the interventions by non-state and/or
non-IP actors so far seem to function as weak "side-constraints" to what is normatively a
utilitarian-driven vision of the common good in this area. Martha Nussbaum, Capabilitiesand
Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 273, 300 (1997). This potential shortcoming of human
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Indeed, Dinwoodie claims that "[s]uch a dispersed system may
possess advantages over the classical model[,] ... can. . . be more
responsive to social conditions and hence more dynamic than the treaty
process." 149 Yet he has also noted the extent to which private firms,
such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), may generate intellectual
property norms through their digital right management practices and
cautions that "no public structuring [of private ordering]. . . currently
exists [to] hold[] private lawmakers to account for their decision to alter
'1 50
the balance of national autonomy and universal rules.
These commentators tend to view TRIPS as allowing developing
countries sufficient policy space to participate in a framework that has
moved decisively beyond sovereign calculations of social welfare.
Whatever flaws attended the original bargain-and they concede
asymmetry in the negotiations-these do not irredeemably poison the
outcome. For example, Gervais believes that "TRIPS should be seen,
and accepted, as a given. Further, it may be defended as an appropriate
reference point for developing nations in the context of TRIPS Plus
bilateral trade discussions... 1151 He suggests several specific ways in
which developing countries can maximize TRIPS flexibilities.
Similarly, Yu points to the many different opportunities for engagement
as well as "constructive ambiguities" 152 within TRIPS, which, in his
view, allow for the possibility of a "pro-development" 153 presumption in
norm-interpretation. Nonetheless, he recognizes at the same time that
"many less developed countries still lack experience with intellectual
property protection and the needed human capital to develop laws that

rights critiques will be developed further infra Section II.B.
149 Dinwoodie, Property Law System, supra note 6, at 216.
150 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private Ordering and the Creation of International Copyright
Norms: The Role of Public Structuring, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 161, 178

(2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodic, Private Ordering] ("International copyright law embodies
important structural or institutional norms that impinge directly upon the generation and
distribution of knowledge: national autonomy, diversity of values, and resistance to orthodoxy,
are all valuable[] tools in optimizing the knowledge supply.").
151 Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development, supra note 88, at 535:
Indeed, post-TRIPS developments have been going in two (arguably diverging)
directions. On the one hand, TRIPS-related development within WTO, as well as
recent developments in the WIPO, have tried to be more responsive to the perceived
needs of developing countries and the interests of users in securing access to protected
content and material on terms they consider reasonable. This even includes broad
exceptions to obligations to obtain permissions and licenses. On the other hand, IP
developments in bilateral and regional trade agreements mirror the so-called
"maximalist" approach.
152 Yu, Discontents, supra note 84, at 387 (citing JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2001)); see also Gervais,

Intellectual Property, Trade & Development, supra note 88, at 528-34 (suggesting that
developing countries utilize "normative elasticity" of TRIPS to formulate policy responsive to
their needs).
153 Yu, Discontents,supra note 84, at 387-89.
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are tailored to their interests and local conditions." As a result, they
might have no option but to "meet their TRIPS obligations by simply
154
transcribing its mandates into law."'
Despite all the regime-shifting 55 and potential alternative normgenerating' 5 6 activity, these proposals have yet to substantively impact
how social welfare is calculated in intellectual property. Like the first
group of scholars, this second group is primarily focused on ways in
which alternative norms may be expressed via existing mechanisms (in
some cases, procedural mechanisms akin to forum-shifting and joinder
of parties). 157
It is far from clear, however, whether these
recommendations will consistently shift substantive norms in favor of
developing countries.

3.

Skeptical

The final category of work approaches intellectual property
globalization with more consistent skepticism toward either the
assumptions underlying the concept of intellectual property or the
concept of development, or perhaps both. Skeptical scholars tend to
come closest to articulating the need for a new substantive norm in the
context of intellectual property globalization. The most prolific is
probably Peter Drahos from Australia, but this group includes many
diverse perspectives both in the U.S. and outside the U.S.158
Given the uncertain benefits of minimum standards of intellectual
property for many developing countries, one might question why these
countries acceded to it. According to Drahos, developing countries
were misled during the TRIPS negotiations about the advantages that
they would receive from linking their acceptance of intellectual property
1 59
norms to concessions by developed countries on agricultural issues.
154 Id. at 378; see also Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents,supra note 144, at 408-16 (describing
inter-regime and intra-regime shifting bargaining frameworks for both developed and developing
countries).
155 Helfer, Regime Shifting, supranote 25.
156 Dinwoodie, Private Ordering,supra note 150, at 161; Dinwoodie, Property Law System,
supra note 6, at 217.
157 As pointed out by John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, "[florum-shopping, in the words of
one US judge, is a 'national legal pastime' in the US (Wright: 1967: 333)." BRAITHWAITE &
DRAHOS, supra note 147, at 564.
158 See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 21; Abbott, supra note 69; Arewa, supra note 20; Boyle, supra
note 13; Chander & Sunder, supra note 20; Coombe, Fear,Hope and Longing, supra note 20;
Coombe, Intellectual Property, supra note 20; Dutfield, supra note 24; Marci Hamilton, The
TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic,Outdated,and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613
(1996); Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading InternationalCopyright Convention Must Be
Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 763 (2003).
159 DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 74, at 11.

In

contrast to this monolithic narrative of bait and switch, Peter Yu offers multiple narratives of why
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While TRIPS was presented as a win-win solution to developing
countries via linkage bargaining, "most importer nations did not have a
clear understanding of their own interests and were not in the room
when the important technical details were settled. ' 160 Alternatively,
they vastly over-estimated the benefit that would accrue to their own
domestic intellectual property holders. 61 Moreover, as observed in the
U.S. with respect to its domestic welfare balance, recently with the
copyright industry's digital agenda, it is relatively harder to mobilize
user interests, which are diffuse compared to producer interests.1 62 The
63
end result is a type of "information feudalism."'
This heightened skepticism towards the benefits of intellectual
property globalization is shared by others in this group. For example,
Keith Aoki questions the norm of transcendentalism throughout
intellectual property, which is particularly slippery in the global context.
He states:

developing countries acceded to TRIPS, including non-mutually exclusive stories of bargain,
coercion, ignorance and self-interest. See Yu, Discontents,supra note 84, at 371-79.
160 DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 74, at 192.
161 Id.; accord COENRAAD J. VISSER, MAKING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS WORK FOR
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE WORLD BANK, POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 207-09 (J. Michael Finger & Philip
Schuler eds., 2004) (discussing six reasons why developing countries agreed to TRIPS). But see
Ruth L. Okediji, TRIPs Dispute Settlement, supra note 77, at 609-10 (arguing that regime theory
explains better than a strictly power-based account why "the U.S. was largely unsuccessful in its
unilateral efforts to raise global levels of protection and why all states were willing to submit to
binding and enforceable dispute resolution"); Yu, Discontents,supra note 84.
162 Drahos, supra note 43, at 46, 50 ("Mancur Olson's analysis of the logic of collective action
provides one example. Concentrated interests are more likely to organize to gain a legislative
outcome than diffuse interests because concentrated interests face lower costs of organization and
greater individual gains. Diffuse interests face the reverse.").
163 DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 74, at 1-3, 16:
[T]he title of our book [may] seem[] too harsh and inaccurate a description of the
modem knowledge economies in which intellectual property rights play a central role.
Even if we can make the case that current standards of intellectual property protection
are excessive, can we really say this will propel us into feudalism?...
•.. The redistribution of property rights in the case of information feudalism
involves a transfer of knowledge assets from the intellectual commons into private
hands. These hands belong to media conglomerates and integrated life sciences
corporations rather than individual scientists and authors. The effect of this, we argue,
is to raise levels of private monopolistic power to dangerous global heights, at a time
when states, which have been weakened by the forces of globalization, have less
capacity to protect their citizens from the consequences of the exercises of this
power ....
...
A situation in which intellectual property rights are used to achieve massive
wealth transfers to a small group of developed nations at the expense of other nations
squares with no theory of justice we know of, except the one that Thrasymachus gives
to Socrates in Plato's Republic: "I define justice or right as what is in the interest of the
stronger party."
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If... globalization is heterogeneous, lumpy, incomplete, and
uneven, and bypasses large regions of the world, then a "one-sizefits-all"

approach

towards

international

intellectual

property

protection may reproduce on a global scale the problematic and
sharp inequalities of access and information that currently
characterize development on the regional or national scales. Also,

by focusing on international multilateral solutions to current
dilemmas, we risk suppressing creation of industry-specific levels of
intellectual property protection that tailor protection appropriately to
1 64
industry-specific considerations and constraints.

Intellectual property globalization magnifies this universalist tendency
by its insistence on technology-neutral rules via TRIPS Article 27.1. As
we have seen, this potentially strips nations of their ability to make
nuanced, industry-specific intellectual property judgments such as
patent exemptions for generic drug competition. 6 5 The escape valve of
exceptions and limitations to patent rights is insufficient to express
domestic welfare values, as global decision-makers increasingly view
patents in absolute property rights terms. Aoki recognized early on that
some remedy is needed for this increasingly absolutist property rights
construction of intellectual property, such as a doctrine analogous to the
public trust doctrine in environmental law. This doctrine would
"reserve[] to the federal government [responsibility] to keep certain
information (for example, some types of basic scientific research,
information in databases, educational purposes and uses...) available
166
and open to benefit both the public and private owners."
Another area of intellectual property's application to development
is in the area of traditional knowledge. Anupam Chander and Madhavi
Sunder have turned orthodoxy on its head by suggesting that
progressive intellectual property scholars have over-romanticized the
164 Keith Aoki, Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293,
1344-45; see also Keith Aoki, The Stakes ofIntellectual Property Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 270-74 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (discussing the bizarre
consequences of the exportation of U.S. intellectual property norms). I would make a stronger
claim that subject matter transcendentalism of intellectual property causes tremendous difficulties
when it effaces the material differences between developing countries and developed countries
(where the need for access to books is conflated with issues of access to the latest Hollywood
film). See infra Section IV.
165 Howse, supra note 28, at 496:
The recent decision of a WTO panel, in the Canadian Generic Medicines case ignores
these words about balance and mutual advantage and may have harmful effects on
developing countries.... Even though it was dealing with an explicit "exceptions"
provision, comprehensible only if there are legitimate, competing policy interests, the
Panel was only interested in how much the rights holder might lose, not in how much
society might gain, from a given exception. It never asked what scope the exception
might require to achieve the social purpose at issue.
166 Aoki, supra note 21, at 43; see also Aoki, supra note 164, at 1345-47 (1996) (arguing that
market forces tend to cater to the needs and tastes of high income consumers, and thus global
intellectual property regimes deepen global structural inequalities).
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public domain precisely at the time when groups of people who have
been historically disempowered have the potential to claim rights to
exclude. 167 The distributional consequences of open access are not
being critically analyzed by scholars or others who take their
entitlement to rights for granted. 168 Chander and Sunder provocatively
highlight the submerged distributional question in intellectual property
by calling into question the standard liberal assumption that the public
domain always serves distributionally positive purposes.
The skeptical views veer closer than do the classical and pluralist
scholars to a critique of the substantive fairness of intellectual property
globalization. 169 Some of these writers also explicitly engage with the
core concept of development.
For example, Drahos notes the
tremendous material inequality among developing and developed
countries and defines development as being
about achieving a group of objectives for poor people including
better educational and job opportunities, greater gendered equality,
better health and nutrition, protection of the environment, natural
resources and biodiversity. Drawing on 50 years of development
experience a three-pronged strategy for development based on the
promotion of opportunity, facilitating empowerment and enhancing
70
security has been proposed. 1
Yet none so far has put forth a consistent method for intellectual
property to break out of its insularity in order to engage with
development objectives within its own paradigm. The scholarship is
rife with the usual exhortations to heed the existing limitations and
exceptions to exclusive rights. We are left with the impression of a
severely out-of-balance system that needs badly to be corrected, but
again, no new principle of substantive equality within intellectual
property itself is proposed.

167 Chander & Sunder, supra note 20; see also Coombe, Fear,Hope and Longing, supra note
20.
168 Chander & Sunder, supra note 20, at 1336-37. This is analogous to the move of
postmodern theorists who claimed the death of the author around the same time that those who
had historically been denied the privilege of voice were beginning to claim agency. Nancy
Hartsock, Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?, in FEMtNIsMJPOSTMODERNISM 157, 163
(Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990):
Somehow it seems highly suspicious that it is at the precise moment when so many
groups have engaged in "nationalisms" which involve redefinitions of the marginalized
Others that suspicions emerge about the nature of the "subject," about the possibilities
for a general theory which can descrie the world, about historical "progress." Why is
it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand
the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just
then the concept of subjecthood becomes problematic?
169 See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 21, at 18-20.
170 Drahos, supra note 81, at 3. His most recent effort to address the asymmetries of TRIPS,
however, is largely procedural. See Drahos, An Alternative Framework, supra note 8, at 16-21.
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CONCEPTS OF DEVELOPMENT

This recent crisis within intellectual property globalization over
local public health concerns can be viewed as evidence of a rupture in
the seamlessness of the concept of development, a concept which has
been deployed by the developing countries to argue for flexibility in the
increasingly one-sided and rigid application of intellectual property
rules.
At the risk of simplifying extremely heterogeneous
perspectives,' 7' two contrasting concepts of development are sketched
here: (neo)liberal and skeptical.1 72 Generally it can be said that one
school emphasizes economic growth and efficiency; the other pays
73
more heed to distributional consequences of growth. 1
My purpose here is to demonstrate that the assumptions underlying
intellectual property globalization fit comfortably within a set of
assumptions based on a particular concept of development, that is the
(neo)liberal development school of thought. Thus, predictably, that
view of development is consistently expressed and privileged when the
meaning of development is contested in the context of intellectual
property norm interpretation.
Development as a term of art is a fairly recent social construct:
It is difficult to imagine a world without development, for it seems as
if development has always been one of the fundamental criteria by
which nations and peoples are defined. In fact, however, the
contemporary concept of development has a quite short history.
Notions of progress and growth have been part of Western discourse
for well over a hundred years and, more generally, since the
[E]nlightenment. "Development" as it is currently construed (i.e.,
171 See generally PEET WITH HARTWCK, supra note 2 (development theories include but are
not limited to economics-based growth theory, sociology-based modernization theory, as well as
critiques based on Marxist and neo-Marxist, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, postdevelopment, feminist theories and, finally, critical modernism and radical democracy).
172 This terminology is mine but parallels taxonomies proposed by others. See, e.g., Kenneth
W. Abbott, Development Policy in the New Millennium and the Doha "Development Round", at
viii-ix (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper
No. 03-12, 2003) [hereinafter Abbott, Development Policy] (contrasting "the enlightened standard
view" with "critical views" on trade reform); James Thuo Gathii, Alternative and Critical: The
Contribution of Research and Scholarship on Developing Countries to International Legal
Theory, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 263, 273 (2000) (contrasting "integrationist strand" of developing
world scholarship on international law with "nationalist strand").
P3 See generally Michael S. Barr & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Law &
Development: Introduction and Overview, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2004):
The debate has therefore focused primarily on how globalization can be managed in a
way that helps development. In this debate, some have advocated maximum reliance
on free markets, free trade, and laissez faire policies in the international arena, while
others have advocated adapting something akin to the "mixed economy" model that is
already generally applied in the developed countries domestically to international
economics, resulting in a bigger role for national or transnational regulation of both
trade and investment.
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modernization and national economic growth), however, is
74
essentially a post-World War II phenomenon.1
Its late twentieth century incarnation is often attributed to President
Harry Truman's 1949 inauguration speech, in which he stated:
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of
our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old
imperialism-exploitation for foreign profit-has no place in our
plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the
75
concepts of democratic fair dealing. 1
Development is an outgrowth of both the United Nations system as well
as the Bretton Woods Initiatives (BWI) 176 establishing the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (known colloquially as the World Bank) and ultimately
the WTO.177 The decolonization of large parts of the developing world
and the concomitant emergence of new nation states contributed to the
growth of a huge development bureaucracy as of the mid to late
twentieth century, a bureaucracy that continues to expand. 178 To its
severest critics, development unleashed a juggernaut of imperialistic,
colonizing, impoverishing and violent programs against most of the
79
world's poor in the name of human progress and humanitarianism.
Even those who believe that development can be rehabilitated admit
that it has caused, and continues to impose costs, on the most vulnerable
of the world's populations, as well as severe dislocations and
180
disruptions among traditional cultures and ways of life.
Development is often conflated with sheer economic growth. But
as Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick explain, "[d]evelopment differs
from economic growth in that it pays attention to the conditions of
production, for example, the environments affected by economic
activity, and to the social consequences, for example, income
distribution and human welfare."''
There is ongoing tension and
unresolved debate about this contested concept.
The post174 Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 68, at 2.
175 Esteva, supra note 14, at 6 (citing DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
(1967)) (emphasis added).
176 So-called because they were conceptualized at the 1944 international conference held in
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.
177 PEET WITH HARTWICK, supranote 2, at 53-57.

178 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 72, at 95-134 (arguing that development supplanted lessacceptable overt forms of colonization and is a form of neo or post-colonial power by developed
countries over former colonies).
179 See generally the essays gathered in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO
KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 14.

180 Paul, supra note 29, at 237-44 (describing development "wrongs" such as large scale dam
projects, involuntary resettlement projects, large scale irrigation projects, large scale commercial
farming projects, etc.)
181PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2, at 1.
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developmental school, the one that has rejected development entirely,
182
insists that "development is, above all, a way of thinking."
A.

The (Neo)liberalApproach to Development

One way of thinking about development derives primarily from
economic theory.183 The dominant flavor has changed over time from a
Keynesian approach that unashamedly approved of state intervention to
the current model, based on neoclassical economics and known
alternatively as neoliberalism or the Washington consensus.18 4 These
disparate economic approaches are denoted here as (neo)liberal to
highlight that the "neo" aspect is a relatively recent gloss on what is
primarily a "liberal" aspect: "'liberal' in the classical sense
of... reliance on markets and the price mechanism, 'liberal' in the
contemporary sense of concern for victims, but 'neo' in the sense that
suffering was accepted as an inevitable consequence of reform and
efficiency."'1 85 I also bracket (neo) because many otherwise liberal
development specialists are increasingly uncomfortable with the costs
borne by developing countries and their inhabitants under the
(neo)liberal vision.1 86 Nonetheless, the current development model, at
least as administered through the development agencies of the IMF, the
World Bank and the WTO, is most frequently referred to by supporters
and detractors alike as neoliberal. It is without question the dominant
approach.
According to the (neo)liberal world view, the development system
basically works, with some minor adjustments needed as problems
arise. To remedy politically unacceptable differences among the
developing and developed countries, policymakers need just add a little

182 Mahmud, supra note 68, at 26:
[Furthermore,] the development project entails "epistemic violence" a violence against
the other exercised by hegemonic systems of knowledge and a violence embedded in
the constitutive functions of such systems. As a result, even its critiques remain
imprisoned within the imaginary of development, and can only speak of alternative
development.
183 It is also informed by sociological approaches such as modernization theory. However, I
do not explore these other disciplinary approaches within my discussion of (neo)liberalism
because the field of intellectual property is dominated by utilitarian approaches with a passing (at
least in the U.S.) nod to natural rights or moral rights theories.
184 Robert Kutmer, Development, Globalization,and Law, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 19, 22 (2004)
(defining origins of the term Washington consensus).
185 PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2, at 53.
186 Perhaps the most well-known spokesperson (as well as critic) of this approach is economist
Joseph E. Stiglitz. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

53-88 (2003) (outlining mistakes caused by what he terms "market fundamentalists" and rigid
neoliberal ideology in Bretton Woods Institutions such as the IMF).
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more "equality" and stir. 187 Mistakes are minor and the overall
direction is positive. 88 One underlying assumption is that short term
costs of free trade will result in long term gains by pushing countries
into greater economic growth. 8 9 Economic growth is the sina qua non
of development. 90
More recent (neo)liberal glosses normatively
privilege economic efficiency but also manage to make room for social
issues.1 91 Nonetheless, the overall emphasis is on growth and not
92
equality. 1
(Neo)liberalism
is
characterized
by
certain
policy
recommendations, including, among other things, trade liberalization,
foreign direct investment, and property rights. 193 In the intellectual
property world, this (neo)liberal emphasis on property rights resonates
very deeply with the dominant rationale for exclusive rights conferred
187 Rittich, supra note 34. For a slightly more critical (neo)liberal perspective, see Amy L.
Chua, The Paradoxof Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 287 (2000) (exploring the tensions and contradictions between free markets and democracy,
focusing on three mediating factors-material redistribution, political exclusions and restraints,
and ideology); cf Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and Development, 102 MICH. L. REV.
1044 (2004) (reviewing AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET
DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003)).
188 See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 23; SEN, supra note 1; JAGDISH
BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK (1991).
189 Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-And Back Again: The Fate of the
Multilateral TradingRegime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 99 (2002):
At the hands of this trade policy elite, 'embedded liberalism' came to be recast as
economics, and economics became ideology, the ideology offree trade. The central
notion that governed the conception of the relationship of trade policy to domestic
policy generally was that wherever trade barriers such as tariffs had direct pricedistorting effects in the market of the importing country, removal of those barriers
enhanced aggregate domestic welfare in that the total gains to consumers could be
shown always to exceed the total losses to producers/workers. Put in this crude way,
the case for trade liberalization appeared to be totally indifferent to any notion of a just
distribution of benefits and burdens from the removal of trade restrictions.... How
then, was the insider network able to turn a blind eye to these issues of distributive
justice? Above all, through the notion that gains to the winners should allow us to
fully compensate the losers from removal of trade restrictions, while still netting an
aggregate welfare gain.
190 See Caio M. Pereira Neto, Development Theory and Foundations of Universal Access
Policies 3-29 (Aug. 2005) (unpublished J.S.D. Thesis, Yale Law School), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/student/papers/12 (describing the focus by mainstream development
economists on efficiency and growth).
191 Rittich, supra note 34, at 202-03:
[A]t least at the rhetorical level, social issues have now been accepted both as ends of
development in and of themselves and as important factors to the achievement of
general economic growth. As a result, issues ranging from human rights to gender
equality no longer stand outside the development agenda, nor is their importance to
economic development still seriously debated.
192 CONSULTATIVE BOARD, THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2004), available at http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/wtosymp05/futureWTO.pdf.
193 PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2, at 52 (listing ten policy recommendations). See infra
Section III.B for a further explanation of public goods theory.
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by copyrights and patents.194 Moreover, the WTO Agreement, of which
TRIPS is an annex, is based on a free trade rationale: that economic
growth is achieved most efficiently through free trade. Within the
TRIPS framework, liberalizing trade includes addressing the problem of
non-existent or weakly enforced domestic intellectual property
systems,1 95 so as to correct "trade distortions" caused by free-riding.
Thus, much of the economic literature on intellectual property and
development focuses on the impact of liberalizing intellectual property
laws-which translates into increased state intervention by
strengthening them--on foreign direct investment in developing
countries. 96 Foreign direct investment is thought to be an optimal way
for developing countries to increase their knowledge capacity, technical
97
innovation and ultimately their economic growth. 1
One important consequence of this (neo)liberal paradigm on global
intellectual property policy-making is that the policy debate over other
development concerns, such as access to essential medicines, is not
easily expressed in intellectual property law or trade law generally.
These demands for intellectual property to accommodate development
concerns have been nurtured instead within separate human rights or
public health paradigms. Not only have these attacks on intellectual
property norms been collateral ones, but they also have arguably failed
to alter the basic assumptions of either the intellectual property or the
trade paradigms. 198
A second consequence of the (neo)liberal world view is that
standards grounded in economic rationales, by virtue of being hard194 This will be developed at length infra Section IIIB. discussing global public goods.
195 See RYAN, supra note 83. Pamela Samuelson describes three trade distortions related to
intellectual property. Samuelson, supra note 55, at 97 ("[l]nadequate substantive laws that allow
pirates to operate legally; ... inadequate procedural or remedial rules that impede effective
enforcement.... and lack of enforcement of facially adequate laws and procedures."). But see
Letter from Jagdish Bhagwati to Editor of The Financial Times (Feb. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.columbia.edu/-jb38/FT%2Letter/ 2Oon%20IPP.pdf (arguing against intellectual
property laws in the WTO as early as 1990 in his Harry Johnson lecture in London, and stating
that "[i]ntellectual property protection ... is for most poor countries a simple tax on their use of
such knowledge, constituting therefore an unrequited transfer to the rich, producing countries");
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 182-85 (2004) (critiquing the harmful

lobbying by intellectual property industries, resulting in the inappropriate insertion of intellectual
property rules within the WTO).
196 See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 9, at 11-15 (summarizing studies); SHAHID ALIKHAN,
Soc1o-ECONOMIc

BENEFITS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

PROTECTION IN

DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES (2000); Carlos A. Primo Braga & Casten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual
PropertyRights and Foreign DirectInvestment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 163 (1998).
197 Accord Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development, supra note 88, at 515-16.
198 See, e.g., Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 146; Okediji,
Toward, supra note 55, at 83-84 (contrasting the "instrumentalist school of thought" that is
opposed to linkage between trade and other disciplines with the "utilitarian school of thought"
regarding trade policy, where trade policy is seen as an instrument of foreign policy and thus
encourages some linkage of human rights and environmental protection concerns to the trade
framework).
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wired into TRIPS, are privileged over possible alternative rationales
based on different models of development. These economically-based
"first principles" of intellectual property might be modified
subsequently with so-called soft law exhortations such as WTO Council
Directives, non-binding statements by other international governmental
organizations such as U.N. agencies and/or exploitation of interstices
within the treaty text. 199 Nonetheless, both the successful attempt to
hard-wire 200 an alternative purpose to TRIPS through references to
development, as well as subsequent soft law interventions, take on the
quality of after-thoughts to the obvious primacy of the economic
rationales.
Recall that making "room to manoeuvre" 20 1 around the mandatory
minimum standards of TRIPS was the impetus behind the Group of 14's
proposal to insert the key terms into that document, as well as the
compulsory licensing provisions that became such a source of
contention in the debate over public health. 20 2 Yet these deliberate
references to "development" have proven to be relatively flabby shields
against the much more durable patent and copyright swords, at least
within the internal logic of intellectual property globalization.
(Neo)liberal concepts of development mean that the term
"development" is already captured by a discourse that privileges the
efficiency norms and incentive rationale of intellectual property, rather
than the human development and basic needs approach favored by those
advocating access to goods protected by intellectual property.
Development agencies such as the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) stand ready to provide
technical assistance and help with "capacity-building" 20 3 for countries
199 Soft law is defined as "rules which are neither strictly binding nor completely void of any
legal significance." JANIS, supra note 64, at 52-53 (quoting Rudolf Bernhardt, Customary
InternationalLaw, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 62 (Rudolf Bernhardt
ed., 1984)). Laurence Heifer provides additional examples of soft law such as U.N. resolutions or
position papers. See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 25, at 78; Long, supra note 14, at 258.
Doris Long mentions model laws, restatements, legal guides, model rules, id.at 258, and joint
recommendations. Id. at 267.
200 Or "bake in," to use Lydia Loren's term. Lydia Pallas Loren, TechnologicalProtectionsin
Copyright Law: Is More Legal ProtectionNeeded?, 16 INT'L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 133,
139 (2002) (analyzing impact of WIPO Treaty on user rights; suggesting minimum level of use
rights modeled after the EU Information Society Directive).
201 WTO, Submission, supra note 32, at 3 para. 5
202 DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 74, at 145:

One of the key objectives of the US pharmaceutical industry was to set the strongest
possible limits on the use of compulsory licenses. The US proposal flowed from a
principle of prohibiting compulsory licenses subject to some exceptions. Other
countries started from the position tht such licenses could be granted subject to certain

conditions being met. Ultimately, the more liberal approach to compulsory licenses
prevailed.
203 As Peter Gerhart points out, "[b]ecause policymakers confront a world with no institutional
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unable to comply readily with intellectual property standards. 20 4 Other
specialized intellectual property agencies such as WIPO are pressed into
the service of educating the developing countries about their
20 5
insufficiently developed systems of intellectual property protection.
In this version of development, industry capture of international trade
20 6
negotiation processes is a given and not particularly problematic.
The recourse of less powerful countries to these exercises of naked
political power is, ex ante, to game the system, by anticipating what
developed countries might want and withholding it as a chip 20 7 or, ex
poste, to participate in more transparent and democratic global
20 8
governance systems.
But even within this (neo)liberal way of thinking about
development, many are registering strong reservations about the costs
that developing countries and their populations are bearing for the
liberalization of their markets. 20 9 Deep integration can only function
well under certain conditions. Open markets must avoid races to the
When
bottom and control opportunism, among other things.210
mechanism for making transfer payments between countries, we have relied on several forms of
Capacitycrypto-redistribution to build redistributive values into the global system.
building... depends on the kind of unilateral payments that are redistributive in nature."
Gerhart, supra note 39, at 76.
204 UNCTAD-ICTSD CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT ON IPRS, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS
AND DEVELOPMENT: AN AUTHORITATIVE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
(2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ResourceBooklndex.htm. In a recent
report issued by UNCTAD-ICTSD, various sectors relevant to intellectual property and
development were identified as:
TRIPS and public health;
WIPO's intellectual property agenda;
The need to determine internationally agreed principles for the development of intellectual
property standards; and
Ways to develop a pro-competitive international system of IP law.
See UNCTAD-ICTSD CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT ON IPRS, TOWARDS DEVELOPMENTORIENTED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY: ADVANCING THE REFORM AGENDA (2003),
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/ Bellagio2_Report.pdf.
205 WIPO-WTO Agreement, supra note 108.
206 RYAN, supra note 83.
207 See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 402-04 (2001) (providing summary of future issues related to
intellectual property in the WTO); Heald, supra note 4.
208 See, e.g., DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 74, at 18789. Writing slightly earlier, Doris Long accepts that "the effectiveness of harmonization
standards should be judged at least in part through their ability to facilitate trans-border trade,"
albeit "carefully balanced against competing concerns of equity and distributive justice." Her
policy prescriptions include greater transparency in decision-making processes. Long, supra note
14, at 260-68.
209 See, e.g., Howse, supra note 189.
210 Nancy Birdsall & Robert Z. Lawrence, Deep Integration and Trade Agreements: Goodfor
Developing Countries?, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS I, supra note 44, at 134 (Races to the bottom
occur when "developing countries ... [are] subject to constant pressure from potential investors
for lower standards in order to attract new investment." Moreover, "[flirms in developed
economies often have monopoly or market power in international trade, so that the international
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participating in open markets, there are special risks for developing
countries, which are particularly vulnerable to "a weak hand in
multilateral settings" 2 11 and "inappropriate standards. 2 1 2
Even
developed countries such as the U.S. cede autonomy over national
welfare concerns, including delicate domestic balances regarding the
proper level of intellectual property protection in specific industries or
213
for specific purposes.
Integrating intellectual property standards through TRIPS is
supposed to result in long term economic growth through innovation
across all member states, at the cost of short term decreases in access to
goods because of higher prices.
For developing countries, this
innovation-driven growth (created primarily through foreign direct
investment and accompanying technology transfer) may be an abstract
or perhaps even non-existent benefit. 2 14 Firms may not enter into the
poorest countries regardless of the level of intellectual property
protection they offer because no profit is likely to be made where
consumers cannot pay. 215 Eminent supporters of free trade such as
economist Jagdish Bhagwati state that
by th[e] test of mutual advantage, the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) does not belong to
the WTO. It facilitates, even enforces with the aid of trade sanctions,
what is in the main a payment by the poor countries (which consume
2 16
intellectual property) to the rich countries (which produce it).
Another economist deeply concerned with development, Jeffrey Sachs,
points to a global division in innovation and technological advance,
noting "roughly a 96-fold higher ratio of patents per capita in the top ten
countries than in the rest of the world. '21 7 And yet, in the area of
market in the product they produce or consumer deviates markedly from the competitive
model.").
211 Id. at 139.
212 Id. at 140-45.
213 Maskus & Reichman, supra note 9, at 20-28; see also Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note
60; Okediji, Toward, supra note 55.
214 CIPR REPORT, supra note 10, at 25-26 ("We conclude therefore that in most low income
countries, with a weak scientific and technological infrastructure, IP protection at the levels
mandated by TRIPS is not a significant determinant of growth. On the contrary, rapid growth is
more often associated with weak IP protection.").
215 CIPR REPORT, supra note 10, at 40-46 (documenting the complexity of factors, including
the presence or absence of intellectual property protection, that affect access to pharmaceuticals).
216 Josd E. Alvarez & Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: A Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
126, 127 (2002); accord BHAGWATI, supra note 195, at 182 ("But pharmaceutical and software
companies muscled their way into the WTO and turned it into a royalty-collection agency simply
because the WTO can apply trade sanctions.").
217 Jeffrey Sachs, The Global Innovation Divide, INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON., Apr. 2003, at
131, 132:
[T]he top ten innovating countries account for around 94% of all of the patents taken
out in the U.S. in the year 2000, yet these countries have a combined population of
only around 14% of the world's population....
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pharmaceuticals, the "rest of the world" has a demonstrable short term
218
need for affordable life-saving drugs.
Thoughtful observers across the political spectrum have voiced
increasing concern that the intellectual property minimum standards of
TRIPS are simply inappropriate for the poorest countries, and of
questionable benefit for some of the middle income countries. TRIPS
severely constrained the policy-making space for countries in areas of
critical concern for public health. For example, prior to TRIPS, India
was able to design a patent law policy that suited its national
circumstances. 21 9
Its current relative success in this intellectual
property-driven industry is attributable to this flexibility, which is no
longer available to countries at relatively low levels of development.
B.

Skeptical Views of Development

Skeptical ways of thinking about development share in common a
critique of (neo)liberalism. 220 To a greater or lesser extent, these
If we look at the bottom 128 countries (with population of at least I
million) .. . each of those countries has fewer than 150 patents. Those countries have
63% of the world's population, but only 1174 patents in the year 2000, or just 0.75% of
all the patents taken out in the U.S. that year.
Sachs serves as the current Director of the UN Millennium Development Project. See UN
Millennium Project, Who We Are, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/who/sachs.htm (last
visited Apr. 13, 2006).
218 Argentinean economist Carlos M. Correa states that "[t]he static-dynamic efficiency
rationale applicable to an industrial country does not necessarily hold where inequality is high.
Strong protection for intellectual property rights may have significant negative allocative
consequences in developing countries without contributing to-and even impeding-their
technological development." Carlos M. Correa, Managing the Provision of Knowledge: The
Design ofIntellectual Property Laws, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS II, supra note 44, at 410, 414
[hereinafter Correa, Managing];see also Carlos M. Correa, Pro-CompetitiveMeasures Under the
TRIPS Agreement to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing Countries, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 481 (2001). Indeed, many legal and economic scholars in the U.S. agree that
prematurely privileging intellectual property protection over a diffusion or public domain model
of knowledge goods production, whether in the U.S. or abroad, "could have deleterious effects on
global welfare." SELL, supra note 26, at 13 (citing numerous sources); see also STIGLITZ, supra
note 186, at 244-46.
219 Assad Omer, Access to Medicines: Transfer of Technology and Capacity Building, 20
WISC. J. INT'L L. 551, 559-61 (2002); Kumariah Balasubramaniam, Access to Medicines: Patents,
Prices and Public Policy-Consumer Perspectives, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 55, at 90, 101; accord Drahos,

An Alternative Framework,supra note 8, at 10:
Interestingly, India did not choose to abandon patent law as a tool of regulatory policy,
but instead to redesign it to suit her own national circumstances-a country with a low
R&D base, with a large population of poor people and having some of the highest drug
prices in the world. Passed in 1970, India's new patent law followed the German
system of allowing the patenting of methods or processes that led to drugs, but not
allowing the patenting of the drugs themselves.
220 David Slater, Contesting Occidental Visions of the Global: The Geopolitics of Theory and
North-South Relations, BEYOND LAW, Dec. 1994, at 97 (outlining four omissions from
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various schools of thought also assume historically-driven, pathdependent, structural impediments to development. Sometimes this is
attributed to the ongoing effects of colonization. 22' At other times,
economic determinism drives the analysis. 222 In yet other cases,
feminist 223 or post-colonial 224 insights result in the conclusion that the
current system is not designed to result in a level playing field between
developed and developing countries. Some post-development theorists
argue in favor of jettisoning the entire development system or forcing it
to go outside the rules that it has made for itself.225 As a member of that
school, Wolfgang Sachs argues that "development is a complex
contradictory phenomenon, one reflective of the best of human
aspirations and yet, exactly because great ideas form the basis of power,
subject to the most intense manipulation and liable to be used for
purposes that reverse its original ideal intent. ' '226 Yet, as Gordon and
Sylvester recently reiterated, "[d]evelopment has evolved into an
essentially incontestable paradigm with such a powerful hold on our
collective imaginations that it is almost impossible to think around
it."227

Skeptical approaches towards development are characterized by
their emphasis on the enduring nature of power differentials among
nation-states, as well as attention to forms of resistance 228 to these
differentials. They view the (neo)liberal development paradigm as

globalization discourse: (1) failure to connect contemporary power relations to historical
geopolitical relations; (2)failure of postmodern cultural critiques to account for the power of
neoliberal theories of globalization; (3) failure to critique newer forms of intervention, e.g., UN;
and (4) indifference to non-Western theoretical knowledges).
221 See Mahmud, supra note 68, at 26.
222 Dependency perspectives, which draw heavily on Marxist and neo-Marxist material
analysis, fall within this category. See PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2, at 14.
223 SHAWN MEGHAN BURN, WOMEN ACROSS CULTURES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 133-57
(2000).
224 See, e.g., HAUNANI-KAY

TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND

SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I (1999); EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979). See generally Vijay
Mishra & Bob Hodge, What is Post(-)colonialism?, 5 TEXTUAL PRACTICE 399-414 (1991),
reprintedin COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY 276, 276-90 (Patrick Williams
& Laura Chrisman eds., 1994); Ali Behdad, Traveling to Teach: Postcolonial Critics in the
American Academy, in RACE, IDENTITY, AND REPRESENTATION IN EDUCATION 40, 40-49
(Cameron McCarthy & Warren Crichlow eds., 1993); PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2, at
132-37; Cheryl McEwan, Postcolonialism, in THE COMPANION TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES,
supra note 37, at 127-30.
225 Esteva, supra note 14, at 25 (describing the various failed incarnations of development
including pure economic growth, integration with social growth, the so-called unified approach,
participative development, the basic needs approach, endogenous development, and, currently,
sustainable development and human development); see also PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2,
at 150-53. In the legal academic world, this perspective has been espoused by Tayyab Mahmud
as well as Ruth Gordon. See supra note 68.
226 Wolfgang Sachs, Introductionto THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 1.
227 Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 68, at 2.
228 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 72, at 13.

2006]

THE DEVELOPMENT DIVIDE

2869

based on a toxic "catching-up" rationale, 229 which immediately marks
certain countries as inferior because they are "less developed," while
masking the oppressive activities of "more developed" countries as
benign providers of technical assistance. 230 As Gordon and Sylvester
state,
the entire development project is premised on its subjects
"developing" into something else-and that something else is the
West. Thus, in the name of modernization, cultures have been
destroyed, communities uprooted or eradicated, and whatever
sovereignty emerging nations possessed has virtually disappeared.
The concept of development privileges certain societies, cultures and
the
institutions, while disparaging others; it is grounded in defining
231
transformation.
of
need
in
and
inferior
incompetent,
"Other" as
In contrast to the (neo)liberal approach, which views laws as
neutral rules of the development game, skeptical approaches tend to
view laws generally as instruments of domination, creating legal norms
and standards that are predictably and one-sidedly in favor of the
developed countries. 232 International law has played an important
justifying role in the evolution of (neo)liberal development ideology
(and, conversely, development ideology has contributed to the
Traditional international law
expansion of international law). 233
specialists generally are complicit with the more powerful states'
interests, which are themselves captured by the interests of global
corporate capital. 234 Moreover, over-reliance on a statist paradigm
results in paying insufficient attention to units of analysis other than
states. 235 So, for example, the role of social movements and indigenous
resistance to development is overlooked in many mainstream legal
236
analyses.
From a skeptical perspective, (neo)liberal legal scholarship often
over-relies on human rights as the primary accepted remedy to the
massive political, cultural, and social problems engendered by
development. 237 Indeed, the human rights response to development
229 Id.at 12, 16.
230 MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, An Evaluation of the Balance of Power with a View to Changing
the Present Order, in TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 76 (1979)

(explaining basic principles of the NIEO as a response to "the persistence of domination in the
form of neo-colonialism and imperialism" and critiquing "technical cooperation... [as] a
powerful agent in this 'legal prosthesis').
231 Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 68, at 5.
232 BEDJAOUI, supra note 230.
233 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 72, at 27.

234 Saskia Sassen, Whose City is It? Globalization and the Formationof New Claims, in THE
GLOBALIZATION READER 70-76 (Frank J. Lechner & John Boli eds., 2000).
235 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 72, at 32-33.
236 Id. at 3.

237 Obiora, supra note 29, at 358-59 ("[T]he vision of development operative in this Article is
a recipe for massive institutional transformation in lieu of the piecemeal strategy of crisis-
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encourages the continued compartmentalization of development, ruled
by economic thinking, from any non-economic concerns. 238 Similarly,
calls for increased democratization and participation are viewed
cynically, as mechanisms that appeal to political ideals while
23 9
maintaining material status quo.
Although the "right to development," declared by the U.N. General
Assembly in 1986, has the potential to collapse the boundary between
economic and non-economic development boxes, it has not yet been a
robust source of legal change. 240 Gordon and Sylvester document that:
As the lost development decade of the 1980s unfolded and these
movements collapsed, Third World states attempted to incorporate
development into the burgeoning rights discourse, and thus to
explicitly claim comprehensive development as a legal right....
These efforts in many ways mirror the larger evolution of the
development discourse; with the movement to establish a law of
international development, countries of the Third World seized the
legal initiative to establish development as a legally mandated
imperative.
...International law was an instrument that promoted the

interests of the North at the expense of the South. The South now
sought to turn the tables by using international law to re-order the
international political and economic sphere and to achieve the goal
24 1
of development.
The insistence by developing countries to include the term
"development" in the TRIPS agreement can be seen as part of a
"turnaround is fair play" proactive legal strategy. TRIPS imposed what
many suspected were inappropriately high minimum standards of
intellectual property protection upon developing countries and thus set
the stage for enduring structural inequity. 242 Indeed, as the previous
Section concluded, some (neo)liberal welfare economists who have
oriented analyses which isolate violations of human rights to the neglect of structural causes.");
cf Rittich, supra note 34, at 222:
[R]eferences to human rights within the development and market reform policies are
not necessarily references to human rights as they are understood by the international
human rights institutions, human rights scholars, the activist community or the wider
civil society. Rather, they are inevitably references to only a limited domain of human
rights, typically identified as basic human rights. While access to basic health care and
education may sometimes be described as a right, in general the [BWIs] seek the
language of human rights only in regard to civil and political rights.
238 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 72, at 216-17.
239 Id.at 144 ("Just as decolonization was the political precursor to modernization of the Third
World, democratization could then be the precursor to neoliberal globalization."). See generally
id. at 135-61 (chapter on democracy and the discontent of development).
240 See id.at 219-22; Gordon & Sylvester, supranote 68, at 61-64.
241 Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 68, at 49-51.
242 Sell points out, however, that there is contingency in this deterministic account, in that
TRIPS would not have occurred without mobilization of the OECD consensus and industry
agency. SELL, supra note 26, at 165.

2006]

THE DE VEL OPMENT DIVIDE

2871

examined this area have tentatively found that while the distributive

effects of pharmaceutical patents resoundingly redound to the benefit of
the developed countries, the dynamic benefit for developing countries is
243
uncertain at best.
Yet when developing countries attempted to invoke these
potentially ameliorative provisions in TRIPS, in justifying their
enactment of domestic "flexibilities" (such as when South Africa

attempted to invoke its parallel importation law 244 or Brazil its
compulsory licensing law 245), they have been met with strong-arm
tactics from countries such as the U.S. with substantial pharmaceutical
246
patent industries. Moreover, through ongoing section 301 pressure,
as well as the negotiation of so-called TRIPS-plus and other bilateral or
regional agreements, 247 the U.S. is currently by-passing the minimum

standards and the negotiated transition periods for developing countries
under TRIPS Articles 65 and 66, which were to allow developing
243 Maskus & Reichman, supra note 9, at 11-15 (summarizing empirical economic studies).
244 Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements:
Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 331, 349 (2004)
(describing dispute between the United States and South Africa and Brazil with respect to parallel
imports and compulsory licenses); Shubha Ghosh, State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on
Patent Rights, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 217 (2002) (same).
245 Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Inaugural Lecture Delivered on the Occasion of the
Acceptance of the Chair of European and International Intellectual Property Law (May 20, 2005),
The Development Agenda for Intellectual Property: Rational Humane Policy or "Modern-day
Communism?", available at http://www.unimaas.nl bestand.asp?id=3827 (describing the action
brought (and subsequently withdrawn) against Brazil by the U.S. before the WTO
(WT/DS199/I), based on the position that the Brazilian compulsory licensing provision for nonworking was in violation of Article 27(1) of TRIPS).
246 "Section 301" refers to unilateral action by the United States pursuant to the Trade Act of
1974. "Aimed at bolstering the leverage of U.S. trade negotiations, ...section 301 ... requires
the United States Trade Representative to identify foreign countries that provide inadequate
intellectual property protection or that deny American intellectual property goods fair or equitable
market access." Yu, Discontents, supra note 84, at 372 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A)).
However, as Yu further points out, "in United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974, the WTO dispute settlement panel confirmed that a member state could only pursue
unilateral sanctions after it had exhausted all actions permissible under the rules of the
international trading body." Id. (citing to Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the
Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS 152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). Therefore, according to Yu, section 301 is
more correctly viewed as a technique of public shaming, which costs the infringing country
political capital in the international trading system. Interestingly, though, many policymakers in
developing countries still respond to section 301 despite the WTO panel decision. E-mail from
Peter Yu, Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law, to author (Sept.
25, 2005) (on file with author).
247 Sanders, supra note 245, at 19 (describing over 40 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and
free trade agreements (FTAs) that provide for exclusivity of drug testing data, requiring more
than TRIPS); Drahos, An Alternative Framework,supra note 8, at 7:
Each new bilateral agreement that sets higher standards of intellectual property is
picked up by the MFN principle of TRIPS. The savings of MFN become significant as
more states enter into agreements with the US. If, for example, 29 states each enter
into a bilateral agreement with the US that contains the same provisions on intellectual
property, the MFN principle spreads those standards amongst all the states. Without
MFN, 435 agreements would be needed.
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countries more time for compliance. 248 Even laws designed as
concessions to developing countries, such as the technical assistance
249
provisions of TRIPS, rarely work to the advantage of these countries.
The same is true of the compulsory licensing provisions, such as the
Appendix to the Berne Agreement, because it was forged in the context
of an over-determined relationship between the developed countries and
their former colonies.2 50 From a perspective skeptical of development,
this simply illustrates a truism that law is always embedded in
institutions that operate politically in favor of the more powerful.
(Neo)liberal proposals about democratic participation in decisionmaking are yet another masked rhetorical game of enforcing the unequal
25
conditions of development. '
As put succinctly by Drahos, "[u]nderneath the development
ideology of intellectual property there lies an agenda of
underdevelopment. It is all about protecting the knowledge and skills of
the leaders of the pack. '252 Indeed, this quote from someone who works
squarely within a (neo)liberal framework suggests that intellectual
property globalization is so out of balance that (neo)liberal reformers
and skeptical critics of development are in fact converging in their

views.
C.

Conclusion

(Neo)liberal views maintain that growth necessarily results in an
increase in overall social welfare and thus are not so concerned with
distributional consequences.
Alternatively, social concerns are
248 SELL, supra note 26, at 123. "TRIPS-Plus" refers to bilateral agreements or regional
multilateral agreements, often denominated as "free trade agreements," in which minimum
standards that exceed the TRIPS minimum standards are negotiated. Examples of this include the
U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement Article 17.5 (requiring copyright term of life of the author plus
seventy years) as compared to TRIPS Article 9 (incorporating Berne Convention Article 7(1),
which establishes a term of life of the author plus fifty years). See also Abbott, supra note 69, at
97-99 (discussing details of the Central American Free Trade Agreement and the Australian Free
Trade Agreement).
249 Kirsten M. Koepsel, How Do Developed Countries Meet Their Obligations Under Article
67 of the TRIPS Agreement?, 44 IDEA 167 (2004) (describing difficulty in meeting reporting
requirements of Article 67 as well as technology transfer requirements under Article 66.2). One
way to view these provisions is that they serve to let off pressure from developing countries
and/or to justify the existence of development agencies, rather than to actually help the client
countries.
250 Okediji, SustainableAccess, supra note 136, at 156-62.
251 Rajagopal views mainstream development democracy efforts as the latest technology for
maintaining unequal relations between developed and developing countries. RAJAGOPAL, supra
note 72, at 143-44 (describing genesis of the link between development, peace and democracy in
early 1990s reports put out by the UNSG, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and extended by the World
Bank in the form of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)).
252 DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 74, at 12.
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incorporated into the (neo)liberal framework only to the extent that they
also demonstrably contribute to economic growth.25 3
While the
skeptical views contain some strains that reject economic growth as the
measure of development, it is safe to assume that the developing
country members of the WTO do view economic growth as a primary
vehicle of development. The question for them, however, is to what
extent economic growth should function as the sole measure of healthy
development.
As Obiora points out, "[g]iven the loaded framework for
development.., it is uncertain what development really is. For this
reason an outright repudiation of the concept without a viable
alternative may do more harm than good.1254 The brief sketch above
necessarily exaggerates the distance between two extreme views. There
is convergence between the two frameworks, with some (neo)liberal
255
institutions advocating "market-centered agendas for social justice
or "pro-poor growth agendas." 256
The next section describes

253 Rittich, supra note 34, at 236-37.
[BWIs] now have a series of enabling arguments for focusing attention on issues of
social and distributive justice. It is important, however, to recall that they retain two
basic limiting arguments from an earlier era. The first is that such issues may be
political; as such, they may fall outside the realm of factors that the[y] are authorized to
consider in their lending decisions. Second, the[y] maintain that they have no
independent, free-floating mandate to act as human rights enforcers; they are strictly
limited in their decisions to considerations that demonstrably further economic
development. As a result, they are only able [to] advance objectives such as human
rights or gender equality to the extent that they also contribute to economic growth.
These two arguments structure the engagement with human rights, distributive
concerns and other social justice claims.
Id.(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
254 Obiora, supranote 29, at 364.
255 Rittich, supra note 34, at 228-29:
These are projects that respond to issues ranging from gender equality to improved
corporate social responsibility and better labor standards in the new economy, largely
by relying upon market forces and market incentives. What both joins them together
and distinguishes them from other social justice projects is that they present the pursuit
of social objectives as essentially congruent and coterminous with the current direction
of institutional reform, if only they are approached in the right spirit and with a
property consciousness of governance norms.
256 Abbott, Development Policy, supra note 172, at 6.
What policies are needed to attack the complex phenomenon of poverty?
Development specialists and IDOs agree that effective development strategies must be
comprehensive. Almost all now accept that market reforms, trade, and competition are
essential to provide opportunities for pro-poorgrowth and address other problems. But
market reforms must be shaped and supported by innovative policies and institutions in
a range of issue areas.
The 1999 ADB Strategy incorporates a comprehensive approach aimed at
producing "socially inclusive development." It includes three main "pillars:" (a)
sustainable, pro-poor growth, coupled with policies to mitigate inequality; (b) social
development; and (c) good governance, including sound macroeconomic policy.
Id.(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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development approaches that straddle views driven purely by efficiency
concerns with those driven purely by distributional ones.

III.

EXPLORING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

In this section, two relatively recent nuances on the concept of
development are described: (1) the human capabilities approach
pioneered by the United Nations Development Programme, popularized
by economist Amartya Sen and advocated in legal scholarship by
philosopher Martha Nussbaum; and (2) the global public goods
approach, an interdisciplinary effort also being spearheaded by the
United Nations Development Programme. These two approaches are
grounded in (neo)liberal development economics rather than concepts
of development that are more based on political, cultural or postcolonial theory. In other words, they are more readily connected to the
concept of intellectual property, which, as it is currently framed, is
heavily influenced by the discourse of law and economics. Curiously,
therefore, the relevance of these two areas of development economics to
the term "development" as it appears in the key legal texts of
257
intellectual property globalization is relatively underexplored.
These newer ways of liberal thinking about development share a
common ground in at least three ways. First, they lead to strong claims
that intellectual property globalization must be much more attentive to
basic needs than it has been in the domestic context. Second, both
approaches express an abiding concern with questions of access and
distribution, questions that are strongly raised by the skeptical ways of
thinking about development. And finally, both point to the creation of a
substantive equality principle to guide intellectual property
globalization, similar to the creation of a substantive equality standard
of comparison in the area of development economics.
A.

The Human CapabilitiesApproach

As described by Martha Nussbaum:
The account of human capabilities has been used as an answer to a
number of distinct questions such as: What is the living standard?
What is the quality of life? What is the relevant type of equality that
257 Cf Pereira Neto, supra note 190, at 2 ("[Pjublic policies towards widespread access
information and communication technologies (ICTs) can impact the development process
three levels: (i) they tend to have a positive effect on economic growth; (ii) they contribute
expanding human freedoms (i.e. functionings and capabilities) and (iii) they contribute
reducing inequality.").

to
on
to
to
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we should consider in public planning? ... [T]he most illuminating
way of thinking about the capabilities approach is that it is an
account of the space within which we make comparisons 25
between
8
individuals and across nations as to how well they are doing.
The human capabilities approach was forged in the recognition that
while the standard economic measure of the standard of living-gross
domestic product (GDP) 259-measures economic growth, it does not
adequately measure economic development. According to this view,
economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition to
development because
an aggregate measure of growth... pays no attention to how that
output is distributed amongst the population; it says nothing about
the composition of output (whether the goods are consumption goods
investment goods or public goods such as education and health
provision), and it gives no indication of the physical, social and
260
economic environment in which the output is produced.
In 1979, economist Amartya Sen began questioning the use of
GDP as the measure of economic development, and began theorizing
towards a new approach, which ultimately became known as the
capability approach. 26 1 He defines
[t]he capability of a person [as] reflect[ing] the alternative
combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and from
which he or she can choose from one collection....
Some
functionings are very elementary, such as being adequately
nourished, being in good health, etc., and these may be strongly
valued by all, for obvious reasons. Others may be more complex,
but still widely valued, such as achieving self-respect or being
socially integrated. Individuals may, however, differ a good deal
from each other in the weights they attach to these different
functionings-valuable though they may all be-and the assessment
of individual and social advantages must be alive to these
variations. 262
258 Nussbaum, supra note 148, at 279.
259 Gross domestic product per capita is measured by the total amount of goods and services
produced per head of the populations. Thirlwall, supra note 37, at 41. Gross national product is
measured by the value of the "'total final output of goods and services produced by an
economy."' PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1989, at 291).

Currently, the World Bank uses "gross national income (GNI) per capita" as the prime
indicator of development. World Bank, Country Classification, http://www.worldbank.org/data/
countryclass/countryclass.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
260 Thirlwall, supra note 37, at 42.
261 As Sen so charmingly writes, "[Clapability is not an awfully attractive word. It has a
technocratic sound, and to some it might even suggest the image of nuclear war strategists
rubbing their hands in pleasure over some contingent plan of heroic barbarity." Amartya Sen,
Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 30 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen
eds., 1993).
262 Id. at 31.
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Both Sen and Nussbaum have attempted to define measures of
capability that correlate to development However, Sen's definitions
have been less categorical and more conceptually linked to freedom
since "[a]ccording to Sen, 'the category of capabilities is the natural
candidate for reflecting the idea of freedom to do', since 'capability to
function reflects what a person can do."' '263 Sen defines five distinct
types of freedom "that contribute, directly or indirectly, to the overall
freedom people have to live the way they would like to live. '264 Among
these are "arrangements that society makes for education, health care
and so on, which influence the individual's substantive freedom to live
265
better."
On the other hand, Nussbaum's list of basic human functions
derives from what she characterizes as an Aristotelian approach toward
the subject, and is offered as "a first approximation,. . . a story about
what seems to be part of any life we will count as a human life. '266 She
then goes on to define what should count as "certain basic functional
capabilities at which societies should aim for their citizens, and which
,,267
quality of life measurements should measure ....
This list includes:
Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length ....
Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be
adequately nourished ....
Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to think, and to
reason-and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a way
informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by
no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific
268
training ....
One of her purposes in articulating this more specific list of
capabilities is to "provide a basis for central constitutional principles

263 G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities,in THE QUALITY OF
LIFE, supra note 261, at 9, 24 ("Sen says that 'capability reflects a person's freedom to choose
between different ways of living."').
264 SEN, supra note 1, at 38.
265 Id at 39. Sen distinguishes between "functionings" and "capabilities." He states the "[t]he
functionings relevant for well-being vary from such elementary ones as escaping morbidity and
mortality, being adequately nourished, having mobility, etc., to complex ones such as being
happy, achieving self-respect ...." Sen, supra note 261, at 36.
266 Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities,Female Human Beings, in WOMEN, CULTURE
AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61, 75-76 (Martha C. Nussbaum &
Jonathan Glover eds., 1995) (listing basic human attributes). Sen's freedom approach has been
criticized as not sufficiently precise or measurable, and as insufficiently complex. See Pereira
Neto, supra note 190, at 36 (summarizing critiques).
267 Nussbaum, supranote 266, at 82.
268 Nussbaum, supra note 148, at 287. This list appears to be slightly different from the
version published in Human Capabilities, Nussbaum, supra note 266, and was apparently
"revised as a result of. .. recent visits to development projects in India." Id.at 286.
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that citizens have a right to demand from their governments. '269 Her
goal is to justify a normative political philosophy. 27 0 Although Sen
originally developed the approach squarely within the context of
welfare economics, 27 ' Nussbaum further contextualized it within
Rawlsian theories of distributive justice, feminist philosophy, and postcolonial debates over universalism versus relativism. 272 Throughout all
the philosophical debates, she maintains:
The basic intuition from which the capability approach begins ...is
that certain human abilities exert a moral claim that they should be
developed.... Human beings are creatures such that, provided with
the right educational and material support, they can become fully
capable of all these human functions .... When these capabilities
are deprived of the nourishment that would transform them into the
high-level capabilities that figure on the list, they are fruitless, cut
off, in some way but a shadow of themselves. They are like actors
who never get to go on the stage, or a musical score that is never
273
performed.
This insight has been adapted by the United Nations Development
Programme in its Human Development Report. Issued annually, it
relies on a "Human Development Index," which "measures
'development' in terms of longevity (life expectancy at birth),
knowledge (adult literacy and mean years of schooling), and income
sufficiency (the proportion of people with sufficient resources to live a
decent life). '274 Although it is an approach that emphasizes fairness in
addition to growth, it is important to understand that it includes a
growth measure (income sufficiency) and is not exclusive of economic
growth. Indeed, as argued in a later section of this Article, economic
efficiency is often enhanced by greater equality. 27 5
Why should intellectual property globalization heed this approach?
That it is an offshoot of welfare economics makes it highly relevant in
269 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:

THE CAPABILITIES

APPROACH 12 (2000). Elsewhere, she states that she aims to "provide the philosophical
underpinning for an account of basic constitutional principles that shoulo be respected and
implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human
dignity requires." Id. at 5.
270 Id.at 10.

271 For this work, Sen won a Nobel Prize in economics in 1998.
272 NUSSBAUM, supra note 269, at 1-33.
273 Nussbaum, supra note 266, at 88.
274 PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2, at 5; see also Pereira Neto, supra note 190, at 38
(attributing the adoption of the HDI to Mahbub ul Haq); Malhotra, supra note 41, at 17
(describing the Human Development Report, Human Development Index, and the capability
approach to measuring development). Moreover, there is growing movement within development
studies dedicated to expanding this approach.
See Human Development and Capability
Association, http://fas.harvard.edu/-freedoms/index.cgi (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
275 Pereira Neto, supra note 190, at 49-50 (discussing recent research indicating that "a more
equal distribution of wealth tends to bring stability and to align the incentives of individuals in the
direction of pursuing economic growth").
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any reconsideration of the instrumental purpose of intellectual property,
which in its current guise is heavily rationalized within an economic
framework. That it is grounded as well in political philosophy means
that it is connected to a set of normative justifications beyond simple
utility maximization and thus compels a fresh look at intellectual
property, perhaps through a more cosmopolitan set of theoretical norms.
In any event, a practical philosophical approach that asks what the goal
of government ought to be in providing its citizens with basic needs
comports with the instrumental purpose of intellectual property in
promoting "Progress" domestically or generating welfare globally.
B.

The Global Public Goods Approach

This section will explore another recent gloss on development that
has great potential to resonate with intellectual property globalizationglobal public goods theory. This is because, as all intellectual property
specialists are aware, public goods theory addresses the non-rivalrous
and non-exclusive qualities of goods. 276 In the case of intellectual
property, these goods are called knowledge goods.
The subject of intellectual property law-for example, a song
about ice cream 277-is quite different from the typical good in the
marketplace-ice cream itself. If the songwriter plays a song about ice
cream, I can listen to it without detracting from others also hearing it
either at the same time or later-thus it is nonrivalrous: consumption by
one does not prevent consumption by others.27 8 And if I'm playing the
song after having purchased a CD, anyone within hearing distance can
also listen to it-thus it is non-exclusive: payers and nonpayers alike
can benefit from the good. 279 By contrast, if I eat an ice cream cone,
276 Although the concept has roots dating back at least as far back as the Middle Ages in
Europe, Meghnad Desai, Public Goods: A HistoricalPerspective, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS II,
supra note 44, at 66, economist Paul Samuelson is widely credited with introducing the concept
of "public goods" to the rest of us in 1954. Id.at 64, 76 (citing Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory
ofPublicExpenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387-89 (1954)).
Public goods theory drifted from economic literature into intellectual property academic
discourse and was firmly implanted by the early 1980s. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 471 (2003); Edmund Kitch et
al., On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). For a brief
overview of this theoretical approach towards intellectual property, see generally ROBERT P.
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 10-18 (3d ed.
2003). See also ROBERT P. MERGES & JANE C. GINSBURG, FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 51-68 (2004).
277 SARAH MCLACHLAN, ICE CREAM (Sony Songs & Tydee Music 1993).

278 Kaul et al., Defining Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 1,supra note 44, at
2, 2-3 [hereinafter Kaul et al., Defining GPG].
279 Id; see also Todd Sandler, Assessing the Optimal Provision of Public Goods: In Search of
the Holy Grail, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS II, supra note 44, at 131.
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another person cannot eat that same cone-thus an ice cream cone is
rivalrous. And if I eat an ice cream cone after I've purchased it from the
local ice cream parlor, a person sitting next to me is not able to benefit
directly from its food energy-thus an ice cream cone is exclusive. A
public good is simply one that has the qualities of being both nonrivalrous and non-exclusive.
As the familiar narrative unfolds, unprotected knowledge goods
such as creative works or inventions may be subject to freeriding and
thus lead to sub-optimal levels of innovative activity. Hence the "public
goods problem." So to address this market failure, it is necessary for
the state to intervene by providing legal rights to exclude others in the
form of copyrights and patents. This will enable market transactions in
knowledge goods among rational, rights-bearing actors, and ultimately
encourage the production and widespread distribution of more
knowledge.
Without such legal rights to exclude others, the songwriter will
have little incentive to write songs, because listeners like me can
"freeride" on her efforts by listening without paying. Without such
rights, society may not fully internalize the benefit of producing
knowledge goods and thus goods may be under-produced. Without
such rights, there is market failure. Therefore intellectual property
rights (IPRs) come to the rescue. 280 In the international context, crossborder externalities-freeriding by country Y on country X's
2 81
innovations-can be prevented.
As economist Joseph E. Stiglitz states generally about public
goods: "The central public policy implication of public goods is that the
state must play some role in the provision of such goods; otherwise they
will be undersupplied. ' '282 In the case of knowledge goods, intellectual
property provides a legal incentive for authors and inventors to produce
them. Public goods theory locks powerfully into the (neo)liberal belief
in the primacy of property rights in the form of IPRs.
Foregrounded in this dramatic trajectory are efficiency and
dynamic long-term economic growth goals; footnoted, if acknowledged
at all, are equity or short-term costs or inefficiencies. In intellectual
property terms, the trade-off between short term costs and long run
growth is expressed by the conceptual difference between static and

280 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 1,

supra note 44, at 308, 311. The term 1PR is used more frequently by development economists
than by intellectual property scholars.
281 Scotchmer, supra note 81, at 415 ("I investigate both the incentive to join ... treaties and
the incentive to harmonize. As compared to an equilibrium in which the countries' policy makers
make independent choices, harmonization will generally strengthen protections. This analysis
recognizes that public sponsorship is sometimes an efficient alternative to intellectual property.").
282 Stiglitz, supra note 280, at 311.
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dynamic efficiencies. 283 Static efficiency is "achieved when there is an
optimal use of existing resources at the lowest possible cost" 284 and
dynamic efficiency is "the optimal introduction of new or better
products, more efficient production processes and organization, and
(eventually) lower prices. '285 Intellectual property law is said to
enhance dynamic efficiency (that is, the rate of innovation over the long
run) at the cost of static efficiency (increased prices and greater
impediments to access generated by intellectual property laws in the
short run), depending on the term of protection.
Public goods theory is a post hoc yet powerful (neo)liberal
rationalization of what the various Constitutional framers did when they
inserted an instrumental copyright and patent clause into Article I of the
Constitution, exhorting Congress to make these laws "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts. ' 2 8 6
Intellectual property
instrumentalism makes particular sense in the U.S. context where the
"rights" generated by the various intellectual property laws are viewed
predominantly as commercial rights rather than personal or human
rights, as they might be viewed in other western cultures, 287 and where
the "Progress" mandate of the Constitution became fused early on with
a market-driven economic system, resulting in the spectacular growth of
the U.S. into today's world's biggest superpower. 288 Who can argue
with success? The public goods story of intellectual property is a type
of winner's history. And, as described above, the policy framework
generated by the public goods tale has become an entrenched binary
analysis: How to balance rights to exclude with the countervailing need
for public access?
However, public goods theory is both much more limited as well
as more multivariate than this unadorned storyline suggests, depending
on the discipline outside of law to which one turns for further
elaboration. Thus, pure economic theory would apply the term "public
283 Id. ("The gain in dynamic efficiency from the greater innovative activity [from intellectual
property protection] is intended to balance out the losses from static inefficiency from the
underutilization of the knowledge or from the underproduction of the good protected by the
patent.")
284 Correa, Managing, supranote 218, at 411.
285 Id.
286 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

287 Most observers of the field agree that the competing paradigms (the natural rights
perspective and the personhood perspective) are minority perspectives within U.S. academic
discourse. Cf Alfred Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); Margaret Jane Radin, Propertyand Personhood,34 STAN. L. REv. 957
(1982).
288 See Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 97, 114-22 (1993); Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to
Promote? Defining "Progress" in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution,
or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REv. 754 (2001); Michael Bimhack, The Idea of
Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3 (2001).
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goods" to a tiny class of goods (perhaps only the military) whereas
sociologists and political scientists might apply it to any good the nonprovision of which generates largely negative externalities. Moreover,
the regulatory or policy consequences flowing from the designation of a
good as a "public good" are far more diverse than we are accustomed to
thinking about in the intellectual property arena: there are many ways to
incentivize innovation than to automatically privatize goods through a
scheme of exclusive rights such as patent or copyright.
Until recently, public goods have not been theorized much beyond
traditional notions of jurisdiction bounded by nation-states. 289 And in
the original formulation of public goods theory, there was a simple
public-private binary.
However, both the increasing pace and
proliferation of international decision-making among nation-states, as
well as among states and other institutions such as IGOs, NGOs, or
CSOs, 290 have catalyzed various development scientists and
policymakers to rethink the concept of public goods within an explicitly
29 1
global framework.
These global public goods theories build on the longstanding
insight that many public goods, including knowledge goods, are not
pure public goods, but rather are a mix of public or private-or are
"impure" public goods. 292 Lawmakers and policymakers choose where
on the continuum of public to private to set certain levels of rights, and
where corresponding duties or countervailing rights may be appropriate.
It is not inevitable that a public good be privatized to cure market
failure, nor is it written in stone that a private good must remain private
if it has partial public good characteristics (partly non-rivalrous and/or
non-exclusive). In other words, the "public-ness" of a good is in part
293
socially constructed.
"Publicness and privateness are highly variable and malleable
social norms. '294 Particularly due to the proliferation of global actors,
289 Kaul et al., Introductionto GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS I, supra note 44, at xix, xxiii ("[Plublic
goods analysis has been applied to global problems. But there has been surprisingly little
examination of what global public goods really are-and few attempts to map out a typology of
such goods.").
290 John Boli & George M. Thomas, World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of
InternationalNon-Governmental Organizations, in THE GLOBALIZATION READER, supra note

234, at 262; David Held & Anthony McGrew, Political Globalization: Trends and Choices, in
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS II, supra note 44, at 185.
291 Kaul et al., Why, supra note 45, at 2, 5:
The analyses reveal that the provision of global public goods occurs largely without the
benefit of relevant, up-to-date theory. Public goods theory often lags behind the
rapidly evolving political and economic realities-marked by a state-centric and
national focus and, consequently, providing poor support for advice on the provision of
global public goods in today's multiactor world.
292 Drahos, supra note 43, at 47.
293 Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 50, at 86.
294 Kaul et al., Why, supra note 45, at 8; see also Kaul et al., Global Public Goods: Concepts,
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including non-state actors, the concept of public requires critical reexamination in a global regulatory environment. The public can no
longer simply be reduced to the state; the public includes civil society,
corporations, as well as the state-and in the context of globalization,
"transnational nonstate, non-profit actors. '295 Indeed, Meghnad Desai
claims that the provision of today's public goods has a "neomedieval
character... [because] multiple authorities of varying power are
'296
involved at different levels of jurisdiction.
Just as public goods (knowledge) can be turned by policy choices
into private goods (as through intellectual property laws), 297 the reverse
is true as well. Private goods such as education can be made the subject
of public provision through the public education system. 298 In the latter
example, public education has been made into a de facto public good
because it has been assigned the quality of nonexclusivity as a matter of
social choice. 299 This suggests that the qualities of goods that make
them "public goods" or "private goods" are not inevitable, natural, or
devoid of social context-except for a very small subset of goods such
as sunshine or air. What might make a good, such as education,
especially important to categorize as "'public" is whether its
300
nonprovision has externalities that are largely negative.

Policies and Strategies, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS I, supra note 44, at 450, 479 [hereinafter Kaul
et al., Concepts, Policies and Strategies]:
[P]ublicness and privateness are not fixed attributes.
Indeed, if the requisite
technologies are available, the publicness of a good can be influenced by policy.
Making a good more private will increase the chance that it will be provided, even in a
decentralized setting. Two methods may be used: assigning property rights or
internalizing externalities.
295 Kaul et al., Why, supra note 45, at 10.
296 Desai, supra note 276, at 63. One example of this might be the Motion Picture Export
Association, which is a U.S. industry group qualified as a "legal export cartel under the WebbPomerene Export Trade Act of 1918... [referring to itself as] 'a little State Department."'
DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM,

supra note 74, at 175.

Another

example is IANNA, which parcels out Internet Domain names. Anupam Chander, The New, New
Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715 (2003).
297 Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 50, at 80-84; see also Aoki, supra note 21, at 28-46
(deconstructing public/private distinction upon which intellectual property rights in knowledge
goods are based); Samuelson, supra note 55, at 98 (describing the phenomenon of "incomplete
commodification" of knowledge goods, evidenced in part by the public subsidies of artistic
production, and comparing that to the skepticism with which public subsidies of manufactured
goods are viewed).
298 Kaul et al., How to Improve, supra note 45, at 22.
299 Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 50, at 87 (proposing an expanded definition of public goods
to include "three groups: technically nonexcludable, public by policy design, and inadvertently
public"); see also Kaul et al., How to Improve, supra note 45, at 22-23 ("The revised, two-level
definition [of public goods] is as follows: Definition 1: Goods have a special potential for being
public if they have nonexcludable benefits, nonrival benefits, or both. Definition 2: Goods are de
facto public if they are nonexclusive and available for all to consume.").
300 Desai, supra note 276, at 68 (arguing that in 19th century Britain, the fight for urban
infrastructure such as water and sanitation made these goods "public in the sense that they were
almost universally beneficial or at least beneficial for a large group").
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Thus, public goods theorists include an enormous array of things
under the rubric of potential public goods. As stated earlier, states
themselves can be viewed as public goods, as can markets and legal
regimes. 30 1 The U.N. Secretary-General has identified ten global public
goods of particular importance globally, including: "Basic human
dignity for all people, including universal access to basic education and
including
health care" and "[c]oncerted management of knowledge,
'302
rights.
property
intellectual
for
worldwide respect
Global public goods theorists are from disciplines other than
economics, and thus there has been more work done on the question of
political power as it relates to the distribution of public goods. In other
words, the definition of global public goods is not just technical: Does a
good possess non-exclusive, non-rivalrous characteristics? It is also
profoundly political: Who wins and who loses from the presence or
absence of public goods? 30 3 Moreover, some theorists focus not only on
under-supply of public goods (or over-supply of public bads), but also
unequal access to global public goods. 3°4 This includes further parsing
of different reasons for deficient provisions, which may include
"underuse, underprovision, undersupply, malprovision, overuse, and
various access problems. '30 5 These various beneficiary questions
30 6
differentiate this approach from the standard public goods approach.
Coupled with this awareness of inclusion and exclusion on a global
level is a focus on process: "whether the public, including all interested
groups, actually has a say in the decision-making process on how much
30 7
of the good to produce and how to organize the production process.

301 Kaul et al., Why, supra note 45, at 7; Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 50, at 88.
302 Kaul et al., How to Improve, supra note 45, at 44, 58 (citing The Secretary-General, Road
Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doe A/56/326 (Sept. 6, 2001)). One of the central challenges of public
goods theory is how to determine preferences. Desai, supra note 276, at 70-73. Although
preferences may vary across different levels of development, I am assuming here that everyone
has a preference for certain basic human needs such as food, health and education.
303 This is important because
we live in a highly divided and inequitable world where some actors are more
influential than others in setting public policy agendas and where some goods, even
supposedly public goods, are more easily accessible to some people than to others.
Answering the beneficiary question and assessing the good's scope of publicness
will.., help in analyzing-and correcting-supply problems... [and] can provide
clues to who is free riding on whom and need[s] incentives to cooperate.
Kaul et al., Defining GPG, supra note 278, at 9; see also Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 50, at 92
(the "triangle of publicness" includes "[p]ublicness in the distribution of(net) benefits").
304 Conceido, supra note 49, at 152.
305 Kaul et al., How to Improve, supranote 45, at 26.
306 Chander & Sunder, supra note 20, at 1331-39 (questioning the distributional benefits of a
public domain framework); Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 50, at 89 ("More than the notion of
public goods, the concept of the public domain is actively and often heatedly debated.").
307 Kaul, et al., Concepts, Policies and Strategies, supra note 294, at 479; see also Kaul et al.,
How to Improve, supra note 45, at 24 (explaining the triangle of publicness).
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Participation by those directly affected by the provision of public goods,
rather than reliance upon "experts" or the arrogation of critical decisionmaking by technical elites, 3 8 has high normative value in global public
goods theory.
Finally, while sustainability, like development, is a contested
concept, 309 the proponents of a global approach state that "at a
minimum, a global public good would meet the following criteria: its
benefits extend to more than one group of countries and do not
discriminate against any population group or any set of generations,
present or future. '310 This sustainable development principle, like the
beneficiary question and the participation question, is directly
concerned with distributional issues.
The classic story of public goods as applied to the knowledge
economy is tidy and, like all elegant theories, has the virtue of
simplicity. Yet it has also had the unwitting (and, from a skeptical
development approach, devastating) result of excising critical variables
out of the intellectual property policy analysis. The only market failure
or externality accounted for is the failure to internalize the costs of
innovation. Thus, the plot always leads to the conclusion that propertylike rights are desirable as a starting point.
Whether framed by the disciplines of political science or
international relations, where the concern is to avoid prisoner's
dilemmas, or by the economist's perspective of avoiding negative
externalities, global public goods theory is a fresh look at a (neo)liberal
theory badly in need of repair in a globalized context.

IV.

A PROPOSED SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY NORM

While the previous sections have demonstrated that there is no
consensus on how to think about development, there are, nevertheless,
predominant ways of thinking about development. Specifically, the
(neo)liberal approach to development mutually reinforces the narrow
public goods discourse of intellectual property. Thus, it is no accident
that much of the scholarship of intellectual property globalization
308 Cf STIGLITZ, supra note 186, at 53-88 (comparing the mistakes made by the experts at the
IMF with the freedom needed for developing countries to choose appropriate paths of
development); Kaul et al., How to Improve, supra note 45, at 28 ("The lack of publicness in
decisionmaking can weaken the technical soundness of policy choices, undermine the legitimacy
and credibility of organizations, and erode the sense of policy ownership so essential for effective
follow-up to international agreements.").
309 Esteva, supra note 14, at 16 ("[l]n its mainstream interpretation, sustainable development
has been explicitly conceived as a strategy for sustaining 'development', not for supporting the
flourishing and enduring of an infinitely diverse natural and social life.").
310 Kaul et al., Defining GPG, supra note 278, at 16.

20061

THE DE VEL OPMENT DIVIDE

2885

continues to perpetuate intellectual property insularity. The challenge is
to move beyond this insularity towards a more intersectional dynamic.
In this section, I argue that a principle of substantive equality is
required. It is not enough to insist on procedural fairness or that
countries adhere to formal equality in the form of national treatment
coupled with minimum standards. There must also be a focus on
At a minimum-in the absence of new
substantive equality.
multilateral agreements or amendments to TRIPS or to other
multilateral instruments such as the Berne Convention, or to WIPO's
governing documents-I propose that this substantive equality principle
be integrated throughout intellectual property globalization decisionmaking via a legal rule akin to the strict scrutiny doctrine in U.S.
constitutional law. This doctrine generally allows decision-makers to
review and strike down government regulation under a non-deferential
standard of review (also known as strict scrutiny review) where that
state-granted right will interfere substantially with a suspect category.
By analogy, the decision-maker will exert strict scrutiny review where
the regulation (in this case, the government intervention in the form of
the grant of an exclusive right over intellectual property or the
withholding of an exception or limitation of that exclusive right)
conflicts with a basic need (in this case, the provision of a developmentsensitive human need, as defined in part by the Millennium
Development Goals). This principle of equality would be applied both
domestically as well as in international decision-making venues.
The human capability approach and the global public goods
approach to development support this proposal. These branches of
welfare economics attend to basic human needs and not just overall
wealth maximization. Both approaches explicitly address distributional
issues, questions that increasingly blemish the wealth generating
rationale of intellectual property. And both ways of thinking about
development have been accepted by mainstream development
institutions within the United Nations.
In the current rule-generating and rule-interpreting environment of
intellectual property globalization, the presumption has been that
intellectual property is good because it promotes economic growth. But
as the area of development economics shows, economic growth is not
synonymous with economic development. Intellectual property can no
longer afford to be insular, as if it does not affect or is not affected by
the provision of other global public goods. Explicit connections must
be made between intellectual property and other global public goods
addressing basic development needs, including food, education as well
as the already highly publicized health care sector. Intellectual
property, after all, cannot "take root" absent a basic national capacity,
which can only be developed with a population that has its essential
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Much of the discussion of intellectual property

globalization has taken pitched a fairly high level, for example, about
the benefits of sharing scientific research, the impact of digital
technology, and so on. It bears keeping in mind that much of the
world's

population

lacks

access to

essential

education, and basic health care. 313

nutrients, 3 12 basic

Basic needs have been

underemphasized in much of the debate about what to do about

intellectual property globalization.
Even more interesting though is that much of the fairness
discussion in the legal literature on intellectual property globalization so
far has focused on the question of procedural fairness. For example,
several writers have called for "democratic property rights," 314 in which
intellectual property rule-setting and rule interpretation take place with
full information and active participation by all affected parties. Notions

akin to forum-shifting and joinder of parties have also been
discussed, 3 15 as well as procedural mechanisms akin to burdens of proof
or presumptions to check the power of the DSU to override national
welfare considerations. 316 While these efforts to inject more procedural
equality into intellectual property globalization are positive, I suggest

that much more is required.
I explore these two points further below.

311 CIPR REPORT,

supra note

10, at 23; see also 3D, IN-DEPTH STUDY SESSION

ON

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005), available at http://www.3dthree.org/

pdf_3D/3DIPHRStudySessreporteng.pdf, at 4-8 (discussing the relationship of intellectual
property to education, food and health).
312 Although this Article does not address the issue of food security and plant genetic
resources, they too could be addressed within the basic needs framework presented here. See
generally Michael Blakeney, Agricultural Research: Intellectual Property and the CGIAR
System,

in

GLOBAL

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHTS:

KNOWLEDGE,

ACCESS

AND

DEVELOPMENT, supra note 55, at 108; Sol Picciotto, Defending the Public Interest in TRIPS and
the WTO, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 55, at 224; Keith Aoki, Malthus, Mendel and Monsanto: Intellectual
Property and the Law and Politics of Global FoodSupply: An Introduction, 19 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 397 (2004); Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 247 (2003); Carmen G. Gonzalez, InstitutionalizingInequality:
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 433 (2002) (arguing that asymmetries in WTO work to the benefit of developed
countries with food subsidies and against the interests of developing countries who are forced into
market open-ness).
313 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2005), available
at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005.
314 DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 74, at 15; Long,

supra note 14, at 217; Boyle, supra note 13, at 7; Shaffer, supra note 145, at 901-07.
315 See supra Section I.C.
316 See supra Section I.C.
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From IntellectualPropertyInsularity to Intersectionality

From a global public goods perspective, there is no hierarchy
among different global public goods. This can lead us out of the
intellectual solipsism generated by a purely intellectual propertyoriented public goods approach. International legal regimes can be
viewed as types of intermediate global public goods, "which contribute
towards the provision of final global public goods. '3 17 Indeed, global
public goods theorists urge the production of more international
agreements and institutions to facilitate the production of public goods.
One way of looking at this is that the WTO or WIPO carries the
potential to build knowledge capacity and push countries towards
creating more sophisticated legal systems, which in turn catalyze
economic development generally. Nonetheless, although the existing
intellectual property framework may treat TRIPS as a type of
unmitigated global public good, other public goods merit equal if not
318
greater consideration.
The WTO Ministerial's Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health was a product of accounting for at least
four separate public goods within a trade framework. Of course, the
primary public good from the intellectual property perspective is the
TRIPS regime and the increased innovation that it is supposed to foster.
However, in addition, the WTO had to consider that knowledge of
antiretroviral drug therapy, whether or not protected by intellectual
property law, is a public good that might need to be disseminated in
ways other than through the intellectual property system of exclusive
rights. Good health is also a global public good because it generates
positive externalities from which everyone, not just the individual,
benefits. The devastating effect of AIDS in many developing countries
makes this point without any further need for elaboration. And finally,
equity (as discussed further below) was a strong public good variable
that drove the final result.
As described earlier, by relying on key terms in TRIPS Article 8
that were intended to function as a type of "development check" to a
purely economic analysis, developing countries challenged high
protectionist patent standards set by the U.S. and other developed
countries, and ultimately forced the WTO to changed inappropriate
compulsory licensing provisions.
From a perspective informed by human capabilities and global
public goods theory, however, this case study does not stop with the
317 Kaul et al., Defining GPG,supra note 278, at 13.
318 Shaffer, supra note 145, at 895-901 (building on this complexity insight when he suggests
that it is important to focus on who the participants are in TRIPS-related disputes because of the
variety of different stake-holders involved in the outcome).
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triumphant issuance of the Doha Declaration. The final WTO General
Council decision in August of 2003 imposed a bureaucratic structure for
compulsory licensing. 319
Compulsory licensing provisions in
international agreements, e.g., the Berne Appendix, are generally hardfought but not deployed favorably for developing countries. 320 There
are potential and actual roadblocks to effective implementation of the
General Council Decision. 32 1 Thus the Doha Declaration and General
Council Decision are political concessions to developing countries, but
in reality may be more symbolic than practical in nature.
The deep integration of legal regimes required by TRIPS will lead
inevitably and repeatedly to the imposition of inappropriately high
standards of intellectual property protection for developing countries.
This, in turn, can result in the continual denial of certain basic human
needs from being met, unless those global public goods are given
priority at all possible decision points over other intermediate public
goods such as legal regimes. The injection of a substantive equality
principle at each of the decision points before and subsequent to the
Doha Declaration would ensure that the legal text would be construed
and applied in a way that defers to the basic needs of those who require
access to the patented drugs.
The language of "limitations" and "exceptions" or the existence of
flexibilities, whether through the mechanisms of parallel imports or
compulsory licensing, might provide room in international intellectual
property instruments to allow access to basic, first order human needs
without the wholesale stripping away of patents or copyrights.
However, these provisions have more often than not been construed
against the needs of users. A substantive equality principle would
provide a minimum threshold of access in the context of basic needs, to
what has been termed a "one-way ratchet" in favor of the rightsowner. 322
B.

From Proceduralto Substantive Equality

One question that might be
proposals to enhance procedural
public goods theorists propose
stakeholders and decisionmakers"

posed at the outset is: Why aren't
fairness sufficient? Indeed, global
a norm of "matching circles of
in order "to create opportunities for

319 See Abbott, Hydra, supra note 105, at 414-15; James Love, Consumer Project on
Technology, CPTech Statement on WTO Deal on Exports of Medicines, Aug. 30, 2003,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/cptech08302003.html.
320 Okediji, SustainableAccess, supra note 136, at 162-68; Story, supra note 158, at 788.
321 See Abbott, Hydra, supra note 105, at 414-15.
322 Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note 3, at 914.
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all to have a say about global public goods that affect their lives. '323
Such an approach is less likely to lead to the sense of marginalization
that has led many to equate globalization with the unilateral imposition
of standards and norms upon the developing world that are more
suitable for rich countries. 324 The perception (based often on reality)
that global public goods agendas were set or decisions made without
collaboration or participation by affected nations has surfaced at the
activist level as exemplified by the "battle in Seattle," 325 as well as in
326
the popular critiques of globalization.
The participation question even could be viewed as a type of
distributional question: How is decision-making power distributed?
One
challenge is to match the
"structure
of political
decisionmaking ... with the range and type of a good's spillover
effects. ' 327
As various legal academics have pointed out, the
international regimes that determine intellectual property law and policy
are often Byzantine and have no formal relational lines of decisionmaking authority. 328 NGOs and CSOs are increasingly involved in
setting state and international policy-making and yet their roles,
influence and representativeness are uncertain. 329 Another challenge
with respect to procedural fairness is to give more voice to poorer
nations, who are structurally disadvantaged by having fewer
informational resources, and fewer chips to put on the bargaining table
330
than the richer countries have.

323 Kaul et al., Why, supra note 45, at 5.
324 Id. at 12.

325 Cecelia Albin, Getting to Fairness: Negotiations Over Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOODS II, supra note 44, at 264.
The needfor active involvement in setting agendas
Efforts to launch another round of multilateral trade talks at the 1999 WTO
meeting in Seattle collapsed partly over this matter. Major industrial countries
suggested negotiations on issues of little immediate priority for developing countries,
such as electronic commerce, investment policy, and labor and environmental
standards. Developing countries, for their part, insisted on the need for further
progress in removing barriers to their exports of textiles and agricultural products
before debating new concerns.
Id.
326 See THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON GLOBALIZATION, ALTERNATIVES TO ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION: A BETTER WORLD IS POSSIBLE 56-61(2002).

Kaul et al., How to Improve, supra note 45, at 28.
328 See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 25, at 8 (describing "the existence of multiple,
discrete regimes, any one of which may plausibly serve as a site for future policy development,
[which] leaves considerable room for maneuvering by different clusters of states (or states and
NGOs) seeking to maximize their respective interests").
329 Boli & Thomas, supra note 290; Michael Edwards & Simon Zadek, Governing the
Provision of Global Public Goods: The Role and Legitimacy of Nonstate Actors, in GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOODS II, supra note 44, at 200.
330 Kaul et al., How to Improve, supra note 45, at 30-3 1; Shaffer, supranote 145, at 895-907.
327
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Thus, ensuring procedural fairness is certainly an important
dimension of intellectual property globalization. But there is growing
evidence that international cooperation on the provision of public goods
depends on actual and perceived equity in the formulation, substance
and outcome of international agreements.
Equity impacts efficiency in several ways. The first two are what
33 1
J. Mohan Rao calls the enabling and lubricating functions of equity.
Equity functions in an instrumental way to promote cooperative
behavior in the shared production of public goods, thus enabling a
greater volume of public goods to be produced than would be produced
in its absence. 332 Related but not identical to this observation, "norms
of fairness and justice provide focal points around which social conflict
can be mitigated and efficiency-enhancing social bargains made," and
333
thus equity "lubricates" the process of cooperation.
Finally and most significantly, equity itself is a public good that
may be undersupplied if attention is not paid to mechanisms for
facilitating its production. 334 As Lisa Martin writes:
[w]e can also see a growing consensus that failure to assure a
relatively equitable distribution of benefits from cooperation can
prevent, or at least greatly delay, the creation of cooperative
mechanisms. While legal scholars, sociologists and philosophers
tend to trace this fact to deeply embedded norms of fairness, political
scientists focus more on bargaining incentives and the desire of
actors to increase their share of any benefits produced. If lack of
equity prevents the creation of cooperative mechanisms that could
benefit all, equity comes to take on some characteristics of a public
good. 335
Recognizing equity as an important global public good in its own
right comes from the pragmatic understanding that international
cooperation simply will not occur in the absence of an overall sense of
fairness and justice by relevant actors. Few public goods in a global
context can be produced by one nation or institution alone. And in the
deep integration and linkage bargaining context within which the WTO
TRIPS Agreement must operate, fairness becomes a critical factor for
331 J. Mohan Rao, Equity in a Global Public Goods Framework, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS I,
supra note 44, at 68, 70.
332 Id. at 70.

333 Id. at 82.
334 Id. at 70, 83.
335 Lisa Martin, The Political Economy of International Cooperation, in GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS 1, supra note 44, at 58; see also Kaul et al., Concepts, Policies and Strategies, supra note
294, at 475:
Inequity creates cross-border externalities in the form of social instability, ethnic
tensions and environmental damage. But in a truly global sense (as articulated by
[Amartya] Sen) it is also an inherently transnational issue and an issue of global,
system risk. The reason is that inequality has assumed such proportions that policies
"merely" aimed at creating a level playing field no longer suffice ....
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the success of intellectual property legal regimes. As Carlos Correa has
stated, "When the [knowledge] products are essential for life-as with
food and pharmaceuticals-allocative efficiency becomes an important
objective on both economic and equity grounds. ' 336 In other words,
equality tilts the balance towards static efficiency and away from
dynamic efficiency arguments, at least for resource-poor areas of the
world. A failure to understand that will lead to policy impasses.
Although an in-depth treatment of equity is beyond the scope of
this Article, Cecelia Albin suggests several fairness principles that
should be considered in any international treaty negotiation 337 and has a
number of suggestions for what she calls "getting to fairness. '338 One
of Albin's principles is the "needs" principle, which would "target the
world's poorest people or countries, regardless
of other
considerations. ' 339 Because the international intellectual property
regime of TRIPS currently functions on a "formal equality" rather than
actual equality basis, attention to the disempowered and resource-poor
can help to remedy the resulting disparities.
The inequitable nature of technical knowledge production and
capacity-building relevant to developing countries is starkly illustrated
by health care research and development, which focuses almost
exclusively on the diseases of the rich countries:
Protected by intellectual property rights, private industry naturally
focuses its technology development on products to serve affluent
consumers with effective purchasing power. Weak profit incentives
discourage commercial research and development investments on
diseases of the poor. Lacking market power, the diseases of the poor
are "orphaned" by benign neglect. Similar concerns over equitable
access are expressed about health-related information. Information
may be a global public good, but its meaning and utilization are
likely to vary with literacy, education and communications
infrastructure. 340

336 Kaul et al., Concepts, Policies and Strategies,supra note 294, at 411.
337 Albin, supra note 325, at 267.
338 Id. at 270-74. These suggestions include:
Creating a just and fair negotiating structure,
Formulating a broad, inclusive agenda,
Ensuring that all parties are represented,
Crafting clear, transparent rules,
Choosing a neutral and accessible venue,
Ensuring a fair negotiation process,
Giving all parties a say in selecting procedures,
Giving all parties an effective voice, and
Ensuring fair play.
Id.
339 Id. at 268.

340 Lincoln C. Chen et al., Health as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 1,
supra note 44, at 284, 294.
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Looking again at the case of patented pharmaceuticals, for twenty
diseases, 99% of the global disease burden is concentrated in low and
middle income countries. However, in 1992, less than 5% of the total
global R&D was spent on their health problems. 34 1 In 1996, only 0.5%
of pharmaceutical patents related to tropical diseases such as malaria.
U.S. patents dominate, with over 50% of the worldwide pharmaceutical
patents. A 1999 UNDP report indicated that 97% of patents worldwide
are held in developed countries, while 80% of patents in developing
countries also belong to owners of the rich countries. 342 There is little
evidence that TRIPS has changed this picture so far.343 Indeed,
economists agree that the global re-distributional effect of strengthening
intellectual property laws will benefit the U.S. predominantly and only a
handful of other developed countries in the short run, especially in the
pharmaceuticals sector. 344
Yet, TRIPS standards mandate patent
protection for pharmaceuticals (the year 2016 is now the "flexibility"
for LDCs) for all member nations of the WTO. Even this transitional
period for the poorest countries is viewed as too much of a concession
345
by U.S. industry interests.
Common to the episteme of those concerned with development,
whether coming from a (neo)liberal perspective or a skeptical one, is a
heightened awareness of radical inequalities among different global
populations. These inequalities are pervasive, as measured not only by
GDP, but also by levels of malnourishment, ill health, and lack of
education. Besides confronting these disjunctures on a regular basis,
development specialists also appreciate, with an urgency that domestic
intellectual property policy-makers perhaps do not always appreciate,
that international cooperation is critical to achieving the development
objectives, among which are the "promotion of opportunity, facilitating
341 Jean 0. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property and the Availability of Pharmaceuticalsin Poor
Countries, INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON., Apr. 2003, at 91, 98.

342 Paranagui Moniz, supra note 109, at 14.
343 See CIPR REPORT, supra note 10, at 37-40 (concluding that patent rights will have little
impact on stimulating research and development into diseases affecting the very poorest
populations). See generally James Love, Access to Medicine and Compliance with the WTO
TRIPS Accord. Model for State Practice in Developing Countries, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 55, at 74; Ruth

Mayne, The Global Campaign on Patents and Access to Medicines: An Oxfam Perspective, in
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra

note 55, at 244.
344 SACHS, supra note 19, at 61-64; STIGLITZ, supra note 186, at 245:
In the final stages of the Uruguay negotiations, both the Office of Science and
Technology and the Council of Economic Advisors worried that we had not got the
balance right-the agreement put producers interests over users. We worried that in
doing so, the rate of progress and innovation might actually be impeded; after all,
knowledge is the most important input into research, and stronger intellectual property
rights can increase the price of this input.
See generally BHAGWATI, supra note 195; Bhagwati, supra note 216.
345 SELL, supra note 26, at 123.

2006]

THE DEVELOPMENT DIVIDE

2893

empowerment [of poor populations] and enhancing security. '346 Thus
substantive equality is a key analytical component to intellectual
property decision-making in this global context.
C.

Why Stop at Public Health? Capabilityfor Basic Education

How does or could a substantive equality principle work in a
practical sense? This section of the Article explores how it might
impact copyright and capacity building for education, an issue which
has received relatively less attention than the now-familiar debates over
patents and building capacity for health in developing countries or for
34 7
scientific research in developed countries.
I first sketch the problem from the perspectives of developing
countries that have large educational deficits. If we focus on these
perspectives, then the question is how copyright policy can or should

accommodate these development concerns, which are about meeting
basic human capabilities. From an "essential needs" standpoint, access
to basic educational materials is as important as access to life-saving
medicines. Education is fundamental to the capacity-building upon
which all further progress is made. 34 8 Although copyright is only one of

many factors that go into the provision of basic education, it is an
349
essential policy lever for educational development generally.
I then develop the proposed substantive equality principle within
intellectual property based on a more wholistic understanding of

Id.at 3.
347 See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
346

the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77 (1999); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation?: The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 ScIENCE 698

(1998).
348 CIPR REPORT, supra note

10, at 28.
The ability of countries to absorb knowledge from elsewhere and then make use and
adapt it for their own purposes is also of crucial importance. This is a characteristic
that depends on the development of local capacity through education, through R&D,
and the development of appropriate institutions without which even technology transfer
on the most advantageous terms is unlikely to succeed.

Id (emphasis added); accordDrahos, An Alternative Framework,supranote 8, at 15.

For developing countries the coming century of knowledge-based growth raises two
basic development priorities. The first is that these countries must give more urgent
attention to encouraging investment in human capital. This essentially translates into
investment in health and education. Without growth in human capital developing
countries will be left to participate in simple commodities markets rather than the
knowledge economy.
Id.
349 Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare, supra note 133, at 160-61 ("Protecting intellectual

property without a correlating investment in education, and other policies specifically directed at
macroeconomic conditions, will not yield significant long-term benefits to the national
economy.").
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development economics, and I suggest generally how it could change
the way that copyright norms are generated or applied in the context of
knowledge goods for basic education. Finally, I will acknowledge some
issues with, and point to, future directions for this proposal.
1.

Knowledge as a Global Public Good: The Context of
Developing Countries

As Yochai Benkler points out,
it is odd to think of cultural production as an area that ever came to
be thought of as "dominated," in any useful meaning of the word, by
market production.

As an analytic matter,

. . .

books are forms of

information, public goods, and could not, even in principle, be
provisioned efficiently by markets alone. As a practical matter, we
have always relied heavily on organizational and institutional forms
insulated from both state and markets to produce information,
knowledge, and culture. That is what the university and academic
freedom are centrally about. That is what underlies the heavy
reliance of the arts on philanthropy and on a culture of esteem and
status as crucial motivating forces. That is what public schools and
libraries are about. Our understanding of information, knowledge,
and culture as "public goods" in the formal economic sense should
have immunized us from mistaking the presence of important
market-based approaches for the whole, or even the core, of the story
of information and cultural production. And yet, it does seem that
our perception of where information generally, and culture in
particular, comes from came to be dominated over the second half of
the twentieth century by a vision of Hollywood and the recording
350
industry.
Similar to the over-production of pharmaceuticals aimed at the
diseases of the rich, there is an over-production of knowledge goods and
cultural goods aimed at the needs or desires of the rich. This is true
even with respect to intellectual property scholarship that addresses
social justice values. U.S. copyright scholarship privileges the first
amendment and other aspects of democratic theory35 1 and overlooks
essential needs generally. There is an over-focus on entertainment
products such as music and movies (freeriding concerns over which
heavily drove TRIPS formation 35 2) and under-focus on educational
350 Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 348-49 (2004).
351 Cf Shaffer Van Houweling, supra note 38; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's
DemocraticPrinciples in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998).
352 INTELLECTUAL INTELLECTUAL PPROPERTY ALLIANCE, IIPA'S 2004 FINAL ESTIMATED
TRADE LOSSES DUE TO COPYRIGHT PIRACY (IN MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS) AND PIRACY
LEVELS IN-COUNTRY, http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPA%20USTR%202005%20SPECIAL%20301
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products such as textbooks.
The provision and dissemination of
knowledge goods related to education and development generally is not
thought of as legitimate copyright issue, except in the narrow context of
the fair use debates in the U.S. educational and library communities.
Generally, it is fair to say that developed country copyright scholars
have overlooked the importance of basic education as a foundation to
every other kind of development criteria. This has been exacerbated by
the heavy emphasis on issues related to digital technology, which are
arguably more relevant to developed than to developing countries,
especially the least developed countries. 353 Yet ironically, the first
copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, was subtitled "An Act for the
'3 4
Encouragement of Learning.
Knowledge goods dramatically affect the provision of education.
And education is "essential to the provision of almost every other public
good-and to the enjoyment of private goods. '355 Thus, education is an
input to the production of knowledge goods, and knowledge is an input
to the production of educational public goods. On both Nussbaum's list
of capabilities and Sen's list of functioning appear the provision of basic
education. 35 6 This is also a specific goal listed as one of the Millennium
Development Goals. 357 It is also high on the agenda of many
developing countries. Education has been recognized as a human right
under the framework of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights as well as the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. 358 Indeed, there has been such an increase in the provision of
%20DECISIONS%20with%20revised%20BSA%20figures%20for%20the%2Middle%2OEast%
20060405.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). For sustained critiques of the concept of piracy as it
relates to China, see the corpus of Peter K. Yu. See generally Peter K. Yu, Still DissatisfiedAfter
All These Years: IntellectualProperty,Post-WTO China, and the Avoidable Cycle of Futility, 34
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (2005); Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright
Piracy, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. R. 127 (2003); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners:
Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131
(2001); Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to
Reconfigure the US.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (2001). See also
DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 74, at 19-38
(deconstructing piracy).
See generally SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY
(2001).
353 Cf Yu, Introduction, supra note 33 (arguing that digital intellectual property issues are as
important to developing countries as are bread issues); Okediji, Sustainable Access, supra note
136 (discussing access to digital works by developing countries while acknowledging the great
need for print works).
354 Craig Joyce, L. Ray Patterson:Copyright (and Its Master) in HistoricalPerspective, 10 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 239, 243 (2003).
355 Kaul et al., How to Improve, supra note 45, at 45.
356 SEN, supra note 1, at 38-39; Nussbaum, supra note 148, at 287.
357 UN Millennium Development Goals, supra note 18 (listing the "[a]chieve[ment] [of]
universal primary education").
358 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) art. 13,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (alliding to a right to education); Convention on the Rights of the
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basic education lately that some developing countries, short on
resources already, are simply not able to meet the demand that has been
359
created by these calls for increased access.
Compelling reasons exist for public provision of basic education.
Studies have repeatedly shown that educational levels of girls and
women are an important determinant of children's health. 360 Basic
education and literacy are thought to increase opportunities to impart
36
basic information about health and nutrition as part of a curriculum, '
to enable mothers to read written instructions and acquire basic health
information from media, 362 to overcome some traditional inhibitions in
adopting newer health care methods, and to give mothers selfconfidence to use the health care system. 363 Indeed, ample evidence
demonstrates that basic education and literacy levels contribute more to
health status than does GNP. 364 Even in developed countries, higher
educational levels have been strongly linked to lower morbidity and
365
mortality levels.
Basic education is also correlated with more productive and
profitable agricultural activity. 366 It is thought to increase the ability of

Child art. 29, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (same). The CESCR General Comment No. 13
(1999) states:
[T]he right to receive an education, including the right to universal and free primary
education, has three dimensions of obligations: to respect, protect andfulfil [sic]. The
right to education includes the right to availability of functioning educational
institutions and programmes, accessibility of educational institutions and programmes
for all without discrimination, acceptability in the form and substance of education and
adaptabilityof education to the needs of changing societies and communities.
3D, supra note 311, at 5.
359 Celia W. Dugger, In Africa, Schools Feed a Different Hunger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004,
at Al 1.
360 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, KNOWLEDGE

FOR DEVELOPMENT

1998-99,

at

17

[hereinafter KNOWLEDGE FOR DEVELOPMENT]. "A study of 45 developing countries found that
the average mortality rate for children under 5 was 144 per 1,000 live births when their mothers
had no education, 106 per 1,000 when they had primary education only, and 68 per 1,000 when
they had some secondary education." Id.; see also SEN, supra note 1, at 195-99. Generally
speaking, women are more heavily impacted by poverty on a global level. See Barbara Stark,
Women, Globalization,and Law: A Change of World, 16 PACE INT'L L. REV. 333, 339-42 (2004)
(women comprise 70 percent of the world's 1.3 billion absolute poor).
361 KNOWLEDGE FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 360, at 41.
362 Id. at41, 120.
363 Id. at41.
364 Sen differentiates between two types of success in the reduction in mortality: what he calls
growth mediated (which relies heavily on dramatic increases in levels of income) and supportmediated (which relies on low-cost labor pool providing social services such as health care and
basic education, in the absence of rapid economic growth). SEN, supra note 1, at 43-46.
365 Nancy Adler et al., Socioeconomic Status and Health: The Challenge of the Gradient, in
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A READER 181, 182-85 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999)
(summarizing evidence that socioeconomic status (SES), including education, impacts health
status in U.S. and Europe).
366 KNOWLEDGE FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 360, at 41.
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populations to adapt to changing economic. environments. 367 Last but
not least, education has been strongly correlated to economic growth per
369
se, both in developed countries 368 as well as developing countries.
Thus, for purposes of development, "education has positive spillovers
internationally; higher education levels can lead to slower population
growth, better disease control, more stable and more robust political
'3 70
systems, both nationally and internationally.
This widely shared understanding has led the vast majority of
countries to provide education publicly rather than privately. Indeed,
because of its importance, the U.S. has long chosen to provide universal
compulsory public education, with private alternatives for those willing
to pay. 371 Developing country governments also play important roles in
promoting basic learning capacity beyond the primary level, and in
facilitating the transfer and dissemination of such basic knowledge
372
through communications infrastructure.
As noted earlier, making education public demonstrates the
socially constructed quality of goods. Although classified as a private
good (because of its rivalrous and exclusive qualities), it can be seen as
a type of basic need leading to human capability. Thus basic education
has intrinsic value and its public provision is a type of "commodity
egalitarianism. '373
Because of the fundamental importance of
education, knowledge inputs to education such as educational materials
should be widely accessible rather than distributed only in limited ways.
While this Article is concerned primarily with the relationship of
knowledge goods to building basic knowledge capacity (basic
education), it is also important to note some aspects of building
technical knowledge capacity. In the intellectual property literature,
perhaps the best-known of the development specialists concerned with
knowledge and global public goods theory is Joseph E. Stiglitz, former
chief economist of the World Bank.3 74 According to him, the "global"
quality of knowledge as a public good arises from the universality of
certain kinds of knowledge, 375 as well as its integral role in capacity
367 Id.

368 Id. at 20 ("One study had found that growth in years of schooling explained about 25
percent of the increase in GDP per capita in the United States between 1929 and 1982.").
369 Id.at 19-22.

370 Kaul et al., How to Improve, supra note 45, at 46.
371 Stephen P. Heyneman, The Role of Textbooks in a Modem System of Education
(forthcoming Nov. 2006) (on file with author). Desai claims that Adam Smith "had made a
powerful plea for the state to provide education and training to overcome the debilitating effects
of the division of labor in modem factories." Desai, supra note 276, at 67.
372 KNOWLEDGE FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 360, at 26.
373 Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 50, at 85.
374 Stiglitz, supra note 280, at 310 (listing four other global public goods besides knowledge:
international economic stability, international security, the international environment and

international humanitarian assistance).
375 Id. at 311.
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building in lesser developed countries, through "learning to learn. 376
He observes that "the ability to learn has to be learned, that the skills
associated with learning are, like other skills, specialized. '3 77 He also
asks, "Why is it that the growth rates and income levels of various
countries have not converged faster than they have?" 3 78 The answer in
379
part lies in a knowledge gap.
There are different kinds of knowledge gaps, which demand
different kinds of state interventions and approaches. For example, the
efforts of some governments to promote the use of the LINUX
operating system as a cheap and more flexible alternative to Microsoft's
proprietary system can be seen as an example of government
intervention into building technical learning capacity that is not based
on a proprietary rights model.38 0 Stiglitz points out that R&D structure
is even more highly concentrated among rich countries than GDP is38l
And the World Bank claims that "[f]or most developing countries, local
research has to focus on more essential needs... [and] should build on
2
local knowledge, which can have tremendous value. '38
Economist Jeffrey Sachs divides the world into three areas: one of
endogenous growth in which innovative activity takes place on a
376 Stiglitz, Learning to Learn, supra note 62, at 125.
377 Id. at 126. He posits two ways to learn, in the context of technological learning: 1)
learning by doing; 2) learning by learning.
Learning by doing may increase production
immediately. Learning by learning (R&D) may increase production in the long term. Stiglitz
hypothesizes that it may not help developing countries to switch to costly techniques that would
increase production in the long term because the benefit tends to be very small in the short term.
Id.
378 Id.
379 KNOWLEDGE FOR DEVELOPMENT, supranote 360, at 26.
380 Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, Workshop on Global Access to Essential Learning
Tools, Apr. 5, 2004 (unpublished notes) (on file with author).
381 Stiglitz, supra note 280, at 312-13.
382 KNOWLEDGE FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 360, at 38. Peter Drahos goes even further
in distinguishing among different kinds of knowledge goods for different purposes.
Knowledge has more qualities than merely those of the "public good." Within
information economics it has been recognized that knowledge becomes more durable
through use and that the use of knowledge often leads to more knowledge....
The policy implications of information economics theory for intellectual property
contrast strongly with those to be found in the appropriation model. The innovation
model developed by Mandeville, for example, argues that highly innovative industries
are crucially dependent on flows ofuncodified information ....
The principal role of intellectual property is to pay for the delivery of what
Kenneth Boulding... once termed "frozen knowledge" (embodied or codified
knowledge).

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY xvi-xvii (Peter Drahos ed., 1999) (citations omitted). Indeed, Drahos'
most recent analysis of knowledge goods extends far beyond the scope of this Article and can be
summarized here as a taxonomy along several different axes: (1) pure v. impure; (2) independent
of norms, exist as norms, dependent on norms; (3) capability-independent v. capabilitydependent; (4) information goods: codified v. uncodified knowledge; (5) artifact-embodied v.
skill-embodied. Drahos, supra note 43, at 52-55.
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significant scale (approximately 1 billion people); another area of
technological diffusers, absorbing new technology within a span of 5-25
years (approximately 3.5 billion people, including China, India, and
Mexico); and a third group, which he calls "marginalized" (about 2.5
billion people). 383 With respect to the poorest countries, he suggests,
among other things, a rethinking of the IPR regime, in particular the
need for technology diffusion through copying and reverse
384
engineering.
In the context of the provision of materials for even technical
education, these observations further buttress the claim that regulatory
alternatives to intellectual property for increasing knowledge must be
considered. Innovation may simply not be at issue when fundamental
texts are already available and require dissemination. But even at a
technical education level, states may have a strong policy justification
for prioritizing imitation and diffusion over protection of knowledge
goods. Thus a country's provision of information could include
"development based on access to public goods using strategies of freeriding and diffusion," 38 5 depending on the circumstances. Yet, as noted
above, these domestic regulatory strategies have been circumscribed by
intellectual property globalization so far.
In any event, knowledge goods are important to development
whether in the context of basic education or technical education. In
either case, it is crucial to understand where to place national priorities,
to build knowledge capacity and infrastructure. Building knowledge
capacity is often a non-commercial endeavor and "few countries on
their own and out of national interest would gather or develop
knowledge that has no commercial value. Yet such knowledge is
critical to the progress of developing countries on which balanced and
stable future world economic growth will depend. ' 386 Thus, there is a
very strong public goods quality to knowledge production of any sort.
Initial knowledge is a key input to the production of further
Knowledge infrastructure can affect the pace of
knowledge. 387
development and the extent to which developing countries can avail
388
themselves of the fruits of the global public good of knowledge.
Technology transfer, in the context of the provision of either basic or
383 Sachs, supranote 217, at 133.
384 Id. at 140. Similarly, Stiglitz suggests that optimal development strategies should focus on
"dynamic comparative advantage," which for developing countries may mean that "[a]s imitators,
they need not expend the resources that the innovators had to spend on R&D; they need not
repeat the mistakes that the innovators inevitably make as they experiment with alternative
But asimitators, they cannot capture the rents commonly associated with
technologies.
innovation." Stiglitz, Learning to Learn, supra note 62, at 11-42.
385 Drahos, supra note 81, at 1,4.
386 Kaul et al., Concepts,Policies and Strategies, supra note 294, at 475.
387 Stiglitz, supra note 280, at 312.
388 Id. at 317.
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technical education, should focus on development with this building
block understanding.
Knowledge pops up frequently as a public good of critical concern
to development specialists: "[k]nowledge is the most public of all public
goods: it is strongly nonrival, and its benefits cut across many issues of
public concern. ' 389 Knowledge has a strong dose of "natural" public
goods qualities and many possible constructed public goods qualities.
Its "public" side can range from totally free access to limited access to
an explicit policy of fostering inclusiveness. 390 Intellectual property
globalization should account for the full range of uses to which
knowledge is put and the range of policy options with respect to
knowledge goods, particularly in the context of basic education. In
other words, there is a lot of "room for manoevre" both for intellectual
property protection in the form of copyright, on the one hand, and for
limitations and exceptions to copyright in order to access knowledge
goods for essential education, on the other.
As Ruth Okediji has recently pointed out, there is a taxonomy of
different types of access, 391 as well different national and international
provisions governing access for educational and library use. 392 Access
will also depend on whether the knowledge is in print or digital form,
which would be useful for distance education efforts in those countries
that have available infrastructure. 393 The policy space for her proposed
reforms in this area depends in large part on the recognition of a greater
394
flexibility than currently exists under the applicable legal regimes.
2.

Substantive Equality and Copyright Norms

A proposal for a substantive equality norm within intellectual
property globalization poses raises several conceptual challenges. How
will it be identified by and incorporated into international bodies? How

389 Kaul et al., How to Improve, supra note45, at 45 (emphasis added); see also id.("The
challenge is to strike a balance between promoting the broader use of knowledge (enhancing
static efficiency) and providing incentives to generate more knowledge (fostering dynamic
efficiency).").
390 Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 50, at 100.
391 Okediji, SustainableAccess, supra note 136, at 148:
[A]ccess ... encompasses the unencumbered right to utilize a creative work
(uncompensated creative access); privately negotiated terms of use between owners
and users (negotiated access); qualified opportunities to utilize certain types of works
through compulsory licensing (mandatory compensated access); as well as the
opportunity to purchase and own the physical embodiment of the protected content
(bulk compensated access).
392 Id. at 166-77.
393 Id.at 177-80.
394 Id.at 181-86.
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will it be identified by and incorporated into the municipal law of

various member states?
A substantive equality norm is arguably embedded within the key
term "development," a term that is explicitly referenced in the TRIPS
The interpretive principles applied to
preamble and objectives.
"development" are relatively straightforward. According to the Vienna
of Treaties, any treaty term shall be given its
Convention of the Law
"ordinary meaning" 395 and evidence to support a treaty's context may
include "a treaty's own preamble and annexes ...as well
as... subsequent agreements among the parties, subsequent practices of
the parties in the application of the treaty, and 'any rules of international
396
law applicable in the relations between the parties.'
Moreover, a WTO dispute settlement panel has noted that "that the
text of the treaty must of course be read as a whole. One cannot simply
397
concentrate on a paragraph, an article, a section, a chapter or a part.

And despite the seeming confusion surrounding this issue, 398 a treaty's
"context" includes "preambles and annexes.

'399

A different dispute

settlement panel has announced that TRIPS should not be "read in
'clinical isolation' from public international law. ' 40 0 Among other
things, emerging customary international legal norms of development

395 Vienna Convention art. 31(1), supra note 64. To resolve a dispute over TRIPS, a WTO
dispute settlement panel explicitly relied on GATT acquis, customary rules of interpretation of
public international law, and specifically Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Panel Report,
India-PatentProtectionfor Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural Chemical Products, Complaint by
the European Communities and their Member States, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998).
396 JANIS, supra note 64, at 30.
397 Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 31, at 17 n.49.
398 As the Panel in the Canada Panel Report found:
as the Appellate Body... held in Alcoholic
[T]he principle of effectiveness ....
Beverages, meant that "[a]n interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result
in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or
inutility".... The principle of effectiveness required that account be taken of both the
contextual provisions, which indicated that intellectual property rights were not
intended to be unlimited, and the objectives provision, which made it clear that the
TRIPS Agreement sought a balance of rights and obligations. To fail to take those
provisions into account, and to read Article 30 as if it were intended that the TRIPS
Agreement should be "neutral vis-6-vis societal values", as the EC contended, would
be to render Articles 7, 8.1 and 30 inutile. Such a result was not possible, as all parties
to this proceeding, except for the EC and Switzerland, agreed.
Canada Panel Report, supra note 58, at 89.
399 Vienna Convention art. 31(2), supra note 64; see also GERVAIS, supra note 3 1, at 80:
The preamble to the TRIPS Agreement is an essential part of it. Under "GATT" law,
preambles are on occasion relied upon to a considerable extent by panels when the
wording of a provision is not clear or where it is susceptible to divergent
interpretations.... The preamble, together with footnotes, should be considered as an
integral part of the agreement, a condensed expression of its underlying principles.
400 Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development, supra note 88, at 528 (citing
Appellate Body Report, United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R (adoptedMay 20, 1996)).
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derive from inter-government organizational documents such as U.N.
40 1
General Assembly resolutions and other forms of soft law.
Thus, consistent with a law and globalization paradigm, which
focuses on transnational norm-generating activity as an organic process,
I suggest here a broad set of materials from which to elucidate the
intellectual property substantive norm of equality.
Even prior to TRIPS, the term "development" had a component
that was directed towards a capability approach rather than a pure
economic growth approach, as evidenced by the use by the UNDP of
the Human Development Index since 1991.
Since TRIPS, legal
documents addressing equality rather than growth-driven development
have been directed only to intellectual property treaties such as
TRIPS, 40 2 but also in the context of other globalization activities. For
example, the U.N. Millennium Development Goals announced by the
U.N. General Assembly clearly provide for a minimum threshold of
material well-being; such a threshold implies if not expressly directs
attention to distributional and egalitarian considerations in the
administration of all development activities under its aegis.
The WTO and WIPO are quite different in their constitution and
mandate.
But arguably, there are overlapping and synergistic
development mandates for both institutions. On the WIPO side, these
include the United Nations charter itself, particularly Chapter IX
(pertaining to International Economic and Social Co-operation),
Articles 55 and 56;403 the Agreement Between the United Nations and
WIPO;404 and other soft law evidence of equality-driven development
offered by Argentina and Brazil in their proposal to the WIPO for a
Development Agenda, such as "the Programme of Action for the Least
Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010, the Monterey
Consensus, the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development
and the Plan of Implementation agreed at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development, the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of
Action at the first phase of the World Summit on the Information
Society, and most recently the Sao Paulo Consensus adopted at
UNCTAD XI. ' ' 405 In addition, the U.N. has declared a right to
development, and it is arguable that the content of this right must

401 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (6th ed. 2003).
The material sources of custom are very numerous and include the following: ... the
opinions of official legal advisors, recitals in treaties and other international
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs,
and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly.
Id.
402 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 15; General Council Decision, supra note 16.
403 U.N. Charter arts. 55-56.
404 UN-WIPO Agreement art. 1, supra note 13.
405 AB Proposal,supra note 116, at 1.
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contain a substantive equality norm. 4 06 While beyond the scope of this
Article, the right to development is a potentially powerful source of

equality norms, focused on collective notions of self-determination in
at "the constant
tandem with other, individual, human rights, directed
7
40
improvement of an entire population's well-being.
On the WTO side, the original 1994 Marrekesh Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization references the need to attend
to sustainable development. 40 8 In addition, the more recent Doha
Development Objectives, 40 9 particularly paragraph 19 of the WTO's
Doha Ministerial Declaration adopted on November 14, 2001,410 sets a

mandate for the TRIPS Council in the context of the Doha Development
Agenda, to wit, "the TRIPS Council shall be guided by the objectives
and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and
shall take fully into account the development dimension." 4 11 The Doha

Plan of Action convened by the so-called Group of 77 and China in
2005, addressed TRIPS and development. 4 12 In addition, the WTO is
406 Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 29; 3D, supra note 311, at 4
(describing the right to development as "particularly relevant in supporting claims for public
participation in IP decision-making processes at the national, regional and international level");
cf Richard Warren Perry, Rethinking the Right to Development: After the Critique of
Development, After the Critique of Rights, 18 LAW & POL'Y 225 (1996) (examining the United
Nations' Declaration of the Right to Development in the context of critiques of development
discourse and of rights discourse; arguing that the assertion of a right to development by human
rights activists may subvert development bureaucracy).
407 Obiora, supra note 29, at 383, 385-392.
408 The view that sustainable development was a central part of the WTO's mandate was
affirmed by the Appellate Body in Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 152, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). I am indebted to
James Gathii for pointing this out to me.
409 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 15.
410 Id.
411 Id 19.
412 Group of 77, Second South Summit, Doha Plan of Action, G-77/SS/2005/2 (June 12-15,
2005),
available
at
http://www.g77.org/southsummit2/doc/Doha%20Plan%20of/20
Action%20(English).pdf.
[T]o enhance the development dimension of the international Intellectual Property
Rights system, taking into account the different levels of development of developing
countries with a view to ensuring affordable access to necessary basic products,
including medicines and educational tools and software, the transfer of knowledge, the
promotion of research and stimulation of innovation and creativity, and in this regard
we call:
a. for action to accelerate the work on the development related mandate
concerning the TRIPS Agreement and the implementation related issues in the
Doha Ministerial Declaration, especially on the issues of making intellectual
property rules of TRIPS supportive of the objectives of the Convention on
Biological Diversity;
b. on WIPO, as a UN Agency, to include in all its future plans and activities
including legal advice a development dimension that includes promoting
development and access to knowledge for all, pro-development normsetting,
establishing development friendly principles and guidelines for the provisions of
technical assistance and the transfer and dissemination of technology ....
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included by the statement at Monterrey in March 2002, in which
governments welcomed "the decisions of the World Trade Organization
to place the needs and interests of developing countries at the heart of
4 13
its work programme."
To the extent that the meaning of "development" is ambiguous or
obscure, the negotiating history (or travaux prparatoires)of TRIPS
becomes relevant. Again according to the Vienna Convention Article
32, negotiating history falls within "Supplementary Means of
Interpretation." 41 4 A dispute settlement panel of the WTO has accepted
Article 32 as an applicable interpretive principle with respect to
TRIPS. 4 15 The insistence of the original Group of 14 developing
countries to include references to "development" within Articles 7 and 8
in TRIPS support a substantive equality norm, especially in the face of
an opposing "A" draft proposed by the developed countries and
ultimately enacted as the final treaty text. 4 16 While opposition of the
developed countries may indicate that the norm was not one that is
accepted by all treaty parties, it is evidence that should be given some
weight. As a leading treatise writer on TRIPS has stated, this
negotiating history "may lead a panel to take a longer look at how these
provisions should be interpreted in the context of the Agreement as a
whole, especially with respect to the need for 'balance.' ' 417 Moreover,
some of the same original Group of 14 member states (particularly
Argentina and Brazil) are now ones that are pushing for a substantive
concept of development via the Development Agenda proposal before
WIPO. As the UNCTAD/ICTSD Resource book states, many
developing countries were
subject to foreign rule for a good part of the period during which the
Paris and Berne Conventions were evolving. The developing and
least developed Members might argue in favour of being allowed to
Id.
413 International Conference on Financing for Development, Mar. 21-22, 2002, Monterrey
Consensus,
26, U.N. Doc A/CONF/198/I1, available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/
0302finalMonterreyConsensus.pdf.
414 Vienna Convention, supranote 64, Article 32:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 3 1, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure ....
415 Canada Panel Report, supra note 58.
416 Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development, supra note 88; cf Okediji, TRIPS
Dispute Settlement, supra note 77, at 613 (discussing example of the United States' persistent
objection to moral rights as a possible exception to the full operation of the TRIPS moral rights
provision); Shubha Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership; Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love Intellectual Property; Review Essay of Lawrence Lessig, the Future of Ideas, and Siva
Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 453 (2002).
417 GERVAIS, supra note 31, at 120.
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develop their own state practice before the practices 8 of developed
41
Members are used to interpret the TRIPS Agreement.

Sources of public international law outside of intellectual property
per se guide the current understanding of "development" as equalitydriven economic growth. As astute intellectual property pluralists such
as Helfer have noted:
[L]awmaking has broken out of the confined institutional
spaces of established international IP fora, such as WIPO and
the WTO, and has expanded into a broad and growing array of
other international venues in environmental law, human rights,
and public health... [generating] what international relations
scholars have referred to as "counterregime norms," . . . to
integrate ...into the WTO and WIPO.419
As he also observes, "[w]ith only a few exceptions, there are no clear
hierarchies among international legal rules. Nor is there a supreme
international judicial body or legislature with the power to
comprehensively reconcile inconsistent rules or balance competing
policy goals.

'420

Some international human rights treaties 42 1 directly address
intellectual property, and this increasingly is an area that may be a
source of emerging equality norms. 422 While human rights treaties and
the soft law mechanisms that have been deployed to challenge
423
intellectual property norms are ancillary to WTO and WIPO treaties,
418 UNCTAD-ICTSD CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT ON IPRS, supra note 204, § 3.3.
419 Helfer, Mediating Interactions,supra note 113, at 127.
420 Id.

421 Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 349 (1999)
(discussing Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 27. 1 & 27.2, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), and International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR)).
422 Cf Helfer, supra note 30, at 4:
The ICESCR Committee's initial foray into the intellectual property arena began in the
Fall of 2001, when it published an official Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual
Property that contained a preliminary analysis of the treaty's intellectual property
provisions and their relationship to other economic and social rights. The Statement
contemplated that the Committee would eventually publish more extensive "general
comments" on the ICESCR's intellectual property provisions.
Helfer concludes that the initial comment focused on equality as it pertains to authors rather
than users.
423 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). Subsection one states that "[e]veryone has
the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits," whereas subsection two states that "[e]veryone has the
right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author." Id. See Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 25, for
more detail on human rights related to intellectual property; see also the developing literature on
trade, intellectual property and human rights. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of
Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of the InternationalMarkets, 37 LOYOLA L.A. L.
REv. 407 (2003); Winston P. Nagan, InternationalIntellectual Property,Access to Health Care,
and Human Rights: South Africa v. UnitedStates, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 155 (2002); Marjorie Cohn,
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they can be viewed as additional evidence of substantive equality norms
that should be incorporated into the intellectual property calculus
through the language of development. If they are to be integrated with
intellectual property in a meaningful encounter, 424 then they should be
incorporated through a substantive equality normative principle. Other
human rights norms address the norm of equality. Article 26 of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR Article 26)425 guarantees,
for example, that "[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled
'426
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.
If equality is incorporated into TRIPS via the key term
"development," then this substantive equality norm is also incorporated
within domestic law through TRIPS. Arguably, both the Preamble and
Article 8's references to development then can be deployed within
domestic welfare calculations when basic needs are at issue in the
domestic balance.
There are several ways in which a general substantive equality
principle in intellectual property globalization, integrated throughout
intellectual property norm setting and norm interpretation activities,
might impact the provision of basic education public goods such as the
availability of textbooks for developing countries.
Some of the
suggestions below have been made by others, but my claim here is that

The World Trade Organization: Elevating Property Interests Above Human Rights, 29 GA. J.
INT'L & COmP. L. 427 (2001); Thomas F. Cotter, Introduction to IP Symposium: Intellectual
Property, Development and Human Rights, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 147 (2002) (with articles by
Winston P. Nagan, Susan K. Sell, Shubha Ghosh, and James Thuo Gathii).
424 Nussbaum, supra note 148, at 300:
[A] list of human rights typically functions as a system of side-constraints in
international deliberation and internal policy debates.... We are doing wrong to
people when we do not secure to them the capabilities on this list. The traditional
function of a notion of rights as side-constraints is to make this sort of anti-utilitarian
point, and I see no reason why rights construed as capabilities-or analyzed in terms of
capabilities-should not continue to play this role.
425 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Id.
The European Convention also has similar language. See European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (Nov. 4, 1950);
American Convention on Human Rights art. 1, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (Nov. 22, 1969).
426 International Covenant on CivI and Political Rights art. 26, supra note 425. In U.S. Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence, governmental regulation would be subject to judicial scrutiny,
the judicial deference towards which would depend on how "suspect" the particular governmental
classification is considered to be. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It
should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect.").
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a substantive equality principle linked to basic needs would make a
difference in outcome for the neediest.
This norm also does not defer to the goodwill or good intent of
domestic policymakers to achieve the optimal resource distribution of
knowledge goods, based on a utilitarian social welfare calculus. It
embodies a heightened skepticism towards both domestic and global
decision-makers with respect to balance-setting, at least in the context
of provision of basic goods. 427 (We may not be so concerned about
agency capture when it comes to the provision of non-basic goods such
as Hollywood DVDs.) At a very general level, such a principle would
operate in the following directions.
Norm interpretation:
* Incorporating a principle of strict scrutiny into the
interpretation of relevant treaty texts such as TRIPS, so as
to influence the outcome of international intellectual
428
property dispute resolution;
* Incorporating a strict scrutiny principle into domestic law,
regardless of the context of international treaty compliance,
and applicable not only to the public regulation but also to
private ordering (such as licensing practices being
challenged by contract law).
Norm setting:
* Amending existing treaties to include language allowing
for the incorporation of a development-related substantive
equality norm;
* Expanding the flexibilities, exceptions and limitations
within existing treaties; expanding transitional periods; 429
" Expanding technical assistance to include development of
430
indigenous publishing capacity;

427 Rosemary Coombe has astutely observed that national governments are not always the best
guardians of their citizens' welfare interests. See Coombe, Intellectual Property, supra note 20,
at 59; accord Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the "Other": Indians,
Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. JurisprudenceNeeds to Incorporate International
Law, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 427 (2002) (arguing that indigenous groups and non-U.S.
citizens inside the U.S. must rely on international human rights instruments to enforce domestic
civil rights); see also Sassen, supra note 234, at 71:
A basic proposition in discussions about the global economy concerns the declining
sovereignty of states over their economies ....Yet this proposition fails to underline a
key component in the transformation of the last fifteen years: the formation of new
claims on national states to guarantee the domestic and global rights of capital. What
matters for our purposes here is that global capital has made these claims and that
national states responded through the production of new forms of legality.
428 TRIPS, supra note 5, at pmbl., arts. 7, 8.
429 Id.at art. 66.1 (regarding transitional periods).
430 Id.at art. 66.2 (regarding other special provisions for technical assistance).
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Creating new treaties within intellectual property venues
such as WIPO that directly address the question of basic
431
needs;
Revising the Berne Appendix to include more expansive
mechanisms for compulsory licensing for education,
libraries, translation and other activities directed at the
432
needs of developing countries.
alternatives:
Expanding collective licensing schemes 433 and finding
other alternative ways to compensate IP producers in
434
developed countries;
Facilitating the development of domestic publishing
capacity;
435
Advocating for TRIPS plus standstill or rollback;
Encouraging the participation and increasing the
effectiveness of indigenous social movements who could
speak on or behalf of education "consumers" within their
own countries, and link them with others to form a global
social consensus for access to essential educational
436
materials.

431 See supra Section I.B (discussing AB Proposal, supra note 116); see also Drahos, An
Alternative Framework, supra note 8, at 15-16 (describing a "framework treaty on access to
knowledge" that would state "general principles... that would constitute the normative code for
the evolution of the treaty... [based on a] human rights framework." The proposed Treaty on
Access to Knowledge is put forth by a coalition of civil society organizations and developing
countries. See CPTech.org, May 9, 2005 Draft Text of Treaty on Access to Knowledge,
http://www.cptech.org/a2k/consolidatedtext-may9.pdf. (last visited April 13, 2006).
432 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works app., supra note
14; Okediji, Sustainable Access, supra note 136, at 181-86. See generally Salah Basalamah,
Compulsory Licensingfor Translation:An Instrument of Development?, 40 IDEA 503 (2000).
433 See the suggestions listed in the CIPR REPORT, supra note 10, at 108-09. See also Helfer,
supra note 30; J.H. Reichman & David Lange, BargainingAround the TRIPS Agreement: The
Case for OnGoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 56-57 (1998) (advocating the establishment of a
forum to "facilitat[e] relations among foreign rightsholders, local enterprise, and government
agencies").
434 See Joel P. Trachtman, The Missing Link: Coherence and Poverty at the WTO, 8 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 611, 618 (2005) (advocating for a greater scope of redistributional concerns addressed
by the WTO and possibly ameliorated by side payments); James Love, Risks and Opportunities
for Access to Knowledge, in VISION OR HALLUCINATION? BRIEFING PAPERS TOWARDS THE
WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 187, 203 (2005), available at
http://www.choike.org/nuevo-eng/informes/3592.html
(describing a proposed A2K Treaty
project that would include provisions to "finance free and open knowledge goods"); cf William
Fisher, Don't Beat Them, Join Them, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A25 (advocating Internet
user monthly licensing fee in lieu of copyright royalties for downloaded music files); Hal R.
Varian, Copying and Copyright, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 134-36 (2005) (outlining various
business models in a world without copyright).
435 See Maskus & Reichman, supranote 9, at 36-39.
436 Peter Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue,
in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT,
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In the specific context of TRIPS interpretation, the application of a
general substantive equality norm might result in the following
outcomes. A WTO dispute settlement panel might decide that Country
A's policy to exclude copyright protection for textbooks and allow
diffusion to flourish for a limited period of time in a specific field of
study is acceptable under the three step test of Article 13.437 Or, as Ruth
Okediji proposes, a dispute settlement panel might develop a
proportional approach to access in the context of determining whether a
country's compulsory licensing of educational materials violates
TRIPS.

43 8

3.

Some Parting Remarks to the Inevitable Critics

This proposed legal norm may please no one. For one thing, it is
not particularly clear in its application. 439 But as Carol Rose has written
in a different context, perhaps that is just the point. In some instances,
the kind of property rule that is required is one of viscosity or fuzziness
rather than clarity. 440 While clear rights of exclusion serve positive
purposes in facilitating market transactions, they can also be
dysfunctional in conditions that do not approximate market
assumptions. Viscosity serves when there is no pressing need for rapid
market transactions but where property rights may need to "be
refashioned to meet new demands."'44 1 Moreover, a basic principle of
substantive equality, once accepted, can easily be inserted into
intellectual property standard-setting organizations in a decentralized
network model of global regulation and policy-making.442
Others may view this Article as an anti-intellectual property tract.
It is not. Among other human capabilities, both Sen and Nussbaum
believe access to property and employment is central to human
supra note 55, at 161, 180.
437 I am indebted to Laurence Helfer for this example.
438 Okediji, Sustainable Access, supra note 136, at 185-86. For further suggestions for
copyright reform in the interests of developing countries, see id. at 182-86 (suggesting the
development of doctrines such as an international fair use doctrine or copyright misuse doctrine;
increasing the accountability of intellectual property institutions; establishing substantive
copyright maxima).
439 My approach is spelled out in greater detail in a forthcoming piece, where I apply the
substantive equality principle to Article 10 of the Berne Convention in order to facilitate building
educational capacity in developing countries. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property from
Below: Copyright and Capabilityfor Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
440 Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places, 114 YALE L.J. 991 (2005) (reviewing
MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003) and KAREN R. MERRILL, PUBLIC
LANDS AND POLITICAL MEANING: RANCHERS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PROPERTY

BETWEEN THEM (2002)).
441 Id. at 1006.

442 See Drahos, An Alternative Framework,supra note 8, at 21.
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flourishing. Thus, this Article is not claiming that intellectual property
globalization should be completely dismantled.
Indeed, small
entrepreneurs and traditional knowledge holders may benefit from
appropriate forms of intellectual property protection, broadly defined.
A substantive equality principle helps to reframe government
intervention as a regulatory choice, which can be accompanied by
various degrees of skepticism, depending on the interests at stake. If
anything, I am arguing against the idea of intellectual property
transcendentalism, and in favor of returning to a more nuanced,
culturally
and
contextually-sensitive,
subject-matter-sensitive
consideration of the intellectual property balance-something that is
44 3
going rapidly extinct in the context of globalization.
My effort will not please development skeptics. Under this view, it
may be no accident that the key terms in the Preamble and other TRIPS
provisions, or in the WIPO Agreement, that reference development have
been virtually ignored so far by these organizations. As Alan Story has
written, the intellectual property balance is often an "incoherent legal
fiction" in the context of development. 444 I myself share some of this
skepticism, but my own particular take toward development could be
characterized as "critical modernism" which sees the "deficiency of
development.., in its limited aims (an abundance of things) and the
timidity of its means (copying the West). ' 445 Like many others who
have observed this field over the past two decades, I am a messenger
443 Accord Lester C. Thurow, Needed- A New System of Intellectual Property Rights, HARV.
BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 94 (arguing against a one-size-fits-all system and in favor of a
regime that accounts for differences in private versus public knowledge, developed versus
developing countries, and different industries, types of knowledge, types of inventors and types of
patents); Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 68, at 17 (urging a critical examination of the
development assumption that "tradition was an impediment to-modernization, and Third World
countries were encouraged to abandon their traditional lifestyles, beliefs and value systems in
favor of 'modem' Western norms and values").
444 Story, supra note 158, at 787; id.at 780-81:
Does [J.K.] Rowling's [Harry Potter] story have the same cultural meaning in the U.K.
as the meaning that the Urdu poems have in India? And have they both been produced
for the same reasons and in even roughly similar or equal circumstances? Is it likely
that the Nigerian film will get billing equal with The Hulk in Los Angeles movie
theaters, let alone those in Lagos? And do filmmakers in the two countries have
equality in their opportunities to make films?
See also id at 767:
The purported balance or equilibrium of copyright-that is, a system that acts to
balance the interests of owners and users--does not work, as a practical matter, in this
globally unequal circumstance. The power inequality between corporate copyright
owners in rich countries and users in poorer countries of the South reveals the
theoretical incoherence of treating copyright as a balanced or balanceable system and
suggests the nonapplicability of the "balance" metaphor in international copyright
discourse.
445 PEET WITH HARTWICK, supra note 2, at 197. The authors describe the methodology as
"[c]riticize everything, convert critique into proposal, criticize the proposal, but still do
something." Id.at 198.
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delivering a fairly straightforward if unpopular message and
446
simultaneously trying to be part of the solution.
I conclude this section with two short vignettes, which both
occurred during the infamous Battle in Seattle, the third WTO
Ministerial held in Seattle in 1999.
The day after the riot police began to throw tear gas at protesters in
downtown Seattle, I was scheduled to give a talk at Plymouth
Congregational Church at Sixth and Madison for a group that espoused
a "No Patents on Life" position. (This is a position, by the way, that I
do not necessarily share.) I was anxious about going downtown,
especially to the very corner where the violence first began. However,
once I made my way to the church, I was astonished to find that it was
filled to the maximum with ordinary people: citizens who were
interested in finding out about patents and what impact they had on
global trade policy. It was standing room only and even though the
coffee was horrible (which is a sacrilege in Seattle), people stayed well
past the end of the panel discussion to continue debating the issues.
During that time, I also invited someone who was in town for the
WTO ministerial 447 to give a guest lecture in my intellectual property
class. I knew that he had been working for several years to publicize
the issue of access to patented ARV drugs in sub-Saharan Africa.
Trained as an economist, my guest speaker brought piles of
transparencies with him.
He began by showing charts with
pharmaceutical prices, government research and development support,
and firm marketing expenditures. He spoke in policy wonk language
about the problem. Finally, about halfway through his presentation, he
stopped his presentation and began to cry. My law students were
stunned. He finally explained to them that he had gotten to know so
many people in Africa through his work on this issue and many had
since died.

CONCLUSION: TURNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SWORDS INTO
DEVELOPMENT PLOWSHARES

The concept of intellectual property has been forced to encounter
the concept of development.
However, the policy levers within

446 ROSEMARY

J.

COOMBE,

THE

©ULTURAL

LIFE OF

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTIES:

AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW 43 (1998):

Like [Pierre] Schlag, I believe that "the typical supposition within the legal community
that intellectual endeavour can and must converge in 'solutions' or 'conclusions' has a
real tendency to kill thought," but I am not sufficiently rationalist to believe that it is
possible to convey an "is" without imparting an "ought."
447 For privacy reasons, I am not publishing details such as his name.

2912

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27:6

intellectual property law to address the core concerns of development
are truncated.
Intellectual property law is global in name but
frighteningly insular in practice.
If the instrumental mandate of intellectual property law is truly to
increase knowledge for positive purposes, then there must be fuller
consideration of the provision of basic needs and other global public
goods such as food security, education, and health care.
Undernourished, diseased, dying, undereducated, or extremely
impoverished populations are viewed by many as negative externalities
both qualitatively and quantitatively more serious than the danger of
under-incentivizing authors and inventors. The latter is the externality
to which intellectual property law devotes its exclusive attention. This
disjuncture over priorities has highlighted an increasingly untenable
intellectual solipsism of the intellectual property policymaking
framework, as intellectual property globalization encounters ethical
concerns associated with development.
Intellectual property has not paid attention to recent development
economics approaches that have examined the ethical and distributional
consequences of economic growth. Moreover, the capture of the
intellectual property policy debate by an absolutist discourse of
economic rights obscures the politically and socially constructed nature
of what is essentially a state regulatory intervention into what
economists have come to term a public goods problem. Intellectual
property globalization highlights the increasing imbalance between the
protection of knowledge goods via intellectual property and the
protection of other public goods, however denoted.
Within the domestic U.S. policy framework, distributional effects
of intellectual property-driven growth have not been a central concern.
This insouciance is reflected in our recent international negotiating
positions, which are widely acknowledged to be driven heavily by the
demands of certain intellectual property industry perspectives. Ignoring
other perspectives can lead, and indeed have led, to inappropriate if not
unjust legal rules. One important consequence of not connecting
intellectual property to basic needs is that substantive equality is
severely undervalued in intellectual property even though equality, as a
public good in its own right, has a critical role to play in enhancing the
efficiency norms that drive intellectual property law.
If the concept of intellectual property is truly to engage with, and
not just brush by, the concept of development, then intellectual property
globalization must incorporate a substantive equality principle within
the intellectual property decision-making framework itself.

